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EDITOR'S BRIEF 
As befits the spring volume of a publication, this issue of The Colonial Lawyer 
focuses to a large extent on land and the environment. Ms. Waymack's article 
thoroughly discusses the rapid decline of usable farmland in Virginia and in other 
parts of the country, along with possible legislative remedies. Mr. Clark's concern is 
with another resource derived from the land - our history, as discovered through the 
science of archaeology. This resource too is threatened. Ms. Munson concentrates on 
yet a third scarce and precious commodity, our drinking water. 
Mr. Murphy's article views land slightly differently. He recognizes the clash 
between certain First Amendment values and the police power of the state to effect 
zoning laws, and proposes a comprehensive analysis. 
The recent Croson case concerning minority business set-aside programs 
originated in Richmond, so Mr. Dene's and Mr. Franklin's review of the law in this 
area is of regional as well as temporal significance. 
Mr. Ehrler's article assesses the history of awards for negligent infliction of 
emotional harm, and urges caution against what he perceives as the modern-day 
potential for over-compensation of the victim. He proposes concrete tests for 
determination of such awards, and distinguishes among types of harms. 
In our final article, Mr. Thomas explores the statutory elements of murder in 
Virginia, and discusses whether different criteria for the "intent" component of the 
crime should be incorporated, as in other states. 
I wish the best of luck to Thomas P. Sotelo and Lisa J. Entress, the incoming 
senior editor and managing editor, respectively. I hope you, the scholar and 
practitioner, continue to find the articles we at The Colonial Lawyer publish interest-
ing and informative. 
Felicia L. Silber 
Senior Editor 
CROSON V. CITY OF RICHMOND 
THE EFFECT ON MINORITY BUSINESS UTILIZATION PLANS 
Joseph F. Dene 
James H. Franklin 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, the City Council of Richmond instituted the Minority Business 
Utilization Plan.1 The council heard testimony both in favor of2 and opposed t03 the 
plan. In opposing the plan, several construction trade associations stated their positions 
and fielded questions by council members on minority membership in their 
organizations.4 Generally, the groups had negligible or non-existent minority 
membership, but no evidence was presented to demonstrate that minorities had been 
discriminated against in attempting to enter such trade organizations. One group 
RICHMOND, VA. CITY CODE (1985): 
[S]ec. 12-156. Covered contracts. 
(a) All contractors awarded construction contracts by the city shall 
subcontract at least thirty (30) percent of the contract to minority 
business enterprises [MBEs]. Where the general contractor is a minority 
business this requirement shall be deemed to be met by the award .... 
[S]ec. 12-157. Rules and regulations. 
The director of the department of general services shall be authorized to 
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the requirements of this 
division, which rules and regulations shall allow waivers in those 
individual situations where a contractor can prove to the satisfaction of 
the director that the requirements herein cannot be achieved. 
[S]ec. 12-158. Division remedial; effective through June 30, 1988. 
(a) This division is remedial and is enacted for the purpose of promoting 
wider participation by minority business enterprises in the construction 
of public projects, either as general contractors or subcontractors. 
(b) This division shall expire and terminate as of the last moment of June 
30, 1988. 
2 For example, last year we had the occasion to visit one company five times 
before we were even allowed to do business with them. On our fifth 
occasion going there, a vice president said to us , well, the National 
Football League did ... not settle their dispute in one meeting, so you must 
learn to negotiate four, five, even a dozen times. We are marketing a 
standard product that is very similar to our competitors.' I'm here 
speaking for contractors. True, I am not a contractor. I do not hire 
construction people. But I would not let this opportunity pass without 
saying that if you can give us access to the enterprise system, we want it. 
We're not asking to come in as second-rate service folk. We're asking to 
come in as first-rate service folk, but to allow us access. Thirty percent 
is not one hundred percent. There is still seventy percent left over. 
Adoption 0/ Minority Business Utilization Plan: Hearing be/ore the 
Richmond City Council, April 11, 1983 [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of 
Ms. Cooper, at 17). 
3 [d. (testimony of Mr. Watts, at 19; Mr. Beck, at 31; Mr. Murphy, at 35; Mr. Shuman, 
at 37). 
4 [d. 
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testified that it actively sought to recruit minority members. s Proponents of the plan 
were the only ones to present evidence of discrimination.6 
The J.A. Croson Company submitted the low bid on a project to install stainless 
steel urinals in the City Jail of Richmond. Croson experienced difficulty in obtaining 
minority suppliers to meet the city's thirty percent MBE requirement. The city denied 
Croson's request for a waiver, and decided to rebid the project. Croson then brought 
suit against the city? 
In overturning the Minority Business Utilization Plan, the l.A. Croson v. City of 
Richmond8 decision has been regarded by the popular press9 as well as the dissent 10 as 
the end to all affirmative action programs. This is an unfair characterization. Though 
the opinion holds race-based classifications to the strict scrutiny standard, it is still 
possible for a state or local government to responsibly implement a voluntary 
affirmative action program. Although the effect on existing affirmative action 
programs may be dramatic, Croson still allows for the development of effective 
affirmative action programs. 
Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the government interest be compelling and 
that the means chosen are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 11 Voluntary 
affirmative action plans by public employers 12 must be narrowly tailored to remedy 
identified, prior governmental discrimination. 13 If a public employer is using a 
statistical approach 14 to prove prior discrimination, then the employer must use a 
restrictive view of the relevant labor market. A restrictive view would include only 
those minorities available to do a certain job, whereas a broad view would look to the 
SId. at 38 (testimony of Mr. Shuman) ("Nobody that I know of, black, Puerto Rican 
or any minority, has ever been turned down. They're actually sought after to join, to 
become part of us."). 
6 Id. at 41 (testimony of Mr. Marsh) ("There is some information, however, that I 
want to make sure we put in the record. I have been practicing law in this community 
since 1961, and I am familiar with the practices in the construction industry in this 
area, in the State, and around the nation. And I can say without equivocation, that the 
general conduct in the construction industry in this area, and the State and the nation, 
is one in which race discrimination and exclusion on the basis of race is widespread."). 
See also Hearings, at 42 (testimony of Mr. Deese). 
7 J.A. Croson v. Ci ty of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
8 Id. 
9 The Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1989, at AI, col. 5; Sacks, A Blow to Affirmative 
Action, TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 60. 
10 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 706, 739 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
11 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1977). 
12 Title VII includes in its definition of employers, "governments, governmental 
agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42 U.S.c. Sec. 2000e(a) (1982). 
13 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
14 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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percentage of minorities in the general population. In Richmond, the percentage of 
available MBEs was unknown. The Court in Croson clarified the Supreme Court's 
standard in affirmative action cases by employing a restrictive view of the relevant 
labor market. 
A public employer who chooses to use racial classification in a remedial program 
may only correct identifiable past wrongs; otherwise the scope of affirmative action 
would be unbounded. These wrongs may include passive participation by the city in the 
discriminatory process. 15 The use of racial classifications should be limited for several 
reasons. First, often the burden of racial classifications falls on non-minorities who 
have never discriminated against minorities. Even benign racial classifications violate 
the anti-discrimination principle which holds that race is never to be used in the 
decision making process. Secondly, racial classifications are a dangerous tool; it is 
difficult to determine whether a plan is remedial or motivated by stereotypes and 
favoritism. Identifying past wrongs ensures a remedial nature. Finally, affirmative 
action should be limited because such race-based decision making may well reinforce 
the very stereotypes that lead to a need for remedial measures. 
THE TWO-PRONGED STRICT SCRUTINY TEST 
FOR VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 
Under strict scrutiny, the compelling interest requirement must be established 
by a substantial, factual showing of prior governmental discrimination. 16 The means 
chosen must be "narrowly tailored" to remedy the identified discrimination. 17 Justice 
O'Connor has stated that only a statutory violation, not a constitutional violation,18 is 
sufficient to establish prior discrimination. 19 Further, it is sufficient to show that the 
government entity involved had a firm basis to believe that it had violated such a 
statute. Discrimination in fact is not required.20 
CASE LAW 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a plurality of the Supreme Court 
held that a sixteen percent set-aside for minority medical school applicants was 
15 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 720. 
16 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309. 
17 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980). 
18 A constitutional violation requires the intent to discriminate, whereas a statutory 
violation does not. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
19 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
20 [d. 
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unlawful.21 Justice Powell used strict scrutiny because even a supposedly benign racial 
classification is still suspect. Because the medical school made no showing of prior 
discrimination, the school failed to establish the compelling interest required by strict 
scrutiny review. Of the plurality in Bakke, only Justices Rehnquist and Stevens remain 
on the Court. Justice White applied a mid-tier review stipulating that the means must 
be reasonably related to an important governmental interest. 22 
Fullilove v. Klutznick 23 concerned a facial challenge to a federal program which 
sought to remedy societal discrimination 24 in the construction industry with the Public 
Works Employment Act of 1977.25 This was a temporary, ten percent set-aside program 
for minority business enterprises (MBEs).26 Congress was acting under the special 
authority of the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Despite the lack 
of showing that Congress ever discriminated against MBE's, another plurality of the 
Supreme Court approved the set-aside plan in Fullilove, deferring to Congress as a co-
equal branch of government.28 
The district and appellate courts that first heard Croson deferred to the City 
Council of Richmond as the Supreme Court had deferred to Congress in Fullilove. The 
rationale for this deference is that Congress delegated its fact-finding authority to 
localities under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.29 However, it does not necessarily follow 
that congressional deference is imputed to localities merely because ease-of-
administration concerns warrant localized fact-finding. Congress merely delegated the 
fact-finding process to the localities, which are better able to discover evidence of 
localized discrimination. However, the localities must still do a responsible job, which 
is measured by the standard commensurate with their resources. 
21 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (four of the justices held the plan unlawful on Title VII 
grounds, four justices held the plan lawful under Title VII, and Justice Powell held the 
plan unconstitutional). 
22 Justice White held that a private right of action under Title VI does not exist. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379 (White, J., concurring). 
23 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
24 The societal discrimination was detailed in legislative fact-finding committee 
reports. [d. at 459. 
25 42 U.S.C.S. Secs. 6701-6736. 
26 An MBE is defined as a company with fifty-one percent or greater minority 
ownership. 42 U.S.C.S. Sec. 6705(f)(2). 
27 U.S. CONST. art. XIV, sec. 5. 
28 Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448. 
29 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492. See also Adelman, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans 
by Public Employers: The Disparity in Standards Between Title V/l and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (1987). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens held that the Fullilove plan violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.30 This is significant because Congress was the actor, and 
challenge was only facial. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun predictably upheld 
the MBE set-aside.31 Justice White also upheld the set-aside provision.32 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board 0/ Education,33 a plurality struck down a race-based 
layoff system in a public school which maintained racial mix at the expense of the 
seniority of non-minority teachers. The school board relied on the student-teacher 
racial imbalance to justify their plan. However, the school board failed to show that 
it had ever discriminated against the teachers. 
A plurality, including Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and 
O'Connor, required a finding of prior governmental discrimination34 to initiate a 
voluntary affirmative action set-aside plan. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun 
believed that societal discrimination was a sufficient basis for race-conscious relief. 
Justice White voted against the plan in Wygant because he applied the anti-
discrimination principle reasoning that race-based layoffs were never appropriate. 
Justice Stevens used a process approach; he offered no opinion on the issue of requiring 
prior governmental discrimination for race-based relief. Justice Stevens stated in United 
States v. Paradise35 that if the prior governmental discrimination is outrageous or gross, 
then a district court judge has broad authority to issue race-conscious relief. 
To summarize, after Wygant, there are four members of the court who require a 
finding of prior governmental discrimination, three justices who do not require such a 
finding, one who allows affirmative action if the process is fair and one who has not 
addressed the issue.36 
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency. Santa Clara County, Cal.,37 Justice Brennan 
wrote for a five-member majori ty38 that prior governmental discrimination is not 
required for the government agency to be able to implement remedial preferential 
relief. The majority held that remedying job classifications which have been 
traditionally segregated is a sufficiently important interest to warrant racial 
30 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 527,552-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
31 [d. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
32 [d. at 492. 
33 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
34 [d. at 286 (Justice O'Connor's threshold was a "firm basis for belief that remedial 
action is required."). 
35 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
36 Two of the four votes for a requirement of governmental discrimination have 
been replaced on the Court by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 
37 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
38 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens were the majority. 
Justice O'Connor concurred separately. Justice Powell is no longer on the Court. 
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classifications. Stevens concurred separately to emphasize that one may use race-based 
relief to remedy not only prior governmental discrimination, but also to increase 
services to ethnic groups, to ease racial tension, and to promote diversity.39 
In Milliken,40 the Supreme Court affirmed, without an opinion, the view that 
strict scrutiny is appropriate. Thus, a state must make a material, factual finding of 
prior discrimination before the state may use racial classifications. 
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST IN CROSON 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White, Kennedy, and Scalia 
require a showing of prior governmental discrimination.41 In Croson, Kennedy is 
squarely aligned with O'Connor and Rehnquist. Kennedy decided that strict scrutiny 
is the appropriate standard of review in lieu of an absolute ban on preferences to non-
victims.42 White also has reaffirmed his opinion that a finding of prior governmental 
discrimination is required.43 Thus, after Croson, there are five Justices who require a 
finding of prior governmental discrimination. 
It was the stated purpose of the Richmond set-aside plan to be remedia1.44 The 
Court found that the city's reliance on Congressional findings, statements of council 
members, the lack of participation of minorities in trade associations, and the level of 
participation of MBE's in the public contracting industry45 was insufficient to show 
that Richmond had discriminated against MBEs. There was no direct evidence that 
the City of Richmond had ever discriminated against a minority contractor.46 Societal 
discrimination cannot be said to proximately cause the few number of MBE's because 
of the pervasive non-racial factors. Thus, a statistical disparity is insufficient to 
establish a remedial purpose in light of pervasive neutral explanations for the disparity. 
39 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647 (Justice Scalia favored a requirement of prior 
governmental discrimination. Justice White is no longer aligned with Brennan, Marshall 
and Blackmun, but rather now requires a material, factual finding of prior 
governmental discrimination. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and White are now opposed 
by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Kennedy's position is critical.). 
40 Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987). 
41 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 706. 
42 [d. at 734. 
43 [d. at 706. 
44 RICHMOND, V A. CITY CODE Sec. 12-158(a) (1985). 
45 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 9. 
46 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 707. 
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LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS IN CROSON 
The second prong of the strict scrutiny test asks if the classification is the least 
restrictive means available.47 Several components of the set-aside plan in Croson fail 
this test. The city council could have taken less restrictive steps to achieve the same 
goals. The plan could have been more narrowly tailored in several respects: if 
nonracial means had been utilized; if stricter measures had been used to define eligible 
minorities and only minorities from the Richmond area had been eligible; if the MBE 
participation percentage had conformed with previous Court opinions; and if a waiver 
provision had been incorporated to ensure that only MBEs from disadvantaged groups 
benefitted from the program. The city of Richmond seems to have been aware of 
the barriers MBEs face when attempting to enter the construction industry. Such 
barriers include inability to meet bonding requirements, lack of capital, unfamiliarity 
with bidding procedures and problems resulting from the lack of a track record.48 
Instituting a race-neutral program to ease these requirements for fledgling construction 
contractors would have most likely resulted in a disparate impact benefiting black 
construction companies. Simplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding 
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all 
races would open the public contracting market to all those who have suffered the 
effects of past societal discrimination or neglect.49 
Thus, such a plan would enable MBEs to compete with establiShed, non-minority 
companies and develop the capital, experience and business skills necessary to remain 
competitive. However, the City Council of Richmond does not appear to have 
considered such a race-neutral plan.50 Instead, the council opted for an affirmative 
action program, centered on explicit racial classifications. If a non-racial solution to 
the problem was ignored, the city of Richmond did not take the "least restrictive" route 
to achieve its aims. Had it attempted a non-racial approach and failed, then perhaps 
an explicit racial classification may have been appropriate. 
The city of Richmond's plan specified minority groups that were eligible to 
participate in the set-aside program. The list was identical to the one used by Congress 
in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,51 the federal set-aside legislation 
validated in Fullilove. Congress was creating a program which was national in scope; 
it appropriately included various minority groups such as Hispanics, Aleut, and 
Eskimos. In Richmond, though, the Eskimo and Aleutian populations are negligible, if 
they exist at all; it is quite unlikely that the city government or the local construction 
47 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480. 
48 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 708. 
49 [d. at 729. 
50 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 1. 
51 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 455 (The list included citizens who are: •... Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.·). 
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trade associations discriminated against either one of these groups. By including groups 
that were never victimized by the local government or even Richmond society in 
general, the ordinance's remedial purpose is impugned.52 This gives an unfair 
preference to those groups based solely on race. 
Additionally, the Richmond plan lacks any type of geographical limitation. 
Thus, minorities from anywhere else in the country receive an advantage over local non-
minority contractors, even though they had never been discriminated against in the 
Richmond area. Over-inclusion of groups that are not the victims of discrimination 
negates the remedial character of the set-aside. 
The third reason that the plan failed the "least restrictive means" criterion is that 
the ordinance set a thirty percent requirement for minority participation in city 
construction contracts.53 The plan roughly split the difference between the percentage 
of blacks in the city population, about fifty percent, and the percentage of MBEs who 
received city contracts,less than one percent, to achieve a figure of thirty percent. This 
is the formula used by Congress in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.54 
Despite the holding in Fulli/ove, the Court has said that this is not the proper formula 
to determine a percentage set-aside: "But where special qualifications are necessary, the 
relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must 
be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.,,55 Because 
construction contractors possess special qualifications, the total percentage of minorities 
in the general population seems to be irrelevant in determining percentages for set-
aside programs.56 
Though the city council followed the congressional set-aside plan validated in 
Fullilove in many respects, it did not do so completely. The city provided a waiver in 
the event minority contractors were unavailable to fulfill a city contract.57 Unlike 
Congress' plan however, " ... there is no inquiry into whether or not the particular MBE 
seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of past discrimination by the 
52 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728. 
53 RICHMOND, V A. CITY CODE Sec. 12-156(a) (I985). 
54 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 465. 
55 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725 (citing Hazelwood School District v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299 
(1977) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616 
(1987». 
56 The dissent makes a very compelling argument to the contrary. If Blacks have 
been excluded from the construction industry then the applicable figure to examine in 
calculating a quota is the percentage of blacks in the general population. This assumes 
that if there had not been discrimination, then blacks would have a market share 
approximately equal to their percentage in the general population. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 
746. 
57 RICHMOND, VA. CITY CODE Sec. 12-157 (1985). 
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city or prime contractors.-58 Such a flexible waiver provision would have safeguarded 
the remedial goals of the plan and innocent parties would not have been required to 
shoulder unnecessary burdens. Furthermore, such a waiver would have minimized the 
over-inclusion of groups that were never the victims of discrimination in Richmond. 
Finally, the Richmond ordinance had a significantly longer duration, five 
years,59 than the plan in Fullilove. Though the Court has not set a specific limit on the 
duration of affirmative action programs, the more brief the program the less restrictive 
it appears. However, the duration of set-aside plans does not appear to be a major 
component in the least restrictive means segment of the strict scrutiny test. 
AN ALTERNATIVE MBE UTILIZATION PLAN 
A state or local government should first consider the use of facially neutral 
means.60 A facially neutral law, on the Croson facts, could be designed to have a 
disparate impact on minorities and thus would address the bonding problem, working 
capital deficiencies, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, and the lack of a track 
record often facing new minority firms. A facially neutral approach additionally has 
the advantage of not being over-inclusive. Furthermore, because no racial classification 
is used, the plan does not need to pass strict scrutiny tests and the legislation is less 
likely to be challenged. 
To increase the level of MBE participation in municipal contracts, a city should 
determine if there is a firm basis for belief that there was local governmental 
discrimination. The Court has held that if there has been governmental discrimination, 
then race specific measures are permissible.61 If no governmental discrimination exists, 
then nonracial measures must be used.62 
The first step to ameliorating the discrimination is identification of the wrong 
that is to be remedied. Then remedial measures should be narrowly tailored so as not 
to unnecessarily trammel the interests of non-minorities. In a set-aside program with 
goals similar to those in Croson, the plan should be limited to those groups who have 
been victims of discrimination. 
The percentages in a model plan would reflect the percentage of available MBEs 
in the relevant market and not the percentage of minorities in the general population. 
The number of available MBEs should increase as new MBEs enter the market to 
compete with existing MBEs. If the MBEs are not working at full capacity, there will 
always be more available MBEs than participating MBEs. As the percentage of available 
58 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729. 
59 RICHMOND, V A. CITY CODE Sec. 12-158(b) (1985). 
60 See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728. 
61 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; Milliken, 834 F.2d at 583. 
62 See supra, note 63. 
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MBEs increases, their statutory share of the market could rise with them. This increase 
could continue to a reasonable level such as half way between the current level of MBE 
participation and the percentage of minorities in the population, as long as the level was 
predetermined. The minority percentage in the population would provide an upper 
limit. After this maximum point has been reached or the statutory time limit63 has 
expired, the statutory percentages would symmetrically64 decrease. The MBEs would 
gradually lose their government preference and thus compete in the general construction 
market. 
The model plan would also be limited to a geographic area equivalent to the 
relevant market. This geographic limitation serves a fairness function; it is patently 
unfair for remote, non-victims to have a preference over non-minority, non-
discriminatory contractors. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has established that strict scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard of review in affirmative action cases. Even though set-aside programs are 
subject to strict review, they are still viable. By responsibly establishing a firm basis 
for belief of prior governmental discrimination and by narrowly tailoring the steps to 
remedy that discrimination, a city or state government may still implement an effective 
affirmative action program. 
63 The model plan should have a time limit at which the predetermined point will 
be considered to have been reached, whereupon the set-aside is decreased. 
64 "Symmetrically" means that the percentage will decrease by the same amounts and 
over the same time periods as it was increased. 
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AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION TECHNIQUES IN VIRGINIA 
Jacqueline Waymack 
INTRODUCTION 
Large amounts of agricultural land within the United States have been irreversibly 
converted to residential, transportation, commercial and other urban uses within the 
last two decades. The total number of acres devoted to farming has declined nationwide 
in the past twenty years.' Confronted with statistics showing a dramatic shift in land 
use, many states implemented legislation aimed at preventing the loss of farmland. In 
the early 1980's, the U.S. Department of Agriculture conducted a large study of 
farmland conversion and the programs that various states had adopted to combat the 
loss of such lands. The National Agricultural Lands Study concluded that agricultural 
lands were disappearing at a dramatic rate across the nation and proposed that states 
adopt comprehensive growth management programs to halt the rapid loss of 
economically and environmentally important lands.2 
Land use patterns in Virginia. have followed the national trend of decreasing 
agricultural land use and increasing residential and urban land uses.3 The amount of 
land devoted to agricultural production has steadily declined since 1960. In 1960 
Virginia had 13.5 million acres of farmland; in 1970, 11.4 million acres; in 1975, 10.1 
million acres; in 1980, 9.8 million acres; in 1988 9.6 million acres.4 Conversion of 
agricultural land in the eastern part of Virginia has occurred more rapidly than in other 
regions and accounts for most of the shift in land use within the state.5 
Many factors contribute to the conversion of farmland. Urban growth pressure, 
farm profitability, land value, taxes, government programs, regulations and incentives, 
community expectations and personal decisions about work and retirement all affect the 
conversion process.6 As urban growth spreads into the countryside, land values increase 
, REGIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, 
THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND: A REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 32 (1981) [hereinafter NALS]. In the eight year period 
from 1967-1975, some 23.4 million acres of agricultural land converted to non-farm uses. 
The highest conversion rates occurred in the Northeast, Southeast and Appalachian 
regions; 2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE I (1982) [hereinafter 1982 CENSUS]. The total number 
of farms in the U.S. declined by 0.7%; 27.98 million acres of farmland were taken out 
of production from 1978 to 1982. Statistics for land conversion from 1982-1988 are 
currently unavailable. The 1988 AGRICULTURAL CENSUS will be available in 1989. 
2 NALS, supra note 1. The study projected that a 60% to 85% increase in demand for 
U.S. agricultural goods would occur in the next 20 years. 
3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, SOIL CONSER V A TION SER VICE, VIRGINIA 
NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY DATA 7 (1982) [hereinafter VNRID]. 
4 Statistics provided by the Va. Agric. Statistics Service, Richmond, Virginia. 
5 VNRID, supra note 3, at 7. 
6 NALS, supra note I, at 16. 
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and investors begin buying land for development. When scattered development occurs, 
farming becomes more expensive and farm expansion more difficult. Public services 
such as water and sewer facilities extend into an area to meet the needs of new residents 
and enable the area to support more development. Public agencies take land by eminent 
domain for highways, parks, powerlines and other facilities necessary to support the 
influx of people. Real estate taxes increase because of these new public services. 
Consequently, some farmers sell their lands as a result of development pressure; others 
join the bandwagon in the belief that agriculture in their area is doomed? 
A majority of states have implemented some type of farmland preservation program 
in order to protect important farmlands from development. These programs often 
include a variety of statutes aimed at making farm areas less attractive to developers, 
easing the burdens of development for farmers, and preventing farmland from being 
converted to non-agricultural use.8 This article examines the agricultural preservation 
efforts in Virginia. It analyzes five pieces of legislation, comments on their 
effectiveness and suggests some changes that would better protect important agricultural 
land from conversion. 
FARMLAND PRESER V A TION IN VIRGINIA 
By 1981, Virginia had implemented several pieces of legislation aimed at preserving 
agricultural land within the state. These include differential tax assessment for 
farmlands, agricultural districting, right to farm legislation, agricultural zoning, and 
a farmland preservation act.9 Overall, these measures reflect a fairly conservative 
approach to farm preservation. Each of these acts has a policy provision that affirms 
the state's commitment to the preservation of farmland as an economic and 
environmental resource. Nevertheless, the main effect of these acts is to ease the burden 
of encroaching development on farmers while providing some relief from governmental 
interference to one sector of the state's economy. 
These programs do provide some incentives for farmers to keep farming, but they do 
not prevent farmland from being converted to more intensive uses. The voluntary 
nature of the tax relief and agricultural districting acts limits their potential to prevent 
conversion of farmland. The ambiguities and loopholes present in the right-to-farm 
legislation and the restricted scope of the preservation of prime agricultural act limit 
the value of these two acts as tools for farmland preservation. Agricultural zoning 
provides an effective tool to restrict the amount of farmland eligible for conversion, 
but its implementation remains in the hands of local governing bodies that may have 
7 Jd. at 35-37. 
8 Jd. at 37-38. 
9 The tax assessment statute was enacted in 1971; the agricultural and forestland 
districting act in 1977; the right to farm act in 1981; the zoning statute in 1950; and the 
preservation of prime agricultural land act in 1981. 
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little interest in preservation. However, they do form a good foundation on which to 
build. 
DIFFERENTIAL TAX ASSESSMENT 
Designed to correct the increase in land value that accompanies encroaching 
development, differential tax assessment permits the farmer to have his land appraised 
at its agricultural use value instead of its fair market value. lt is the most common 
form of tax relief that states have adopted to further the goal of farmland 
preservation.10 There are three different types of differential tax assessments: 
preferential, restrictive agreement and deferred.11 Some states have adopted 
preferential tax assessment programs in which eligible land is assessed at its use value 
and no penalty attaches for conversion of the land to a non-eligible use. 12 Few states 
have adopted restrictive agreement programs. In order to obtain differential assessment 
under this type of tax relief program,landowners must enter into a contract prohibiting 
the conversion of their land. 13 A majority of states, including Virginia, have deferred 
tax assessment laws. Under this type of statute, penalties attach to the withdrawal of 
land from the use value assessment program. 14 
~, 
Many localities in Virginia have adopted a use value taxation scheme pursuant to 
the deferral tax assessment statute.15 Participation by both localities and individuals 
is voluntary. Localities must pass ordinances adopting the tax relief measure and 
individual landowners must apply to the local assessing officer in order to receive any 
tax relief.16 A farmowner can receive special assessment of his land and the structures 
present on the property. Qualifying structures include any structure, except farm 
houses, which is used in connection with the land's special use. 17 Qualifying land must 
meet several criteria before the special tax assessment can apply. 
First, the land must be devoted to either agricultural, forestal or open space use. 
The determination of the land's use is the responsibility of the Director of the 
10 K. MEYER, D. PEDERSON, N. THORSON & J. DAVIDSON, AGRICULTURAL 
LA W 853 (1985) [hereinafter TEXT]. Every state except Kansas has some program for 
reducing the tax burden on farmers. 
11 NALS, supra note I, at 18. 
12 See NALS, supra note I, at 19; TEXT, supra note 10, at 853 n.1. Seventeen states 
have preferential tax assessment, including Florida, Iowa and thc Dakotas. 
13 See NALS, supra note I, at 18; TEXT, supra note 10, at 853 n.1. California and 
New Hampshire have restrictive agreements. 
14 TEXT, supra note 10, at 853 n.1. 
15 Statistics were unavailable for the number of acres in the states which receive 
use value taxation. A majority of, but not all, counties have land use taxation. 
16 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 58.1-3234 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
17 [d. at Sec. 58.1-3236(8)(1984). 
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Department of Conservation and Historical Resources and the Commissioner of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services.18 The special tax assessment is also available for 
lands which are part of an agricultural or forest district. 19 In 1987, the legislature 
amended the tax code to provide that, regardless of any deferred tax assessment 
ordinances, local governments can avoid the application of use value assessment by 
designating land in certain areas as ineligible for special assessment.20 Thus, a locality 
interested in developing a certain area can tax agricultural, forest and open space land 
in that area at fair market value. This frustrates the purpose of deferred taxation 
(preventing conversion, or at least easing the burdens of development) by allowing 
localities to deny tax relief whenever they desire development of an area. While this 
provision does give more flexibility to the locality for guiding growth, it certainly 
weakens the act as a land preservation tool. 
In addition, the land must be a certain size in order to qualify for special 
assessment. Land devoted to agricultural, horticultural or open space use must consist 
of at least five acres; land in forestal use must cover at least twenty acres.21 Except for 
properties divided by public right of way, land must be in contiguous parcels in order 
to satisfy these minimum acre requirements. 22 Because the number of small farms (1-
180 acres) is growing in Virginia,23 such a minimum acre requirement allows more 
farmers to benefit from the special tax assessment. 
Virginia uses the capitalization of income method to determine the use value of 
qualified land. Each year the State Land Evaluation Advisory Committee [SLEAC] 
establishes a range of suggestive values for land in each soil classification based on the 
productive earning power of the property as it is used for agricultural, horticultural or 
open space purposes. SLEAC publishes these value ranges for the counties and cities 
which use them as a guide to determine the actual value of land within their 
jurisdiction. To define the productive earning power, the Committee either looks to the 
capitalization of the warranted cash rents of the specific property or the incomes of 
similar properties in the locality.24 
The deferred tax assessment statute provides for penalties for misstatements made 
in applications, changes in the use of the land, failures to report such changes and for 
applying for and receiving a rezoning of the land to a more intensive, nonqualifying 
18 'd. at Sec. 58.1-3240 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
19 'd. at Sec. 58.1-3231 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
20 'd. at Sec. 58.1-3231. 
21 'd. at Sec. 58.1-3233(2) (1984 & Supp. 1988). Open space land in cities must be at 
least two acres. 
22 'd. at Sec. 58.1-3233(2) (Supp. 1988). Recorded subdivision lots owned by the same 
person cannot be included to meet the minimum acre requirement. 
23 1982 CENSUS, supra note 1, at Part 46 at VIII. From 1978-1982, the number of 
farms that have 1-180 acres of land have increased by 2289 farms. 
24 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 58.1-3239 (1984). 
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use. Persons who either make material misstatements in their applications or who fail 
to report changes in land use are responsible for any taxes which would have been 
levied otherwise. If a landowner makes a material misstatement with an intent to 
d.efraud, then she must pay an additional penalty of 100% of the unpaid taxes.25 While 
the statute lists some things that constitute material misstatements, it does not provide 
any examples of reportable changes in use. 
A penalty of additional taxes attaches if a landowner either changes the use of her 
land so that it no longer qualifies for special assessment or requests and succeeds in 
having that land rezoned to a more extensive use which is not compatible with an 
agricultural use.26 This additional tax is known as a roll-back tax and is equal to the 
difference between the tax which the landowner would have paid had the land not been 
under the special assessment program during the past five years plus simple interest.27 
An owner must report a change in use or a rezoning of her land within 60 days after 
it occurs to the local commissioner of the revenue or the assessing officer. 
Once the commissioner has determined the amount of the roll-back tax, the 
landowner has 30 days to payor she is assessed an additional penalty.28 If rezoned land 
is later zoned for agricultural use, it is not eligible for special land use assessment for 
three years. However, if the land is taken by eminent domain or a change in ownership 
occurs, no such penalty accrues.29 Thus, a farmer can sell her land to someone else who 
then can develop that land without suffering the withdrawal penalty. Those 
landowners with good tax advice avoid the penalties for developing their lands. 
While tax relief for land devoted to agricultural uses is widely viewed as an 
important method for preserving farmland, it does not prevent farmland from being 
converted to other uses.3D The underlying assumption of differential tax assessment 
legislation, that tax burdens have a great influence over whether a parcel of land is 
converted to nonagricultural use, is faulty.31 Because a multitude of factors influence 
the conversion of land to nonagricultural uses, decreasing the tax burden for farmers 
may have little impact on whether land remains in agricultural use.32 Because of the 
voluntary nature of the land use taxation program and the weak penalties for 
25 [d. at Sec. 58.1-3238 (1984). 
26 [d. at Sec. 58.1-3237(A)(D) (Supp. 1988). 
27 [d. at Sec. 58.1-3237(B) (Supp. 1988). 
28 [d. at Sec. 58.l-3237(C) (Supp. 1988). 
29 [d. at Secs. 58.1-3237(C), 58.1-3234 (Supp. 1988). 
30 H. GAMBLE, O. SAUERLENDER & R. DOWNING, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACT 
139, THE PENNSYLVANIA FARMLAND AND FORESTLAND ASSESSMENT ACT (1977), quoted in 
TEXT, supra note 10, at 852. 
31 Dunford, A Survey 01 Property Tax Reliel Programs lor the Retention 01 
Agricultural and Open Space Lands, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 675, 689 (1980). 
32 [d. at 689-90. 
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withdrawal, the act affects the preservation of land only to the extent that farmers find 
it economically worthwhile to participate in it.33 Thus, even though the special tax 
assessment in Virginia may postpone conversion of lands to some future time, it is not 
a preservation measure; instead it operates to offset the tax burden caused by 
approaching development in order to keep farming economically viable for those 
farmers who want to farm.34 
The differential tax assessment actually shifts the tax burden to other groups within 
the taxing jurisdiction.35 Local governments may increase the taxes of nonagricultural 
taxpayers in order to compensate for the loss of income from farmers.36 Such tax 
shifting may erode the tax base of rural areas, adversely affecting the quality and 
a vailability of services within those areas. This loss of tax base problem could affect 
the willingness of localities to adopt land use assessment ordinances. Indeed, poorer 
counties, such as Charles City, have no special assessment for farmland. 
AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTING: THE AGRICULTURE AND FOREST ACT 
Virginia has also adopted agricultural districting in order to keep land in 
agricultural use. Districting emphasizes long term preservation of farmland through 
voluntary compliance and local initiative.37 It provides an incentive for farmers to 
continue farming by conferring benefits to those who voluntarily place their land in 
special districts. Those lands included in districts are taxed at use value and protected 
from government activities aimed at development.38 
Currently, Virginia has 547,095.71 acres in 175 agricultural districts located in 
twenty-two counties and one town across the state.39 The acres included in the 
33 [d. at 695. 
34 NALS, supra note I, at 37-38. 
35 Dunford, supra note 31, at 692. 
36 [d. at 693. 
37 Meyers, The Legal Aspects of Agricultural Districting, 55 IND. L.J. I, 2 (1979-80), 
reprinted in 2 AGRIC. L.J. 627, 628 (1980). 
38 [d. 
39 Statistics provided by the Virginia Department of Agriculture & Consumer 
Services, Richmond, Va. Accomack Co. has the most number of acres in districts--
83,702.43 acres in 22 districts; Fauquier Co. has the second most--8I,988.20 acres in 9 
districts; Loudoun Co. has the third most--66,819.91 in 17 districts. Fairfax Co. has 2 
districts with 1,261.36 acres and 23 local districts with 2,646.75 acres. Blacksburg is the 
only town that has any districts; it has 2,529.44 acres in I district. Remaining counties: 
Albemarle (44,962.52 acres in 13 districts), Clarke (24,959.40 acres in 2 districts), 
Culpeper (45,736 acres in 13 districts), Frederick (15,013.58 acres in I district), Green 
(23,597.43 acres in 7 districts), Hanover (14,301.86 acres in 8 districts), Isle of Wight 
(8,191 acres in 2 districts), James City (18,209.30 acres in 12 districts), King William 
(3,729.95 acres in 5 districts), Madison (607.07 acres in 1 district), Montgomery (47,487.91 
acres in 11 districts), New Kent (15,241.96 acres in 8 districts), Orange (668 acres in I 
district), Prince William (3,466.83 acres in 2 districts), Rappahannock (16,841.12 acres 
in 9 districts), Shenandoah (9,702.75 acres in 4 district), Tazwell (7,362 acres in 1 
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agricultural districts comprise only 0.06% of the state's farmland. Counties in the 
northern-northwestern region of the state have the most districts, while counties in the 
southern portion have few, if any. In the Tidewater region, only James City and Isle 
of Wight have land in districts and both of these are on the outskirts of the Hampton 
Roads sprawl. In the Richmond-Petersburg area, only Hanover and New Kent Counties 
have land in districts and these two remain primarily agricultural. In southwest 
Virginia, Tazwell and Montgomery Counties have districts; on the eastern shore, 
Accomack County has over 83,700 acres in agricultural districts.40 
The state purpose in enacting the districting statute is the protection and 
enhancement of agricultural and forest land as a viable segment of the state's economy 
and a valuable economic and environmental resource.41 The Act declares that it is a 
state policy to protect and conserve these lands as important "ecological resources which 
provide essential open spaces for clean air sheds, watershed protection, wildlife habitat, 
as well as for aesthetic purposes.,,42 However, the provisions within the Act are directed 
toward the economic aspect of land preservation and do little to implement the policy 
of ecological protection. Like the tax relief statute, this act focuses on offsetting the 
burdens caused by encroaching development rather than preventing the conversion of 
farmland. 
The act applies only to land which has been, is currently or can be retained for 
agricultural or forestland production.43 While land which is not currently devoted to 
production may be included in a district, it may not receive some of the benefits 
relating to the restriction of governmental activity. Likewise, land devoted to 
nonagricultural use does not receive any benefits under the act. The statute does not 
offer any preservation methods to counties that want to preserve open space lands from 
private development or government interference. 
Districts can only exist in the localities which have adopted an ordinance permitting 
their creation.44 The absence of such ordinances may account for the lack of districts 
in certain areas, especially those which faced strong development pressures in the early 
1980's. Because some local interest in the districting program must exist before a 
governing body will adopt it, farmers and members of local governing bodies in areas 
of high farm conversion rates probably were not interested in establishing districts 
when the state adopted the districting act. Likewise, rural areas not confronted with 
approaching development or those wishing to attract development to boost the local 
economy may have had little interest in implementing such a program. 
district) and Warren (8,069 acres in I district). 
40 [d. 
41 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-1507 (1981 & SuPp. 1988). 
42 [d. 
43 [d. at Secs. 15.1-1508 (Supp. 1988), 15.1-1511(C) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
44 [d. at Sec. 15.1-1511 (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
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Once a locality does pass such an ordinance, landowners can submit applications to 
the local governing body requesting to create a district.45 The locality provides the 
application forms and may charge a fee, which cannot exceed the cost of processing or 
$300, whichever is less.46 Thus the base of the districting program rests on the 
willingness of farmers with significant landholdings to request that their lands form 
a district. 
The Virginia statute requires that each district contain at least 200 acres of land in 
a contiguous parce1.47 The land may be owned by one or more persons.48 Land not 
contiguous with the 200 acre core may be included in the district if it lies within one 
mile of the district's boundary or if it borders on non-core land within the district.49 
A district may extend between two localities provided that both governing bodies grant 
approval of it. 50 The 200 acre limit may not be sufficient for the needs of Virginia 
farmers. The average size farm in Virginia is 196 acres and the number of smaller 
farms (1-180 acres) is growing.51 A lower limit would provide more protection, 
especially for counties where development has swallowed most of the farmland. 
Once the local governing body receives a districting application, the planning 
committee provides public notice, holds hearings on the matter and makes 
recommendations to the local governing body.52 The land may be evaluated through the 
Virginia Land Evaluation and Site Assessment System [LESA] or a local LESA system 
if one exists.53 The statute lists several factors which the committee should consider 
when evaluating land. These include the agricultural or forestal significance of land 
to be included in and adjacent to the district, the presence of any such significant land 
which is not in agricultural or forestal use, the extent of other uses for land in and 
around the district, local development patterns, needs and zoning regulations and the 
environmental benefits of creating a district.54 Once the local governing body receives 
45 Id. at Sec. 15.1-1511. 
46 Id. at Sec. 15.1-1509 (1981 & Supp. 1988). A sample application is provided in the 
statute. 
47 Id. at Sec. 15.1-1511(D) (Supp. 1988). Earlier versions of the statute required a 
500 acre minimum. 
48 Id. at Sec. 15.1-1511 (A) (Supp. 1988). Earlier versions of the act had a 3500 acre 
limit for anyone owner. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 1982 CENSUS, supra note I, at Part 46 at VIII. Statistics on the average farm size 
provided by the Va. Agric. Statistics Service. 
52 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-1511(B)(I) (Supp. 1988). 
53 [d. at Sec. 15.1-1511(C) (Supp. 1988). 
54 [d. at Sec. 15.l-1511(C). 
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the committee's final report, it holds a public hearing and may pass an ordinance to 
create a district. The locality may condition the creation of a district on landowners' 
obtaining governmental approval before land in the district can be used more 
intensively or for a more intensive nonagricultural use.55 After the creation of a 
district, the local governing may adopt incentive programs which promote certain land 
use and conservation in a district. 
Districts may be reviewed no less than four years and no more than ten years after 
their establishment.56 If lands are withdrawn from the district so that it no longer has 
a 200 acre core or if annexation of the land occurs, the districting ordinance remains 
in effect until the date set for review.57 Land may be added to a district by following 
the creation procedure.58 
Landowners may remove land from the district by filing a written notice to the local 
governing body. If the notice is filed at the time of the district review, the landowner 
must submit written notice to the governing body before it has acted with regard to that 
review.59 If a landowner files a notice at any other time, the planning committee must 
make recommendations regarding the request and public hearings must be held on the 
matter.60 If the governing body rejects the landowner's request, the landowner has a 
right of appeal de novo to the circuit court.61 If the governing body approves the 
withdrawal, the land is subject to roll-back taxes and to the government actions that 
were restricted while the land was in the district.62 If a landowner dies, his heirs can 
withdraw the land by filing written notice to the governing body within two years after 
the owner's death.63 Thus, withdrawal from the program is quite easy. 
The creation of agricultural or forestal districts confers two general benefits to 
landowners: land use tax assessment and the restriction of government activities. Land 
within a district automatically qualifies for use-value tax assessment if it meets the 
requirements of the deferred assessment statute.64 Land within a district must be 
devoted to an agricultural or forestal use in order for the special assessment to apply. 
Unfortunately, the same problems of ineffectiveness and tax shifting arise in this 
55 'd. at Sec. 15.1-1511(0). 
56 'd. at Sec. 15.1-1511(F) (Supp. 1988). 
57 'd. at Secs. 15.1-1511(D), 15.1-1513(F) (Supp. 1988). 
58 'd. at Sec. 15.1-1511(E) (Supp. 1988). 
59 'd. at Sec. 15.l-1511(F). 
60 'd. at Sec. 15.1-1513(A) (Supp. 1988). 
61 'd. 
62 'd. at Secs. 15.1-1513(B) (1981 & Supp. 1988), 15.1-15I3(C) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
63 'd. at Sec. 15.1-1513(D) (Supp. 1988). 
64 'd. at Sec. 15.1-1512(A) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
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portion of the districting act that appears in the tax relief statute. Thus, one of the two 
major incentives for farmers to place their lands in districts does not effect the Act's 
main goal of preservation. 
The more important benefit derived from placing land in a district is the restriction 
on governmental activity. The statute ostensibly limits actions of both local and state 
governments. A locality cannot enact ordinances which would unreasonably restrict or 
regulate farming, farm structures or forestry practices in a district unless such 
regulation has a direct relationship to public health and safety.65 However, because the 
Act only prohibits a locality from unreasonable regulation, it adds very little to existing 
limitations on governmental power.66 Indeed, the limitation merely provides a 
functional definition of the locality's police power.67 
The Act also provides that local water, sewer, electricity or non-farm/non-forest 
drainage districts cannot impose benefit assessments or special tax levies on land which 
is primarily devoted to agricultural or forestland production within a district.68 This 
limitation specifically focuses on inhibiting the urbanization process by relieving the 
developmental pressures produced when localities finance public improvements in their 
areas through special assessments.69 However, by including comprehensive planning at 
the district formation stage, the act has provided some leeway for farmers who wish to 
obtain an increase in public services in order to intensify their farm operations.1o 
Additionally, localities can maintain special assessments for one-half acre lots 
surrounding dwellings or non-farm structures within a district. 71 Before the exemption 
from special levies attaches, land must meet a use requirement even though it is already 
included in a district.n Such a requirement is consistent with the statute's policy of 
preservation of land as an economic resource, but does not encourage preservation of 
land for environmental purposes. 
The statute restricts the state's exercise of eminent domain over lands within 
districts and establishes their maintenance as a policy of state agencies. If any state 
agency intends to take land within a district by eminent domain,73 it must notify the 
65 [d. at Sec. 15.1-1512(B) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
66 Meyers, supra note 38, at 643. 
67 [d. 
68 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-1512(E) (1981 &Supp. 1988). 
69 Meyers, supra note 38, at 643. 
70 [d. 
71 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-1512(E). 
n [d. at Secs. 15.1-1512(E), 15.1-1508(5) (1981 & Supp. 1988). "Agriculturally 
significant land" is land which either has produced agricultural or forest products or 
is currently producing or considered important farmland. 
73 [d. at Sec. 15.1-1512(0) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
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local governing body. The locality then has 30 days to review the state's proposed 
action. If the locality determines that the action is contrary to state or local policy, it 
can order the agency to wait an additional 60 days before taking any action. During 
that period, the locality holds public hearings and issues a final order concerning the 
proposed action. If that final order decrees that the agency may not act because such 
actions would adversely affect state or local policy, the agency may appeal the order in 
the circuit court having jurisdiction over the district. 74 These express procedural 
limitations on the state's exercise of eminent domain appear to be a significant tool for 
preserving farmland and guiding growth in rural areas.75 
While the eminent domain protection for land in a district effectively prevents land 
from converting to certain intensified uses, it applies only in the limited context of 
state action so that it only protects against conversion which a landowner probably 
would oppose anyway. While this provides a good benefit for landowners who do not 
want their lands to become highways, it does not address the loss of farmland caused 
by economic development. The act does not offer farmers faced with increased 
development pressures any incentives, other than the threat of roll-back taxes, to keep 
their lands in agricultural uses. Instead of actually preventing conversion of farmland, 
forestland or open space land, the act merely provides a few incentives to the state's 
agricultural economy mainly by limiting state actions which interfere with lands 
devoted to production. 
The state's policy provision is unlikely to grant farmers any additional rights or to 
protect against farmland conversion.16 While state agencies are required to encourage 
the maintenance of farming and forestry within districts,n they are not prohibited from 
adversely affecting the land within a district.18 Nevertheless, the existence of state 
policy to maintain farming in districts could be significant during a judicial review of 
an agency's actions.19 
RIGHT-TO-FARM ACT 
Virginia's right to farm act insulates farmers from nuisance liability in certain 
situations, thus, protecting some agricultural land from conversion.80 It focuses on 
alleviating the problem of land-use conflict that arises when development borders on 
74 Id. 
75 Meyers, supra note 38, at 644. 
76 Id. 
n VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-1512(C) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
78 Meyers, supra note 38, at 644. 
79 [d. 
80 Grossman & Fisher, Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits 011 Nuisance 
Actions Against Farmers, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 118 (1983). 
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agricultural production areas. When more and more people move into farm areas, 
residential uses of land begin to conflict with agricultural operations.81 The new 
residents object to the noise, smells, pesticides, dust and other by-products associated 
with farms.82 These people express their discontent in the form of nuisance suits or by 
influencing the local governing body to pass an ordinance which declares the farm 
operation a nuisance. Indeed, nuisance suits have been a problem for Virginia 
farmers.83 Defending against nuisance actions and challenging ordinances is expensive 
for farmers and if they lose, they may have to halt their farm operations. The Act can 
protect farmers from becoming victims of urban sprawl only by barring nuisance claims 
and voiding local ordinances in this situation.84 
The Act does not protect farmers either when their rural neighbors bring nuisance 
actions or when the conflicting residential use existed prior to the farm operation. It 
only applies when new residents arrive in the area and initiate actions against pre-
existing operations. Thus, the statute codifies the "coming to the nuisance" defense. The 
Act states that a court cannot declare an agricultural operation a nuisance if it has been 
operating for one year prior to a change in condition in that locality.8S Little doubt 
exists that the legislature intended the change-in-condition clause to refer to urban 
sprawl; the act's policy declaration specifically identifies the extension of 
nonagricultural land uses into agricultural area as the cause of farm nuisance suits. In 
an interpretation of a similar right-to-farm act, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded 
that "'changed conditions in ... the locality'" refer[red) ... solely to the extension of 
nonagricultural land uses .... ,,86 Thus, in farm nuisance actions, the date of the change 
in condition becomes extremely important; however, determining the date when that 
change occurred is difficult. 
The statute modifies the "coming to the nuisance" defense by creating a statute of 
limitations. The act restricts new neighbors from bringing nuisance actions and 
localities from adopting nuisance ordinances if the farm operation in question has been 
functioning for more than one year.87 Such a limitation discourages farmers concerned 
about potential nuisance actions from establishing new operations, especially feedlots, 
81 V A. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-22.28 (1983). Agricultural operations are defined as any 
operation producing crops, livestock, nursery, floral or forest products for sale. [d. at 
Sec. 3.1-22.29(B). 
82 N ALS, supra note I, at 21. 
83 No reported cases under the right to farm act could be found for Virginia. 
However, officials at the Va. Agric. Statistics Service were aware of nuisance suits being 
brought against farmers in the state both prior to and after the passage of the right-
to-farm act. 
84 Grossman & Fisher, supra note 80, at 122. 
8S VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-22.29(A) (1983). 
86 Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140, 142,281 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1981). 
87 V A. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-22.29(A)(D) (1983). 
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in areas threatened by development. A developer acquiring land near a young farm 
operation could easily use nuisance actions to either force the operation to close or 
contribute to its demise. Conversion of the farmland to nonagricultural uses could 
easily fo)\ow. Thus, the one-year limit favors the expansion of nonagricultural uses 
over agricultural uses, especially in localities where the two are just beginning to 
conflict. While the year limit would protect new residents from objectionable activities 
of new farm operations, it does not further the state's policy of protecting, conserving 
and encouraging the development of agricultural land. Indeed, the discouragement of 
agricultural expansion is inconsistent with farmland preservation. 
The statutory prohibition against declaring a farm operation a nuisance does not 
apply to situations where the alleged nuisance resulted from negligence, or improper 
operation.88 The act does not define either term. While a court could easily determine 
the meaning of negligence, it might have difficulties with a vague term like "improper". 
Some states' right-to-farm statutes include definitions of both negligence and improper 
standards.89 States like New Hampshire and Idaho define both terms with respect to 
compliance with local, state and federal laws and regulations.90 Including a provision 
which defines improper operation as a violation of federal, state, or local law or 
regulation would certainly clarify the Virginia statute. Such a liability standard for 
farm operations would also accommodate the dual state policies of farmland 
preservation and environmental protection.91 Indeed, allowing farmers who pol\ute or 
do not exercise due care for the rights of others to escape nuisance liability does not 
further the act's policy. 
The Act also denies protection from nuisance actions when the farm operation 
has significantly changed.92 Expansion or other change in the farm operation could 
remove the Act's nuisance protection completely. While this provision may protect new 
residents from offensive activities, it also places the farmer in the dilemma of choosing 
between more efficient farming methods and protection from nuisance liability.93 Such 
a situation clearly does not further the act's policy. However, the interpretation of 
"significant change" determines the extent of the Act's protection. 
"Significant change" is a very ambiguous phrase with a wide range of 
interpretation. If "significant" is construed strictly, the act could penalize farmers for 
diversifying or investing in a more profitable crop or more efficient farming method. 
Such a result frustrates the policy behind the Act. If "significant" is interpreted very 
broadly, its inclusion in the Act could become meaningless as almost nothing would be 
88 [d. at Sec. 3.1-22.29(A). 
89 Grossman & Fisher, supra note 80, at 132. 
90 [d. 
91 [d. 
92 V A. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-22.29(A). 
93 Grossman & Fisher, supra note 80, at 128. 
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considered significant. Such an interpretation is very unlikely. Courts addressing this 
unresolved issue would probably decide the existence of a significant change on a case 
by case basis in light of the relevant policies. Unfortunately, farmers who are planning 
changes and are concerned about nuisance actions have no guidance from the statute 
or the courts. 
Likewise, the act does not provide protection in situations where an agricultural 
operation pollutes or causes a change in the condition of any stream or causes overflow 
onto neighboring lands.94 This Virginia Code provision applies regardless of the length 
of time the operation has been in existence. If the statute provided an exception for 
agricultural operations that are in compliance with state, local and federal water 
pollution regulations, the protection against nuisance claims would not be negated. 
Either the state did not consider the effec~ of this provision on farmland preservation 
or the state's interest in preventing water pollution takes priority over its interest in 
such preservation. 
Unlike some right-to-farm statutes, the Virginia act does not mention 
distribution of the burden of proof. In traditional nuisance actions, if the plaintiff 
shows an unreasonable interference, then the defendant has the burden of showing that 
he uses his land in a reasonable manner and does not adversely affect the plaintiff.95 
A few states have included a presumption that farm operations are not nuisances if they 
meet the statutory requirements of the right-to-farm acts.96 Because the Virginia statute 
has no such provision, the defendant farmer probably has the burden of showing that 
the right to farm act bars the nuisance claim.97 However, following traditional evidence 
rules, the plaintiff probably has the burden of showing that the farmer's activities are 
not afforded protection due to negligence, improper use or significant change in 
operation.98 
The Act prohibits a locality from passing an ordinance which declares 
agricultural operations existing for one year a nuisance on account of a change in 
condition in the 10cality.99 However, the prohibition may not affect zoning ordinances. 
Because localities are free to designate areas according to the uses they desire in an 
area, residents could pressure the governing body to zone farm operations protected 
from nuisance actions out of business. 100 This problem could easily arise in rural areas 
that have been annexed into a city. The negation of nuisance protection for annexed 
94 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-22.29(C) (1983). 
95 Grossman & Fisher, supra note 80, at 133. 
96 [d. Arizona, Oklahoma, Vermont and Washington have such a presumption. 
97 [d. 
98 [d. at 134. Requiring the adversary of one who relies on a statutory exception 
to prove the exception is a rule of evidence. 
99 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-22.29(0) (1983). 
100 Grossman & Fisher, supra note 80, at 161. 
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farmland would combine with other pressures of urbanization to ensure conversion of 
such land. 
PRESER V A TION OF PRIME AGRICULTURAL LAND ACT 
The preservation of prime agricultural land act establishes a state policy of 
encouraging the preservation of important farmlands in Virginia and requires certain 
state agencies to prepare plans to implement this policy.l0l Each agency's plans must 
contain an impact statement detailing the effect the agency has on conversion of 
important farmlands. 102 The Act establishes a committee on the preservation of 
important farmlands to review the effect of an agency's plans. The committee operates 
as a subcommittee to the Virginia Council on the Environment and annually reports its 
findings to the Governor and state legislature.103 
Government land use has a significant impact on the conversion of farmland. 
The state controls the location of highways, reservoirs and various public facilities 
which require large tracts of land. 104 The adoption of a farmland preservation program 
by the state provides an effective tool for preventing the conversion of farmlands. 
However, state agencies must rigorously adhere to the farmland preservation policy in 
order to save farmland from unnecessary destruction. Because the Act merely adopts 
a policy of encouraging preservation, agencies could still ignore the conclusions of an 
impact statement and convert important farmland. Thus, the degree of protection that 
this statute affords farmland may depend on how committed a certain agency or an 
administration is to preservation. 
The Act defines important farmlands according to production and soil 
classification. In general, important farmlands are those which have been or are 
producing and have soil types suited for agricultural use. Specifically, the Act defines 
three categories of farmland to which the preservation policy applies: prime farmland, 
unique farmland and farmland of statewide or local importance. 105 The statute adopts 
the Soil Conservation Service definitions for prime and unique farmlands. 106 Prime 
farmlands are those lands with little soil erosion which can produce crops with 
minimum use of fertilizers, pesticides and labor. Unique farmlands are lands other than 
101 VA. CODE ANN. Secs. 3.1-18.4(B) (1983), 3.1-18.6 (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
102 [d. at Sec. 3.1-18.6. 
103 [d. at Sec. 3.1-18.7 (1983 & SuPp. 1988). 
104 Geier, Agricultural Districts and Zoning: A State-Local Approach to a National 
Problem, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 683 (1980). 
105 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-18.5 (1983). 
106 7 C 
.F.R. Sec. 657.5(a), (b) (1988). 
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prime farmland which produce high-value food and fiber crops such as grapes, nuts, 
olives and fruits. 107 
The statute requires localities to designate the important farmlands in their 
jurisdictions, making adequate provisions for nonagricultural uses. 108 Apparently, a 
rural county could not designate all of its land as important farmlands in order to avoid 
future nonagricultural development. In addition, because important farmland does not 
include land committed to urban development, localities cannot designate a parcel of 
land as important farmland and stop its conversion once the development begins. 
However, deciding when a commitment to develop land has occurred is difficult. While 
the signing of a contract would more than likely satisfy the requirement, any lesser 
action mayor may not constitute a commitment. 
AGRICULTURAL ZONING 
Agricultural zoning is a common method of land use control. 109 Many states 
permit localities to adopt zoning ordinances that designate an area for either exclusive 
or nonexclusive agricultural use. Nonexclusive zoning allows agricultural and other 
uses within an agricultural zone; exclusive zoning permits only agricultural uses. 110 
Because nonexclusive zoning allows nonagricultural uses to exist and expand within 
areas labeled agricultural, its use is less likely to protect farmland than exclusive 
zoning. 111 Even though exclusive zoning is a more effective preservation method, its 
validity is more difficult to sustain in court. In states that permit exclusive zoning, 
such as California and Wisconsin, courts have generally upheld the use of such 
ordinances in areas where little developmental pressure exists. However, development 
surrounding an exclusive agricultural zone could increase to the point where restricting 
land use in that area becomes unreasonable and thus invalid.112 
The Virginia zoning statute authorizes localities to classify lands within their 
jurisdiction according to various uses and to designate zones for the purpose of 
preserving agricultural and forest lands. 113 The statute establishes a nonexclusive 
zoning system so that localities can permit various other uses in an area which is 
107 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 3.1-18.5. 
108 [d. at Sec. 3.1-18.5(3). 
109 Rose, Farmland Preservation Policy and Programs, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 591, 
600 (1984). 
110 [d. 
111 [d. at 601. 
112 [d. 
113 VA. CODE ANN. Secs. 15.1-486, 15.1-489 (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
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designated as agricultura1. 114 Likewise, a locality can grant a special exception or use 
permit for nonagricultural uses in a pre-existing agricultural zone. 115 Localities can 
grant these permits at their discretion because the statute does not require them to 
follow any standards. 116 
The state gives localities a wide discretion regarding the zoning of land within 
their jurisdictions.117 The statute limits localities to designating areas only for certain 
purposes, but it makes no special provision which either encourages or requires localities 
to protect important farmlands from conversion. Thus, any preservation efforts based 
on zoning must come from the locality. However, localities cater to local concerns; they 
cannot effectively tackle a problem, like the conversion of important farmlands, which 
is statewide in scope. Indeed, the state is a better vehicle for preserving farmland 
because it has the jurisdictional authority to design a program for lands which cross 
local political boundaries.118 
The current zoning system in Virginia is not an effective method for preventing 
farmland conversion. Localities permit nonagricultural uses to exist and expand within 
agricultural zones and individuals can readily receive special use permits allowing 
development in agricultural zones.119 Virginia could certainly benefit from a detailed 
agricultural zoning program. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While several Virginia laws address farmland preservation, they do not prevent 
the conversion of important farmlands to nonagricultural use. Most of the programs 
focus on easing the burdens of approaching development for farmers rather than 
preventing conversion of agricultural lands. Deferred taxation, agricultural districting, 
agricultural zoning, the right to farm legislation and the preservation of prime 
farmlands act all protect farmland to some degree. However, each act could be 
amended to provide stronger incentives for farmers to keep farming, alleviate more 
developmental pressures and protect important farmlands from conversion. Indeed, the 
current Virginia programs provide a good base on which to build a comprehensive 
farmland preservation scheme which would protect this valuable economic and 
en vironmental resource. 
If Virginia is to have a policy of preserving farmlands from conversion through 
tax relief measures, then the legislature needs to enact a tax relief program which 
114 [d. at Sec. 15.1-491 (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
115 [d. at Sec. 15.1-491(c). 
116 Bollinger v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 185,227 S.E.2d 682 (1976). 
117 Byrum v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 37, 225 S.E.2d 369 (1976). 
118 Geier, supra note 105, at 686. 
119 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-491(c). 
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realizes that policy. If the legislature opts to keep the current system of deferred tax 
assessment, then it needs to address the problem of tax shifting. Some states have 
addressed this problem by providing subvention payments to the localities using state 
monies. 120 Certainly the inclusion of subvention payments in the Virginia tax relief 
program would alleviate the problem of tax shifting. However, because the overall tax 
relief structure of deferred taxation is fairly ineffective as a farmland preservation 
technique, a more effective solution needs to be adopted. 
The other major type of tax relief, circuit breaker tax credits, offers an 
alternative solution to the problem of tax depletion. Two states, Michigan and 
Wisconsin, place the burden of lost taxes directly on the state by allowing farmers to 
receive a dollar-for-dollar state tax credit for the local property taxes they pay.121 Yet, 
the circuit breaker credits, like deferred taxation, do not prevent land from being 
converted to nonagricultural uses. 
One type of differential tax assessment, the restrictive agreement, appears to be 
the most effective tax relief technique for promoting the preservation of farmland. It 
focuses on preventing changes in land use rather than merely easing the burdens of 
encroaching development. In order to receive use value assessment, farmers must enter 
into contracts to maintain their land in agricultural use for a certain number of 
years.122 This assures the postponement of development and the preservation of 
economically and environmentally important lands. 
The adoption of restrictive agreements along with subvention payments would 
provide a strong preservation incentive that avoids the tax shifting problem inherent 
in the current program. However, because tax relief is neither a comprehensive nor 
effective protection against the conversion of important agricultural lands, additional 
measures are necessary to slow the trend of changing land use in the state. 
The agricultural and forestal districting act provides a good foundation upon 
which to build a program of land preservation.123 Modifying the act in certain areas 
would increase the protection afforded the state's agricultural, forest and open space 
lands. Lowering the acreage requirement to 100 acres for the core parcel would provide 
protection for more lands. Loosening the production requirement for the receipt of 
benefits and extending the act to open space lands would further the policy of 
preserving land as an environmental resource rather than just for its economic input. 
Within a district, a limit on the annexation of land by municipalities would slow the 
conversion of agricultural and forest land bordering on cities and towns. 124 Including 
a provision requiring district landowners to adopt sound conservation practices would 
120 Dunford, supra note 31, at 694. 
121 N ALS, supra note 1, at 19. 
122 [d. at 18. 
123 Meyers, supra note 38, at 646. 
124 NALS, supra note 1, at 20. 
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increase the land's production capabilities and economic profitability so that owners 
would more likely keep the land in agricultural use. Localities should incorporate 
agricultural districts in a zoning program which permitted only agricultural and 
compatible uses in districts. Thus, the legislature could do a good deal to amend the 
districting act so that it would more likely preserve land and more effectively protect 
the state's farm economy. 
The right-to-farm statute eases some of the burdens placed on farmers by 
encroaching urbanization. It bars nuisance claims and voids nuisance ordinances in 
many situations, yet its protection against such actions is far from complete. The 
number of farms producing cows and hogs in Virginia has declined in the past five 
years.125 In counties, such as Amelia, hog farms have all but disappeared in the last 
decade. The hog industry is more stable in counties such as Smithfield and Surry, yet 
the farmers there have no nuisance protection for actions initiated by rural neighbors. 
Removing the significant change exception would contribute both to the conservation 
of farmland and protection of a vital economic sector by enabling farmers to expand 
or improve their operations without penalty. Defining "improper" would give farmers 
better guidance for planning purposes. Including a provision that creates a rebuttable 
presumption that operations are not nuisances if they meet federal, state and local law 
regulations would clarify the burden of proof distribution and provide an easily-
determined guideline for farmers planning their operations. Extending the Act to cover 
suits brought by rural neighbors would also better protect the farmer raising livestock. 
The designation of important farmlands by the state and localities pursuant to 
the preservation of prime farmland act provides the basis for a farmland preservation 
program that affects conversion by private owners. If the state can use these guidelines 
to determine which lands it should avoid disturbing, it can use them to prevent 
conversion of important farmlands in general. The land classification system could be 
used in a state-mandated zoning program, a land banking system, acquisition of negative 
easements or other farmland preservation programs aimed specifically at land use 
control. Knowing which lands constitute the most important farmlands allows the state 
and localities to regulate development more efficiently. A land use control program 
guided by these designations could prevent important farmlands from being developed 
while allowing development of lands which are less suitable for agricultural uses. 
Because the mechanisms of zoning are present in most localities, the state could 
easily implement such a program using the existing infrastructure. The adoption of a 
state-mandated agricultural zoning scheme would further Virginia's policy of 
encouraging, promoting and preserving agriculture. The legislature should enact a 
measure which requires localities to place lands classified as important or prime 
farmlands in special agricultural zones. Development in those zones would be restricted 
to more intensive farming or farm support operations, with allowances for farm 
residences. 
125 Statistics provided by the Va. Agric. Statistics Service. The number of farms 
with hogs decreased from 14,000 in 1984 to 8,500 in 1987. The number of farms with 
cattle and calves has decreased from 39,000 in 1984 to 38,000 in 1987. 
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The major countervailing consideration in establishing such a strict zoning program 
is that the more control the state has over land use, the less control individual owners 
ha ve. Even if the courts would find zoning restrictions reasonable in light of the state 
policy of farmland protection, most landowners would strongly object to any such 
limitation on the use of their lands. 
The creation of such a program would likely face stiff opposition from the 
legislature especially in areas where development pressure is high. 126 So, a less 
restrictive alternative may be more feasible. The state could purchase development 
rights [PDR] for farmland in localities where rapid growth is occurring, thus preserving 
farmland and avoiding harsh restrictions on landowners. Hampton Roads, northern 
Virginia and the Richmond-Petersburg areas are ideal candidates for such a program. 
Through either purchase or donation, the state could acquire negative easements 
(PDRs) on farmland which prevent the owners from developing those lands. The 
difference between the market value of land and its agricultural value would determine 
the cost of the development right for each farm. In areas with high development 
pressures, this would be very expensive. Spacing of easement purchases and limiting 
those to areas in danger of conversion could lessen the initial cost of preserving 
farmland in certain areas. 127 The legislature could raise money for the purchase of 
development rights by bonding or levying taxes on either real property transfers, land 
grants or conversion of agriculturallands. 128 A tax on property transfers would raise 
more money when development pressures are high, thus enabling the state to purchase 
more development rights when the need for farmland preservation is great. 129 Likewise, 
a tax on conversion of agricultural land would both discourage conversion and raise 
revenues for purchasing development rights during times when they are most needed. 
In addition to a PDR program, the state could exercise its power of pre-emption to 
save important lands already for sale from being developed. The state can substitute 
itself for the bona fide purchaser of important farmlands, acquire that land, place use 
restrictions on it and then either resell or lease it, giving preference to the bona fide 
purchaser. 130 This would certainly be helpful during the initial stages of a PDR 
program and in cases where the owner of important farmland refuses to sell the 
property's development rights to the state. 
Two other land use regulation techniques exist that Virginia could implement in 
order to expand its farmland preservation program: land banking and transfer of 
development rights [TDR]. In a land banking scheme, the state would acquire farmland 
126 NALS, supra note I, at 148. 
127 [d. at 170. 
128 Rose, supra note 110, at 617. 
129 [d. at 617-18. 
130 [d. 
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before it is for sale, place restrictions on its use and either resel1 or lease it.131 Such a 
program is wel1-suited for counties on the outskirts of the high development areas. 
Land prices in those areas have not increased dramatical1y, but the spread of urban 
growth is likely in the future. While land banking would further the preservation of 
farmland in Virginia and benefit the state through the increase in land values, its costs 
would be high. The state would have to establish an agency to handle the land bank 
programs and raise considerable amounts of money to purchase important farmlands. 
Even though the initial costs could be offset by later increases in the value of land and 
by benefits to the state's agricultural industry, the same preservation results could be 
achieved by a less-costly POR program.132 
Under a transfer of development rights plan, development rights are purchased and 
then used in a different location. 133 Virginia would have to divide its lands into 
development and preservation districts. Landowners in preservation districts have 
development rights for their lands, but they cannot develop their own lands. Instead, 
they can only sel1 the development rights to landowners in development districts so 
that those landowners can develop their lands at higher densities that zoning ordinances 
would permit. 134 While this may be less costly for the state than a POR program, the 
price would be paid by those people living in or near the development zones who could 
easily face overcrowding and congestion which would not ha ve existed but for the TOR 
program.13S A TOR program is certainly a radical means of easing the cost burden on 
the state of obtaining development rights for important farmlands. Because of its 
novelty as a legal technique for farmland preservation, the legislature may be suspicious 
of such a program. Because of its side effects of overcrowding and congestion, 
landowners in would-be development zones may be greatly opposed to the measure. 
Thus, a TOR plan may be less attractive than a POR program for Virginia. 
The Virginia legislature needs to strengthen existing preservation programs and to 
adopt additional measures to protect the state's important farmland. The state should 
revise its tax relief program by entering into restrictive agreements with farmers and 
providing subvention payments to localities in order to reduce the financial impact of 
differential taxation. It should modify the agricultural and forestal districts act to 
include open space lands, integrate conservation practices and restrict annexation. The 
legislature needs to reword the right-to-farm statute to give it more substance. It also 
needs to use the land classification system established under the preservation of prime 
agricultural land act to halt farmland conversion caused by non-governmental actors. 
Incorporating the classification system in either a state-mandated zoning scheme or a 
131 [d. at 610. 
132 [d. at 614. 
133 NALS, supra note I, at 174. 
134 [d. 
135 Rose, sllpra note 110, at 622. 
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PDR program would ensure the preservation of important farmland in the state. While 
a zoning scheme would be easier to implement given the existing zoning mechanisms 
throughout the state, a PDR program would not restrict farmers' use of their lands as 
much. Whichever plan the state legislature prefers, it needs to act now in order to slow 
the conversion rate of the important economic and environmental resource of farmland. 
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT IN VIRGINIA 
Mary A. Munson 
INTRODUCTION 
National enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) has been weak and 
ineffective, whether carried out by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or a 
state agency. The situation may be due to inadequate funding for programs. Virginia 
reflects the national trend with its insubstantial record of enforcement. A citizen suit 
initiated by an environmental group has challenged the legality of the government's 
enforcement efforts. If successful, the suit will overturn many administrative law cases 
that favor enforcement discretion in decision-making by agencies. However, the 
seriousness of the policy implications of non-enforcement may cause the courts to 
reexamine administrative law precedent. 
Water pollution clean-up in the Commonwealth has focused on improving the quality 
of water sources, including groundwater and surface water sources such as rivers and 
lakes. These waters are not exclusively covered by the SDWA. The SDWA focuses on 
the improvement of public, rather than private, water supplies. 
OVER VIEW OF THE SDWA 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 1 was enacted in 1974 to ensure that tap 
water reaching the public is safe for consumption. The statute requires that public 
water systems (PWSs) provide water which either does not exceed maximum contaminant 
levels (MCLs) or conforms to treatment requirements set out in the national primary 
drinking water regulations (NPDWRs).2 It also requires a permit for underground 
injections which may endanger underground sources of water, thus preventing excessive 
MCLs.3 
SDWA provisions allow PWSs to delay compliance under certain circumstances 
through variances4 and exemptions.5 These provisions were made more restrictive in 
the 1986 SDWA Amendments, wherein Congress provided that any water supplier 
applying for exemptions show that it has applied the best available technology (BAT) 
in attempting to comply.6 PWSs self-monitor by testing for contaminant levels and 
42 U.S.C. Secs. 300f-300j-10 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
2 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300g-1 (1982 & SuPp. IV 1986). For an excellent overview of the 
statu te, see DEAN, DANGER ON TAP: THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE FEDERAL 
SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (National Wildlife Federation, Oct. 1988). 
3 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300h (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
4 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-4 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
5 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-5 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
6 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300g-4(a)( 1 )(A) (SuPP. IV 1986). 
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reporting the results to the enforcement agency? The monitoring requirements have 
been described by one environmental group as "the heart of the law" because they enable 
the identification and correction of public health risks before they blossom into crises.8 
They are also important because of budgetary constraints at the enforcing agency, 
which are likely to occur and which make monitoring by the government impractical. 
The PWSs are defined as systems that have at least fifteen service connections, 
or regularly serve at least twenty-five persons.9 This definition covers not only public 
water systems which serve residential communities and are easy to identify and 
regulate, but may also include water suppliers that serve only a hospital, rest area, or 
campsite because they serve at least 25 persons. The EPA has treated these latter water 
suppliers as "non-community" water systems. The users of the water from these systems 
are transient, raising difficulties in notifying users about contaminated water. 
However, the non-community water system owner can be identified and regulated using 
regular PWS programs. 
SDWA ENFORCEMENT IN VIRGINIA 
Except for Wyoming, Indiana, and the District of Columbia, all other states and 
territories have been granted the responsibility for their own public water supply 
supervision.10 States receive this grant of primary enforcement responsibility 
("primacy") by, inter alia, adopting regulations no less stringent than the NPDWRs and 
promulgating enforcement plans and emergency provisions.11 If a state fails to ensure 
enforcement, EPA should notify the state that a PWS is not in compliance, request the 
state to provide information about the supplier within fifteen days, and consider a civil 
action against the non-complying supplier. 12 
Virginia obtained primacy by enacting its own PWS statute, which vests 
responsibility for ensuring safe drinking water in the Virginia Department of Health. 13 
Within the Department of Health, the Division of Water Programs oversees the drinking 
water regulations. The Virginia statute requires permits, minimum water quality 
standards, and mandatory testing of water for bacteriological, chemical, radiological, 
7 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300j-4(a)( I) (Supp. IV 1986). 
8 DEAN, supra note 2, at 11. 
9 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300f(4) (1982). 
10 53 Fed. Reg. 29194 (1988). 
11 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300g-2 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides the authority, whereas the 
requirements are set forth in 40 C.F.R 142, Subpart B. 
12 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300g-3(a)(I) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
13 VA. CODE ANN. Secs. 32.1-167 to 32.1-176 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
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and other contaminants,14 and dictates that free technical assistance be provided to 
water suppliers at their request.15 The statute is consistent with the SDWA and 
conforms to the primacy requirements.16 
The Virginia Department of Health is responsible for all issues relating to public 
health,17 but shares responsibility with the State Water Control Board (SWCB) relating 
to regulating water quality.18 However, the Department has sole responsibility for 
regulating drinking water quality. Unlike the Department, the SWCB deals primarily 
with water issues, with authority to regulate sewage discharge into waters, investigate 
fish kills, put conservation measures in place, among other duties. 19 
One of its most important duties is to establish and enforce water quality 
standards for state waters, including all surface and underground water within the 
state.20 By doing so, it carries out its responsibility to enforce National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.21 
The State Water Commission estimates that out of the average 28 billion gallons per day 
of tap water used in Virginia, 27 billion gallons originate in state rivers and streams, 
and the remaining amount comes from the state's groundwater or 75 reservoirs.22 While 
the Health Department regulates the public water suppliers, the SWCB regulates activity 
that affects the quality of water received by the public water suppliers. 
This dual oversight of state waters could lead to confusion and overlap of 
responsibilities. In 1983, a Water Study Commission recommended that a body be used 
to overview and coordinate the activities of all state entities considering water-related 
14 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 32.1-170 (1985). 
15 VA. CODE ANN. SEC. 32.1-171 (1985). 
16 The EPA has proposed a rule that would modify the primacy requirements for 
state Public Water Supply Supervision (PWSS) programs. The rule would require states 
already granted primacy to adopt new or revised EPA regulations. 53 Fed. Reg. 29194 
(1988). This was necessary to accommodate the 1986 SDWA amendments, which require 
EPA to promulgate NPDWRs for 83 new 
contaminants. 
17 Report 0/ the Joint Subcommittee Studying the Operation and Services 0/ the 
Department 0/ Health to the Governor and General Assembly 0/ Virginia, H. Doc. No. 43, 
15 (1984) [hereinafter Report 0/ it. Subcommittee]. 
18 Functions of the Department of Health include administering Medicaid, 
regulating medical care, licensing hospitals, day care centers and migrant labor camps, 
compiling vital statistics, and regulating sewage disposal as well as water treatment and 
supply. Report 0/ it. Subcommillee, supra note 17, at 5-7. 
19 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 62.1-44.15 (Supp. 1988). 
20 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 62.1-44.15(3a) (Supp. 1988). A Circuit Court held that its 
primary responsibility was to protect groundwater from contamination in all forms. 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983). 
21 33 U.S.C Secs. 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
22 Report 0/ the State Water Commission to the Governor and General Assembly 0/ 
Virginia, H. Doc. No. 31,4 (1988). 
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issues.23 A Legislative Joint Subcommittee recommended that the Division of Water 
Programs, in particular, work with other agencies with which they interface.24 In fact, 
Virginia has received a grant from the EPA to develop a clearinghouse for groundwater 
data and has created a task force to help coordinate agencies.25 If the two agencies are 
coordinated, it may not be necessary to reorganize state water-related programs. 
The Division of Water Programs carries out its mandate through six offices 
around the state. Each office is divided into water and wastewater issues. PWSs work 
with the District Engineers to achieve compliance with SDWA provisions. Most cities 
and .counties have local health departments, which are responsible for the water works 
compliance. The state officials work with local owners and officials to achieve 
compliance and compile records. 
If a violation is found, the state follows a set procedure. Notice is sent to the 
violator, followed by a "Passion Report" which identifies the type of violation, and 
any follow-up action. The enforcement officer in Richmond receives it and keys it into 
a computer and sends it to EPA on a computer disk. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ENFORCEMENT IN VIRGINIA 
Enforcement efforts in Virginia reflect the national trend by being underfunded 
and insubstantial. The EPA maintains computerized records of PWS violations and 
actions taken by states and the EPA against the violators, which are called the Federal 
Reporting Data System (FRDS) reports. An analysis of these reports by the National 
Wildlife Federation (NWF) revealed an enormous gap between the number of reported 
violations and the number of enforcement actions taken. In Fiscal Year (FY) 87, for 
example, NWF found that out of 101,588 violations, representing 36,763 water systems 
(both community and non-community), only 2544 enforcement actions were taken by 
states.26 When the EPA discovers that a system is in violation, it must inform the state 
and take action on its own if the state does not commence action within 30 days of 
notification.27 According to the NWF report, the EPA took only 50 such actions in FY 
87, which amounts to five one-hundredths of one percent of the 99,044 cases in which 
the state governments failed to take action.28 
23 Report 0/ the State Water Study Commission to the Governor and the General 
Assembly 0/ Virginia, H. Doc. No. 32, 6 (1984). 
24 Report 0/ /t. Subcommittee, supra note 17, at 16. 
25 Interview with Evans Massie, Compliance Officer, Office of Water Programs, 
Virginia Department of Health (Sept. 1988). 
26 DEAN, supra note 2, at 14. 
27 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300g-3(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
28 DEAN, supra note 2, at 17. According to the report, the enforcement figures are 
probably overstated. In the FRDS reports, the EPA may take several distinct "actions" 
for a given violation: a notice of violation, proposed administrative order, and a final 
administrative order. Thus the EPA can "triple count" enforcement data. Id. 
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FRDS reports of EPA Region III states reveal that in FY 1987, Virginia's 4,768 
PWSs experienced 2,578 violations, for which the state took 65 enforcement actions.29 
This 2.52% enforcement rate is about average for all of the states. 
It is conceivable that the lack of enforcement actions listed in FRDS does not 
mean that PWS violations continue in Virginia. EPA records only the state actions 
which constitute "appropriate" actions, because SDWA requires EPA to take action if 
"appropriate enforcement" is not taken by a state.30 Therefore, if the Health 
Department informally worked with a PWS, or compliance was actually achieved, SDWA 
goals could be attained without taking "action" as recorded in FRDS. 
Evidence indicates that this may not be the case. In 1988, EPA performed an 
audit of the performance of non-community water systems. those who do not use a 
commercial or community water supply. by selecting a sample of non-community water 
supplies and scrutinizing their actual SDWA compliance performances. According to 
the audit report. EPA found "numerous" monitoring violations that were not reported 
in FRDS.31 In FY 86. there were 79 unreported coliform bacteria monitoring violations 
discovered at 51 non-community water supplies which recorded no violations in FRDS. 
The same year, EPA found that 86% of the non-community water supplies in Virginia 
did not monitor for nitrates as required by law. despite the fact that FRDS listed no 
monitoring violations at all for this contaminant.32 
The audit also reported that in FY 86. Virginia PWSs were lax in initiating check 
sampling once a maximum contaminant level (MCL) violation occurs.33 Check sampling. 
required every 24 hours when MCL violations occur, is necessary to assure users that the 
contamination has been expunged. 
The audit revealed other enforcement problems in Virginia. Upon confirmation 
of an MCL violation. the Health Department is required to notify the public of the 
problem.34 EPA found "little evidence" that the Health Department issued notification 
for any of the 36 MCL violations it found in the sample.35 It also found that data 
reported from Virginia to EPA was erroneous. to the extent that some counties were 
unaware that violations should be reported to the state.36 The discrepancies between 
reported violations and the data sent to EPA is understandable in light of the 
29 DEAN. supra note 2. at B-2. 
30 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-3(a)(1 )(B) (SuPP. IV 1986). 
31 EPA. Report oj Audit EIHW7-03-0171-81928: NOIl-Commullity Water System 
Program 38 (Sept. 26. 1988). 
32 [d. at 39. 
33 [d. 
34 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-3(a)(I)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
35 EPA. supra note 31. at 40. 
36 [d. 
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difficulties in coordinating the 1531 community and 2550 non-community water works 
in the state. If much of the field work necessary is done by county and city officials 
unfamiliar with the technicalities of the state-EPA reporting requirements, it is possible 
that many attempts to achieve compliance remain on the local and informal level. 
Enforcement is complicated by the fact that violations are common in some 
circumstances where enforcement officials are reluctant to initiate action. One state 
official revealed that they have difficulties with PWSs without definable owners. For 
example, after a coal company emplaces a water supply, it may move out of the area and 
deed the rights to the supply to a new landowner, who may be unaware of his or her 
responsibilities under the SDWA.37 Another problem is that the testing required in the 
monitoring provisions can be expensive for a smalJ supplier. The State Corporation 
Commission must approve some water works' rate increases, but rate increases for 
smalJer suppliers may be difficult. 
Whether the problems with enforcement pose a threat to the health of Virginians 
is difficult to assess. It appears that contamination of drinking water sources has 
become a serious problem in some areas of the state,38 so failure by the PWS to 
adequately treat water may raise health dangers. For example, problems with 
trilomethane contamination at PWSs in Northern Virginia have occurred, as welJ as high 
bacterial levels in limestone regions, mainly in the western part of the state.39 A Health 
Department survey of tap water in the south-central Piedmont region revealed that 72.5 
percent of the water had "serious water quality problems," the most prevalent being high 
levels of fecal coliform.40 This constituent comes from human and animal fecal matter 
and is associated with gastroenteric infections.41 
ACTIONS TO COMPEL ENFORCEMENT 
Enforcement of the SDWA is weak, but there is considerable uncertainty as to 
whether this deficiency can be remedied through judicial action. In the folJowing 
months, a federal court wilJ face this question in a suit brought by an environmental 
group. On December 12, 1988, the National Wildlife Federation issued a notice of its 
intent to sue the EPA. The notice contained charges that the EPA has failed to enforce 
standards, review state programs effectively, assist PWSs in violation of the SDWA, 
37 Interview with Evans Massie, Compliance Officer, Office of Water Programs, 
Virginia Department of Health (Sept. 1988). 
38 See WEIGMANN & KROEHLER., THREATS TO VIRGINIA'S GROUNDWATER (1988). 
39 Interview with Evans Massie, Compliance Officer, Office of Water Programs, 
Virginia Department of Health (Sept. 1988). 
40 WEIGMANN & KROEHLER., supra note 38, at 35. 
41 DEAN, supra note 2, at 26. 
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adopt adequate enforcement policies, and prepare annual reports required by the 
SDWA.42 
The major issue in the case is whether the EPA has discretion to refrain from 
taking enforcement actions for the provisions identified in the suit. The evidence that 
no enforcement actions have been taken against many violators is strong, because much 
of it is EPA documentation. 
The language of some of the provisions supports the contention that EPA 
enforcement is non-discretionary. The specific provision reads: 
Whenever the Administrator finds during a period during which a State 
has primary enforcement responsibility ... that any public water system-
i) ... does not comply with any national primary drinking 
water regulation ... 
he shall so notify the State and provide such advice and technical 
assistance ... as appropriate ... to bring the system into compliance.43 
The SDWA then specifies that where a state fails to take enforcement action 
within 30 days of being notified of a violation, the Administrator "shall issue an 
order ... or ... commence a civil action .... "44 The use of the word "shall" raises questions 
about the mandatory nature of the clause, where canons of statutory construction, 
common law precedents, and legislative history reveal divergent interpretations. 
There is considerable weight in support of the interpretation that would make 
EPA's decision to issue an order or commence a civil action non-discretionary. The 
critical first step in statutory interpretation is "that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive.,,45 The ordinary meaning of the word "shall" implies that the 
action is mandatory. Accepted practice in drafting legislation is to use "shall" if an 
"obligation to act is to be imposed.,,46 The plain meaning of the word "shall" points to 
the mandatory nature of EPA enforcement. 
The fact that the 1986 Amendments changed the word "may" to "shall" in the 
clause quoted above also supports this contention, since it implies a legislative 
recognition of the distinction between the words. Statements in the legislative history 
show that some legislators interpreted the language as mandatory.47 The wording 
appears to be clear and unambiguous, but extrinsic evidence suggests that "shall" may 
indeed be treated as a discretionary order. 
42 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1653 (1988). 
43 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300g-3(a)(I )(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). 
44 42 U.S.c. Sec. 300g-3(a)( 1 )(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Other provisions contain the "shall" 
language as well, and raise similar questions about the mandatory nature of the 
sentence. 
45 North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983), quoted ill Sacramento 
Regional Co. Sanitation Dist. v. Thomas, 668 F.Supp. 1427, 1431 (E.D. Cal. 1987). 
46 SUTHERLAND, IA STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 689 (1985). See also STATSKY, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 133 (West 1984). 
47 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 575, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1986), reprillted ill 132 CONGo 
REC. H2335 (daily ed. May 5, 1986). 
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One commentator analyzed similar enforcement language in the Federal Wa-ter 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)48 and found that an overwhelming number of courts 
that interpreted the "shall" language held that the enforcing agency retained its 
enforcement discretion.49 The primary case cited was Sierra Club v. Train,50 where the 
Fifth Circuit examined a FWPCA provision very similar to that of the SOWA. The 
court said that although upon superficial examination it appeared that "shall" imposed 
a non-discretionary duty to act, extrinsic aids showed that the meaning of Congress was 
inconclusive, and "shall" need not be considered mandatory.51 Because many courts 
regard "shall" as a discretionary, rather than mandatory, command, the meaning is 
ambiguous. 
When ambiguity exists in a statute, the administrative interpretation, although 
not conclusive, is entitled to deference if consistent with the statutory purpose and 
linguistically reasonable.52 If the EPA asserts that it has interpreted the "shall" 
language to mean "may," it is Questionable whether it can be considered "linguistically 
reasonable," but numerous precedents making that interpretation may make it so. 
Assuming that the statutory purpose of the SOWA is to achieve safe drinking water 
within budgetary or resource constraints, EPA may argue that enforcement discretion 
is appropriate. Indeed, a spokesman for EPA has implied that budget realities are 
partially responsible for the enforcement deficiencies.53 
Another factor supporting the discretionary enforcement of agencies is the 
doctrine of separation of powers. In a speech given when signing the SOWA 
Amendments into law, President Reagan stated: 
"I believe that Congress cannot bind the Executive in advance and remove 
all prosecutorial discretion without infringing on the powers of the 
Executive. It is unrealistic to expect that the EPA will ever have the 
resources or the need to take formal action against each and every 
violation of the Act, without regard to how trivial the violation or unfair 
an enforcement action would be."54 
The EPA may also argue that such a statutory interpretation is consistent with 
the general acceptance of the fact that enforcement decisions are so committed to 
agency discretion as to preclude review. The Third Circuit has suggested three criteria 
48 33 U.S.C. Sees. 1251-1376 (1986 & Supp. I 1987). 
49 Gray, The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986: Now a Tougher Act to 
Follow, 16 Envt'l. L. Rep. (Envt'l. L. Inst.) 10338,10342 n.66 (1986). The article cited ten 
supporting cases as well as four analogous cases. 
50 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977). 
51 Id. at 489. 
52 Flint v. State of California, 594 F.Supp. 443, 448 (E.O. Cal. 1984), quoted in 
Sacramento Regional Co. Sanitation Oist. v. Thomas, 668 F.Supp 1427, 1431 (E.O. Cal. 
1987). 
53 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1177 (1988). 
54 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Ooc. 832 (June 19, 1986). 
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for determining whether review is appropriate, the second of which is the consideration 
of "the product of political, economic, or managerial choices that are inherently not 
subject to judicial review."55 Enforcement decisions may be so clearly related to 
economic, management, and political choices that they might be the appropriate 
decision to which the phrase "committed to agency discretion" might apply. 
The National Wildlife Federation case outcome could depend on the court's view 
of discretionary agency enforcement. If the environmental group succeeds in having 
a judge compel EPA enforcement, it may be necessary for EPA to request more money 
from Congress for SDWA programs, or divert money from other programs to programs 
of enforcement. Attention will be on this case, since another group has recently filed 
a lawsuit to compel enforcement of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).56 
CONCLUSION 
Virginia's weak enforcement of the SDWA reflects a national trend. Where 
public water suppliers remain in violation due to state inaction, the law requires the 
federal government to step in and take action to ensure that water is safe. The federal 
government has not been responsive. A suit has been filed to require EPA to increase 
its enforcement presence. The success of the suit may depend upon the degree to which 
courts are willing to abandon a traditional view of discretion in agency enforcement. 
If the suit is successful, Virginia's water system may benefit due to the additional 
presence of more certain sanctions against water suppliers who provide contaminated 
water. 
55 Local 2855 v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1979). 
56 The Environmental Defense Fund is alleging that RCRA provisions should be 
interpreted as meaning that EPA had a non-discretionary duty to perform certain tasks 
by the dates Congress had set forth. 19 Env't Rep. (DNA) 2376 (1989). 
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STATE CONTROL OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES ON PRIVATE LAND 
David E. Clark 
INTRODUCTION 
In Titusville, Florida, road builders in a new subdivision were digging out a 
swampy bog near a pond. They gave up when, after digging twenty feet down with a 
backhoe, they had not hit the bottom of the bog. In the process, however, they 
discovered two skeletons. After the police determined no foul play was involved, 
archaeologists from Florida State University were called in and determined the bog 
was an Indian burial site approximately 8000 years old. The greatest discovery was in 
the skeletons; the bog had preserved them so well that many still contained the brains 
of the deceased. They are the oldest examples of human cellular structure anywhere. 
Windover Farms, Inc., donated the site to the state, paid some of the excavating costs, 
and lent its name to the site. The dig was to be closed in January 1987 with half the 
area left for future digs.' 
In Plymouth, Massachusetts, a bulldozer operator hired by a developer to work 
on a planned housing development graded an area adjacent to the development. In the 
process, he also destroyed a village, 800 years old, described as one of the last known 
Indian villages that existed before the arrival of the Pilgrims in 1620. Valerie 
Talmedge, director of the Massachusetts Historical Commission, said the site would ha ve 
provided information on Indian life before European culture. The site had been left 
unmarked due to fear of looting of artifacts. 2 
These examples illustrate the contrasting treatment of America's archaeological 
resources. Public awareness of environmental problems is becoming more prevalent 
today, as evidenced by public involvement in pollution prevention, wildlife 
preservation, and the preservation of scenic wonders. Subsumed within this concern for 
our environment is an interest in the preservation of our cultural and historical past, 
the "human environment." One way of examining our cultural heritage is through the 
study of archaeology. This paper will survey the processes in which states and local 
governments have (and could) protect our archaeological resources, with an emphasis 
on the protection of archaeological sites on private land. 
ARCHAEOLOGY IN GENERAL: THE PROBLEM 
Archaeology is the science by which remains of ancient man can be methodically 
and systematically studied to obtain as complete a picture as possible of ancient culture 
, Rensberger, Florida Bog Reveals 8.000 Year-Old Secrets, Washington Post, Oct. 26, 
1986, at AI, col. C. 
2 Indian Village Bulldozed, Washington Post, Aug. I, 1987, at A4, col.-F. 
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and society, thereby allowing past ways of life to be reconstructed.3 Ivor Noel-Hume 
and other historical archaeologists would also include the "recent past.,,4 Archaeologists 
generally attempt to examine how man lived and adapted the environment to his own 
use. 
Today an archaeologist at work on a site is looking for all remains, not just 
obvious evidence of human activity. Not only artifacts (like pottery, metals, and stone 
tools) and features (permanent objects situated in the soil such as floors, pits, walls, 
foundations, post holes) are gathered and recorded, but also nonartificial materials are 
gathered: seeds, animal bones, and soils.s These artifacts and features help identify the 
community that produced them both chronologically and culturally. 
Archaeology is an important concern, according to noted archaeologist Jaquetta 
Hawkes, because it gives a people a "sense of having roots.,,6 Archaeology also helps 
chronicle our cultural heritage, by filling in the blanks left by the written record of 
history. At some point, every nation looks into its past with pride, and how successfully 
archaeology can preserve things today "may have a very real influence on how this 
nation thinks of itself in the centuries ahead."? As the International Council on 
Archaeological Heritage Management proclaimed in its charter, "The protection of the 
archaeological heritage is the moral obligation of all human beings."s 
Given a motive for preserving archaeological sites, there is an ever-growing 
urgency to preserve them. One estimate calculated that in California alone two 
archaeological sites per day were being destroyed by construction projects, natural 
erosion, incompetent excavation, or just plain vandalism.9 Today, one can readily see 
the changing landscape through development just by driving through the country. This 
development may damage the ecological part of the environment, but destruction of 
archaeological sites is permanent. As Hester A. Davis of the Arkansas Archaeological 
Survey said, "You can't grow a new Indian site.,,10 Once one perceives the need to 
preserve such sites for the information they contain, however, subsidiary problems of 
identifying sites and analyzing which sites to preserve crop up. 
3 M. JOUKOWSKY, A COMPLETE MANUAL OF FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 2 
( 1980). 
4 I. NOEL-HUME, HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY 12 (1969). 
S JOUKOWSKY, supra note 3, at 177. 
6 NOEL-HUME, supra note 4, at 8. 
? Id. 
S Klock, The Friend's Forum, 5 ALEXANDRIA ARCHAEOLOGY VOLUNTEER 
NEWS 4 (Nov. 1987). 
9 G. MCHARGUE & M. ROBERTS, A FIELD GUIDE TO CONSERVATION 
ARCHAEOLOGY IN NORTH AMERICA 22 (1977). 
10 Is There a Fulllre lor the Past?, Archaeology (Oct. 1971) 
(quoted ill L. BRENNAN, BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO ARCHAEOLOGY 14 (1973». 
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In the United States, there are potentially innumerable sites of archaeological 
significance. Indians have lived in North America since approximately 10,000 B.c. 11 
and, given the nomadic tendencies of some tribcs, the possibility for sites anywhere is 
incredible. Also, James Deetz considers the potential number of historical 
archaeological sites in the eastern United States alone "astronomical".12 The number is 
astronomical because historical sites represent the period of maximum population in the 
U.S. The ultimate dilemma is in deciding which sites to save. In the past, homes of 
famous people were preserved, spawning "individual" archaeology. 
However, archaeology studies cultures, not individuals; it would be dangerous 
to extrapolate generalizations about a society from a site used by an elite sector of that 
society.13 Archaeologists would thus ideally like to save all sites, at least until 
excavation. The Office of Technical Assessment of the U.S. Congress even says 
excavation should be the last resort in archaeological research because new techniques 
in research are constantly being developcd. 14 The key for state governments is to 
balance the common interest of mankind in the information contained in archaeological 
sites and society's interest in putting the land to an economically viable use. 
STATE LANDS 
In general, state governments control archaeological sites located on state owned 
or state controlled property. The state either explicitly reserves the right to investigate 
and excavate archaeological sites 15 or grants permits to qualified institutions and 
individuals to excavate the sites, while the state retains ownership of any artifacts 
found. 16 A state archaeologist or statc historical commission usually has power to grant 
permits. 
State governments usually provide for state agencies to "cooperate" with the state 
agency charged with protection of archaeological sites.17 The degree of cooperation, 
though, varies from state to state. Alaska, for example, provides for one of the more 
strict state programs on public construction sites. The Department of Natural Resources 
may survey an affected area for historical or archaeological sites before "public 
construction or public improvement of any nature is undertaken by the state, or by a 
governmental agency of the state, or by a private person under contract with or licensed 
11 G. MCHARGUE & M. ROBERTS, slIpra note 9, at 62. 
12 J. DEETZ, IN SMALL THINGS FORGOTTEN 32 (1977). 
13 [d. at 30-31. 
14 OFFICE OF TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR PREHISTORIC AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION 70 (1988). 
15 See. e.g., V A. CODE ANN. Scc. 10.1-901 (Supp. 1988). 
16 See. e.g., id. at Sec. 10.1-903. 
17 See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. Scc. 41.35.070 (Supp. 1988). 
44 
by the state or governmental agency of the state."18 The department has the power to 
stop construction and investigate and excavate the site if it determines that such sites 
will be adversely affected by the public construction or improvement. Of course, "[a]1I 
investigations, recording and salvage work shall be performed as expeditiously as 
possible so that no state construction project will be unduly impaired, impeded, or 
delayed."19 
Some states provide for inspection of state land before state sale and the 
possibility of retention of historic sites or structures for preservation.20 State 
governments overall do an admirable job in preserving state controlled archaeological 
sites. They recognize that they are preserving these sites and artifacts for the common 
welfare of the general public and consequently, they take their job seriously by 
mandating penalties for permit violations and vandalism. Unfortunately, the states do 
not extend their expansive protection to archaeological sites located on privately owned 
land. 
PRIV A TE LAND 
IN GENERAL 
State control of archaeological sites on private land can be described as limited; 
the states respect the sanctity of private property. State statutes provide for control of 
such archaeological sites (and artifacts found) by the landowner.21 Occasionally, a state 
will declare its wishes that a property owner will excavate or preserve a site in 
conformity with proper archaeological standards and methods. Oklahoma provides an 
example: 
"[i]n order to protect and preserve historical, archaeological, and scientific 
information, matters and objects and other archaeological remains, which 
may from time to time be found on privately owned lands within 
Oklahoma, the Legislature declares as a statement of purpose that 
archaeological excavations on privately owned lands should be 
discouraged except in accordance with and pursuant to the spirit and 
authority of this statute.,,22 
Most states thus merely encourage a property owner to be civic minded; there are few 
state controls over the use of privately owned archaeological sites. Owners may loot a 
site for artifacts if they so desire without regard for their informational value. The 
ultimate control still resides in the property owner. States possess the power to acquire 
land, through gift or purchase, for the purpose of preserving archaeological or historic 
18 [d. 
19 [d. 
20 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 14-3-3.4-5 (Burns 1987). 
21 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 10.1-904 (Supp. 1988). 
22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, sec. 361 (1988). 
45 
sites.23 Very few states, however, take the extra step by allowing property acquisition 
through the process of eminent domain.24 
Another state tool is the conservation easement, a nonpossessory interest in real 
property for the purpose of preserving the archaeological aspects of the property, 
whereby the landowner maintains the site in accordance with the easement.25 The 
designated ,state agency or historical commission may declare a site or structure a 
historic site or landmark, thus ensuring state protection through various regulations.26 
But if an individual owns the site, the state may only declare the site a 
landmark/historic site with owner consent. Easements must also be purchased from the 
owner. Consequently, the most common state mechanisms for protecting such sites are 
subject to owner consent, either through selling an interest or consenting to state control 
of the lands' archaeological resources. 
PERMITS 
Excavations on private lands could be controlled by the state through a permit 
system. Permits are generally required for excavations on state property and some 
states require a permit for excavating on private lands designated as state landmarks.27 
Only a few states, however, have taken the next logical step and provided for a permit 
requirement for excavating on any land in the state. Colorado provides one of the few 
such examples: 
"The society shall issue or deny permits for the investigation, excavation, 
gathering, or removal from the natural state of any historical, 
prehistorical, and archaeological resources within the state and determine 
whether or not the applicants for such permits are duly qualified to 
conduct investigations for which the permit is requested.,,28 
Such a statute, depending on the permit qualifications, could ensure excavations 
that conform with proper archaeological standards, yet protect the owner's property 
rights in the artifacts and his development rights. 
The idiosyncrasies of specific state statutes may nevertheless present interpretive 
problems. One such ambiguity is in the North Dakota Code,29 which requires a permit 
for excavating on any land in the state. However, the Code also states that nothing in 
the chapter shall limit a private land owner from excavating on his own land or 
23 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 11-6-114 (1987). 
24 See ALA. CODE Sec. 41-9-242 (1982); ALASKA STAT. Sec. 41.35.060 
(1988); HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 6E-3 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6081c (Vernon 
1970). 
25 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 10.1-1009 (1988). 
26 See, e.g., id. at Sec. 10.1-905 (Supp. 1988). 
27 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 267.12 (West 1988). 
28 COLO. REV. STAT. Sec. 24-80-406( I )(a) (1982). 
29 N. DAKOTA CODE Sec. 55-03-02. 
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someone with the owner's written consent.3D An attempted reconciliation of these 
provisions argues that the Superintendent (the permit issuer) cannot refuse to issue a 
permit where the applicant is the land owner or someone with the land owner's written 
consent.31 
Beck's reasoning, however, is directly contradicted by the Turley decision in New 
Mexico.32 Turley was hired by land owners to excavate an archaeological site on their 
land, using a front-end loader. The applicable New Mexico statute stated that no person 
could excavate an archaeological site with mechanical equipment on private land 
without a permit. However, nothing in the section was deemed "to require such owner 
to obtain a permit for personal excavation on his own land."33 Turley did not have a 
permit, though he did have a contract with the owners. Turley argued, however, that the 
word "owner" in the statute also included the owner's agent. 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico took a common sense approach to this 
argument and ruled that this section did not include the word "agent," whereas other 
sections did.34 By process of exclusion, therefore, the Legislature did not intend to 
include the owner's agent within the section.35 The Court of Appeals fixed on the word 
"personal" in the statute and determined the word meant that the act is done in person 
without intervention of another.36 "This statutory requirement of "personal" excavation 
cannot be reconciled with the contention that "owner" includes 'agent'", and concluded 
the common law rule of agency was not applicable to this statute.3·T The court also said 
that permitting a land owner to excavate while requiring his agent to acquire a permit 
was consistent with the legislative intent of the statute: to preserve and protect 
structures, sites, and objects of historical significance in New Mexico and to discourage 
archaeology on private lands except in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the 
Act.38 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico then rejected this analysis and overruled the 
Court of Appeals, holding that Turley, as the land owner's employee, was not required 
to get a permit.39 The court asserted it was construing Section 18-6-11 "according to its 
3D [d. 
31 Note, North Dakota's Historic Preservation Law, 53 N.D.L. REV. 177, 199 (1976). 
32 State v. Turley, 96 N.M. 592, 633 P.2d 700 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
33 N.M. STAT. ANN. Sec. 18-6-11 (1978). 
34 [d. at Sec. 18-6-9(B) (1978). 
35 Turley, 96 N.M. at 594, 633 P.2d at 703. 
36 [d. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. at 594, 633 P.2d at 702-3. 
39 [d. 
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plain meaning."40 The court applied the law of agency, stating that a person may do an 
activity through an agent that he may do personally, "unless public policy or some 
agreement requires personal performance."41 The statute must expressly or by 
implication prevent an agent of the owner from acting. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico's interpretation of the statute nullifies its 
policy. The New Mexico legislature stated that "the historical and cultural heritage of 
the state is one of the state's most valued and important assets" and laid out a program 
designed to preserve the state's cultural heritage.42 The legislature expressly declared 
its intent to discourage private land owners from excavating archaeological sites except 
in accordance with the Act, including the permit system.43 The permit system is 
designed to assure that archaeological remains are removed with adherence to proper 
archaeological procedures, yet to preserve some discretion with the land owner. By 
allowing a land owner to hire anyone to excavate without a permit, the information the 
. sta te seeks to preserve may be lost. 
A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court of New Mexico chokes 
on its own words: a strong public policy of preserving the state's cultural heritage 
mandates personal performance. Turley reveals the problems of accommodating private 
land owners within a permit system. State legislatures should be careful to be explicit 
in their permit statutes, lest more Turleys and circumventions of state policy arise. 
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE ACTS 
The protection of archaeological resources can be attained by including such 
protection in legislation designed to protect the environment in general from the effects 
of development. California has enacted an elaborate statutory framework designed to 
protect its environment. The California Environment Quality Act (CEQ A) provides 
that public agencies should not approve projects44 as proposed if there are feasible 
alternatives or mitigation measures which would lessen the significant environmental 
effects of such projects.45 The Act is primarily designed to apply to "discretionary" 
projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public agencies, including 
40 [d. 
41 [d. 
42 N.M. STAT. ANN. Sec. 18-6-2 (1978). 
43 [d. at Sec. 18-6-10. 
44 Including direct activity by a public agency, activities undertaken by a person 
supported by any form of assistance by a public agency, and activities involving 
issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use 
by a public agency. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE Sec. 21065 (West 1986). 
45 [d. at Sec. 21002. 
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amendment of zoning ordinances, issuance of zoning variances, issuance of conditional 
use permits, and approval of tentative subdivision maps.46 
One part of the process is the filing of an Environmental Impact Report, a 
document to be considered by every public agency prior to its approval or disapproval 
of a project. The report provides public agencies and the public detailed information 
about the effect a proposed project will likely have on the environment. Additionally, 
it lists ways in which the significant effects of a project may be minimized and 
indicates alternatives to such a project.47 The public agency having principal 
responsibility for carrying out or approving a project has the responsibility for 
determining whether an environmental impact report or negative declaration shall be 
required for any project.48 
The state has authority to require preservation of "unique" archaeological sites 
or mitigation of development effects on the site.49 Examples of preservation include 
avoidance of such sites, conservation easements, and capping or paving the sites with 
a layer of soil before building. Mitigation involves excavation of the parts of the site 
that would be destroyed or damaged by construction. Such excavation should normally 
be completed within 90 days after final approval of a project. 
The statute is instructive in establishing guidelines by defining a site as a 
"unique archaeological resource" if it has a particular quality, such as being the oldest 
or best example of its type, is directly associated with a prehistoric or historic event or 
person, or has information needed to answer important scientific research questions and 
there is demonstrable public interest in the information. The protection provided may 
be limited, however, because the statute expires January I, 1994. One can expect 
another amendment to be forthcoming, though, because the statute was originally set to 
expire in 1986, but was amended. 
Section 21083.2 may have been designed to address Society for California 
Archaeology v. County of Butte50 in order to specifically protect archaeological sites. 
Prior to the decision, "environmental" was defined as "objects of historical or aesthetic 
significance." The court of appeals ruled the definition included archaeological sites.51 
In this case, the Court overturned approval of a subdivision because the board of 
supervisors did not comment specifically and respond to the archaeological information 
contained in the environmental impact report. The board must state why certain 
positions or objections were accepted or rejected.52 Although objections based on the 
46 [d. at Sec. 21080. 
47 [d. at Sec. 21061. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at Sec. 21083.2. 
50 65 Cal. App. 3d 832, 135 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1977). 
51 [d. at 837, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 682. 
52 [d. at 839, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 683. 
49 
adverse effects of the development on archaeological sites were presented, the board 
may not have felt an obligation to respQItd.due to the lack of explicitness in the statute. 
Section 21083.2 removes this ambiguity by mandating consideration of the effects of a 
project on archaeological resources during the approval process.53 SO]11e jurisdictions 
provide protection for designated natural areas, such as coastal areas,54 scenic rivers,55 
and "areas of critical state concern.,,56 Subsumed within these environmental protection 
acts are protections for archaeological resources. Such comprehensive frameworks are 
useful in identifying archaeological sites and mitigating the effects of development 
projects. This type of legislation would serve the purpose of collection of information 
contained in archaeological sites by preserving a site outright or at least by excavating 
the site properly within recognized archaeological procedures. 
The likelihood, however, that other states will follow the lead of California and 
enact environmental protection statutes for the entire state is unlikely. A state is much 
more likely to pass such legislation covering a discrete natural area whose uniqueness 
or importance to the state is widely recognized, such as Virginia's Chesapeake Bay. 
Restricted, rather than statewide, areas of monitoring will also solve administrative 
problems by making monitoring easier and thus save already inadequate state 
archaeological funding. 
HISTORIC DISTRICTS 
Whereas regional environmental/archaeological protection plans are more suited 
to rural or undeveloped areas, the regulation of archaeological resources located on 
private lands in more developed areas or in the urban context is best achieved through 
historic district legislation. Several states provide for local designation of such areas 
or specifically list the areas in the statute.57 While the state has to obtain owner consent 
before a single site is named a landmark, if the site is within a homogeneous area of 
historical or cultural significance, the entire area may be designated as a historic 
district and be regulated through ordinances, subject to various methods of owner 
53 Other litigation discussing the effects of the proposed projects on archaeological 
sites and mitigation include Atherton v. Board 0/ Supervisors, 146 Cal. App. 3d 346, 194 
Cal. Rptr. 203 (1983), Environmental Protection In/ormation Center Inc. v. Johnson, 170 Cal. 
App. 3d 604, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1985) (requirements apply to Timber Harvesting Plans), 
and Citizens 0/ Goleta Valley v. Board 0/ SlIpervisors, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1167, 243 Cal. 
Rptr. 339 (1988). 
54 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE Sec. 30244; HAW. REV. 
STAT. SEC. 205A-2 (1987). 
55 TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 11-13-101 (1987). 
56 FLA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 380.05 (West 1988). 
57 See, e.g., V A. CODE ANN. Sec. 15.1-503.2 (Supp. 1988). 
50 
approval. For example, Connecticut provides that two-thirds of the owners have to vote 
affirmatively for a proposed district in order for it to become a historic district.58 
Currently, most historical district statutes use cultural, architectural, and 
historical significance as criteria.59 One could possibly read archaeology into these 
criteria, but few states explicitly specify archaeological resources as criteria to be 
evaluated in the designation process.60 Nevertheless, historic district statutes and 
ordinances can easily be amended to require review of archaeological resources in the 
designa tion process. 
The basic procedure in designating a historic district remains generally the same 
throughout the states. The process begins with the "historic preservation committee" 
that investigates and recommends landmarks or districts to the appropriate zoning or 
planning agency for designation as historic districts. The governing body then may pass 
ordinances or statutes designating the area as a historic district. The preservation 
committee then usually controls the district; its members are primarily represented by 
experts in history, architecture, and possibly archaeology. Any new structures to be 
built or changes to the exteriors of buildings in the district have to be approved by the 
commission with what is called a certificate of appropriateness. Lou isia na is 
unique in prohibiting excavations without a certificate of appropriateness if earthworks 
of historical or archaeological importance exist in the historic district.61 When the 
commission denies a certificate of appropriateness for modification or construction, the 
property owner can then appeal the decision to the appropriate governing body over the 
commission, and then to a court of competent jurisdiction.62 Under the historic district 
procedure, the property owner's interest in a viable economic use of his property is 
protected, while the public's interest in maintaining the historical identity of the area 
is preserved. 
As of 1983, 800 to 1000 communities in the United States have created 
preservation committees at the local level, a jump from a mere II in 1957.63 The 
phenomenal jump can be credited in some part to the Supreme Court's decision in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.64 The facts in Penn Central involved the city 
58 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 7-147b (West 1988). 
59 New Hampshire uses "cultural, social, economic, political and architectural 
history". N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31 :89a (1988). 
60 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE Sec. 67-4607 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, 
sec. 6503 (Smith-Hurd 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. Sec. 399.202 (West 1988); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. Sec. 1-19B-34 (1985). 
61 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 25:737 (West 1988). 
62 [d. 
63 R. RODDEWIG, PREPARING A HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCE I 
(1983). 
64 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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designation of Grand Central Terminal as a landmark, thus subjecting it to unique 
regulations. and whether such designation constituted a "taking" under the Fifth 
Amendment. The Court generally held that state landmark designation. and thus 
historic district designation, does not constitute a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court noted it had upheld land use regulations for the health, safety, morals. or 
general ~elfare that nevertheless destroyed or adversely affected recognized real 
property interests.65 But, "a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' 
if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose ... or 
perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property."66 
In Penn Central's case, the Court held the landmark designation statute was not 
discriminatory zoning, since it was part of a comprehensive plan to preserve historic or 
aesthetic sites in the city, and the designation was not arbitrary since the owner had a 
right to judicial review.67 The Court concluded the landmark designation was not a 
"taking" because the restrictions were substantially related to the promotion of the 
general welfare and still permitted reasonable beneficial use of the site.68 
Historic districts are arguably in a better position than landmarks as a result of 
Penn Central. Penn Central did not dispute that a showing of property value diminution 
would not esta blish a "taking" if the restriction had been imposed as a result of historic 
district legislation.69 The Court also noted that duties imposed by zoning and historic 
district legislation that apply throughout particular physical communities provide 
assurances against arbitrariness.7o 
One can infer from Penn Central that in order for historic district designations 
to be constitutional, they can not be arbitrary and must provide for reasonable 
beneficial use by the owner. The cure for arbitrariness is specific criteria?' The 
ordinance should also permit the owner to enjoy the beneficial use of the property, 
either economically or personally. Consequently, with ordinances covering 
65 [d. at 125. 
66 [d. at 127. 
67 [d. at 132, 133. 
68 [d. at 138. 
69 [d. at 131. The Court cited Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (1975), 
which upheld the Vieux Carre ordinance, an architectural control ordinance applicable 
to New Orlean's French Quarter, as a permissive means to pursue the legitimate state 
goal of preserving the "tout ensemble" of the Quarter. The property owner did not show 
a "taking" because he did not prove the ordinance denied him a reasonable rate of 
return on his property. 
70 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135. 
71 Alaska provides that a historic district is a compact area of historical 
significance in which two or more structures important in state or national history are 
located. "Structures important in state or national history" is defined as property listed 
in the National Register of Historic Places, characteristic of the Russian-American 
period before 1867, early territorial period before 1930, or reflecting indigenous 
characteristics of Native culture in Alaska. ALASKA STAT. Sec. 29.55.020 (1986). 
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archaeological sites, preservation or excavation of the site should not be duly 
unreasonable so as to destroy the owner's business, for example. In any event, the right 
to judicial r~view of a historic district designation and of denial of a certificate of 
appropriateness mitigates any damage the regulation might entail. Judicial review can 
adequately reconcile a property owner's desire to utilize his property with the public's 
interest in preserving its cultural heritage. 
THE ALEXANDRIA ARCHAEOLOGY PRESER V A TION CODE 
The city of Alexandria, Virginia, has proposed an ordinance system which would 
require archaeological survey work on any site slated for development. The Code was 
first proposed in 1984; subsequent research by the Alexandria Archaeology Commission 
revealed that only five jurisdictions in the U.S. require archaeological work prior to 
development (including Santa Fe, N.M. and Dade County, Fla.). A draft code, written 
by Assistant City Attorney Ignacio Pessoa, was then sent to the City Council in June 
1987. A revised draft was completed in March 1988; the ordinance is now further being 
revised before public hearings and a vote by the City Council.72 
The Archaeology Preservation Code requires an archaeological clearance before 
grading or excavation can be undertaken on a site, depending on the area in which the 
site is 10cated.73 On receipt of an archaeological clearance application, the city 
archaeologist conducts or accepts an independent archaeological assessment of the 
activity. The assessment may include a history, extent and location of ground 
disturbances, previous acts of ground disturbance, type and quantity of predicted 
archaeological resources on the site, and analysis of the public value of the site relating 
to its cultural heritage. The city archaeologist shall determine in the assessment the 
probability of adverse effects on archaeological resources by the activity, the benefit 
to be derived from preservation of the archaeological resources, and an archaeology 
management plan to be performed by the city or the applicant to secure the public 
benefits identified.74 The Code provides criteria for determining the significance of 
archaeological resources on a site.75 
If the city archaeologist determines the proposed activity would have no adverse 
effects on any archaeological resources on the site, he shall issue an excavation permit. 
But if the activity will have adverse effects on such resources, the city archaeologist 
and applicant are to decide on a management plan. Management plans may include 
monitoring of the excavation, surface reconnaissance, and full-scale excavations and in 
72 P. Cressey, The Director's Chair, 6 ALEXANDRIA ARCHAEOLOGY 
VOLUNTEER NEWS 2 (April 1988). 
73 Old Town Alexandria, the designated historic district, entails the most protection, 
then parcels with buildings over one hundred years old on them, and so on. ARCH. PRES. 
CODE Sec. 7-6-344 to 346. 
74 [d. at Sec. 7-6-348. 
75 [d. at Sec. 7-6-350. 
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place preservation; all resources found on private land, however, remain property of the 
land owner.16 Once a management plan is determined, a permit is issued, 
conditioned on fulfillment of the requirements of the management plan.77 The 
applicant further has right of appeal to the Archaeology Preservation Code Committee, 
the City Council, and then to the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria.78 Alexandria 
has thus formulated an ordinance system designed to protect its archaeological 
resources, patterned on established historic district ordinances as applied to structures. 
Whether the Code can survive the influence of the real estate lobby and pass in its 
present form, only time will tell. 
CONCLUSION 
Archaeology has slowly been recognized as a part of our cultural heritage 
deemed worthy of protection in the public interest. States have wholeheartedly 
protected archaeological resources on state lands, but have been reticent about treading 
on the rights of private property. Whether states will expand the principle that a 
private land owner cannot use his property so as to harm the public interest (and thus 
protect archaeological sites on private land) depends on the public interest. Extensive 
protection of such sites on private land is premised on the assumption that the public 
actually cares. 
Given the proliferation of historic district commissions, one can safely assume 
there is growing interest in the preservation of our cultural heritage. Comprehensive 
permit procedures, comprehensive land use statutes recognizing archaeological 
preservation, and archaeology ordinances in the historic district setting should be 
enacted to further the public welfare. The examples in the introduction are merely 
typical; the discovery of archaeological sites in construction sites happens every week. 
The preservation of man's cultural heritage requires more control over the actions of 
private property owners. To allow a land owner to destroy or excavate a site without 
any control or procedures is like taking words out of context - the essential meaning is 
lost forever. 
76 [d. at Sec. 7-6-351. 
77 [d. at Sec. 7-6-352. 
78 [d. at Sec. 7-6-368 to 70. 
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IRRESISTIBLE FORCE MEETS IMMOVABLE OBJECT: 
WHEN THE ZONING POWER COMES UP AGAINST FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Will Murphy 
INTRODUCTION 
When state and local governments establish land use restrictions that hinge, at 
least in part, on the nature of expression made on the premises, the police power cases 
and First Amendment precedents are both implicated. Yet the standards in the two 
areas are vastly different. This conflict often arises in the context of a challenge to a 
zoning law that restricts adult entertainment establishments. Beginning with Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty,' the Supreme Court has developed standards for reviewing exercises of 
the police power in the form of land use restrictions. The Court has shown great 
deference to the states in this area, defining broadly the goals which it will consider 
permissible for state action and viewing tenuous connections between purpose and 
action as sufficient to pass constitutional muster. In the area of free expression, the 
precedents are much less favorable to the government. Speech, including conduct that 
is equivalent to speech, is generally afforded substantial protection. 
How is the Court to analyze a case to which both of these lines of cases apply? 
Should it view the problem as a possible infringement on free expression and apply a 
high level of scrutiny? Is it more appropriate to determine the level of review and the 
questions to be asked by making reference to the power being exercised and, thus, give 
deference to the state? 
This paper will briefly examine the history and development of each of these 
two areas of the law. It will then examine those cases that have come before the Court 
that have involved both areas. Finally, there will be a discussion of possible flaws in 
the Court's treatment of these cases and recommendations for resolving the conflict 
between these areas of the law. 
Suggested changes in the Court's analysis include adoption of standards from 
First Amendment law rather than only the generally deferential tests that are found in 
the police power cases, abandonment of the "secondary effects" test for 
content-neutrality and a more realistic approach to the question of the availability of 
alternative avenues of communication. 
, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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THE ZONING POWER: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LIMITS 
A BRIEF HISTORY WITH SELECTED PRECEDENTS 
The first comprehensive land use regulation was that of the City of New York 
in 1916.2 The genesis of the statute was a conflict between the owners of fashionable 
shops and the owners of factories in the garment district. The garment district, 
historically confined to the southern part of the city, had been expanding and 
encroaching on the shop areas. The shop owners lobbied for legislation to confine the 
factories. 3 
On March 25, 1911, the Triangle Shirt Waist Company fire killed over 140 
garment workers. An investigation revealed that the factory had been poorly 
constructed and that all means of escape from the building had been locked from the 
outside to prevent employees from avoiding their work. This event turned the political 
tide in favor of the shop owners.4 The state legislature Quickly gave the city zoning 
power and the ordinance came soon thereafter.5 
The Supreme Court did not address the validity of the power to zone for ten 
years after the passage of the New York ordinance. When it did, it was not the 
metropolis of New York that was challenged, but the Village of Euclid.6 The Ambler 
Realty Company had, for fifteen years, bought and sold land in Euclid. When it sold 
a parcel for residential use, it inserted a restrictive covenant in the deed, so that the 
land could only be used for residential purposes. At the same time, Ambler was keeping 
an island of unrestricted land. Ambler would eventually have had a stranglehold on the 
market for land that was available for commercial use? 
Unfortunately for Ambler, Euclid passed an ordinance which, inter alia, 
restricted the uses of the land in some parts of the village. Potential uses of land were 
placed in a hierarchy. Parks and single-family residences were among the highest uses. 
The lowest class of uses included such things as garbage incineration facilities and 
prisons.S The statutory plan was a "cumulative" one, meaning that land could be put to 
a higher use than it was zoned for, but not a lower one. If an area was zoned for the 
2 S. K UR TZ & H. HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN 
PROPERTY LAW 884 (1987). 
3 [d. at 884. 
4 [d. 
5 [d. 
6 Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
7 See generally S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2. 
8 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 381 (there was another class of uses excluded completely). 
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highest uses, most commercial activities were prohibited.9 Significant restrictions were 
placed on some of the tracts owned by Ambler. 10 
Ambler brought suit, alleging that it had held the land for years for the purpose 
of industrial development, that the land was especially adapted to such uses, and that 
its market value would be reduced by sixty-five to seventy-five percent by the 
restrictions.11 The Supreme Court held, 6-3, that the ordinance was a valid exercise of 
the state's police power and was not a taking without due process of law. 12 The extent 
of legitimate power to zone depended on the circumstances in which it was exercised. 
Unable to draw a precise boundary, the Court pointed to the common law of nuisance 
as a guide. 13 Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, noted, "[a] nuisance may be 
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard."14 Deference was to be accorded to the judgment of the legislature. In fact, 
before the Court would declare a land use ordinance unconstitutional, it would have to 
be shown that the ordinance was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."15 
The result in this case is somewhat surprising, coming as it did during the 
"liberty of contract" or "Lochner" era. The Court had struck down many statutes that 
regulated employment on the theory that individuals had a right to make their own 
contracts. 16 Yet in Euclid 17 and in Welch v. Swasey,18 a case involving a challenge to a 
restriction on the heights of buildings, the Court upheld significant restrictions on the 
right to contract for construction and for the full use of one's land. 
The cases in the two areas (land use and employment) could be distinguished on 
the basis of greater externalities in the land use context. 19 The Court may have 
believed that an employment contract did not have substantial effects on non-parties, 
9 [d. at 380-81. 
10 [d. at 383. 
11 [d. at 384-84. 
12 [d. at 397. 
13 [d. at 387. 
14 [d. at 388. 
15 [d. at 395. 
16 S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 882. 
17 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365. 
18 214 U.S. 91 (1909). 
19 S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 883. Theories of externalities 
had become well-developed by 1926. The Court's apparent appreciation of the 
difficulty of the "free rider" problem (apartments that took advantage of the lower 
density of surrounding areas) lends more credibility to the suggestion that these theories 
motivated the Court. However, it is more likely that the observations as to "free riders" 
were based on common sense and intuition, not a conceptual theory. 
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while decisions as to land use did. A more likely explanation of the greater deference 
shown by the Court in the cases involving restrictions on land use is the long history of 
governmental regulations affecting land use. There have been such regulations in 
England for over 600 years.20 After the Euclid decision, many municipalities imitated 
the statute that was challenged in that case. Cumulative zoning was widely used.21 
Planners felt that residential areas needed protection from encroachment by commercial 
uses. However, the reverse, that commercial uses might need protection from 
encroachment by residential areas, was not a widely held view.22 Thus, the ideal system 
was one that kept commercial uses from burdening residential areas with their 
unwanted presence, but did not keep an individual or family from building a home 
among the factories. 
In 1928, the Court decided Neetow v. Cambridge,23 a case that was similar to 
Euclid in several respects: the plaintiff had land that had been zoned residential and 
he wanted to sell it for commercial use.24 Here, in contrast to the result in Euclid, the 
Court found that the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated.25 The 
plaintiff's land, a narrow strip, was surrounded by industrial facilities. As zoned, it 
was worthless.26 Unlike Euclid, this was a challenge to the statute as applied, not a 
facial challenge.27 The Court found that the application of the statute in this instance 
was not integral to the general plan and bore no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.28 
The trend today is away from "cumulative" zoning and toward "exclusive" 
restrictions. Under an "exclusive" zoning statute there is no hierarchy of uses. For each 
area certain uses are permitted. All others are excluded.29 Planners now believe that 
some of the uses that were thought of as lower under the cumulative schemes need 
protection from uses that were thought of as higher; that, for instance, some commercial 
uses need protection from residential development.30 
20 D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 1 (1988). "Public control of land use has a 
long history." According to Mandelker, the Romans had building site restrictions in the 
fourth century, B.C. Id. 
21 S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 887. 
22 Id. at 887. 
23 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
24 Id. at 187. 
25 /d. at 188-89. 
26 Id. at 187. 
27 Id. at 185. 
28 Id. at 188-89. 
29 S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 887. 
30 Id. at 887. 
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LAND USE RESTRICTIONS V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES 
In the 1970's, the Court dealt with challenges to statutes restricting those who 
could live together. The Village of Belle Terre passed an ordinance that allowed only 
one "family" to live in the same house. A "family" could include any number of related 
persons, but could not include more than two unrelated persons.31 In Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, the Court heard a challenge to the ordinance on the grounds of equal 
protection and the rights of association, travel and privacy.32 The majority analyzed 
the case as an exercise of the police power.33 It specifically found that no fundamental 
right guaranteed by the Constitution was involved.34 
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the plaintiff attacked a statute that made it 
illegal for her to live with her grandson.35 The Court distinguished the facts before it 
in Moore from Belle Terre on the ground that the Belle Terre statute affected only 
unrelated persons.36 The Court explicitly refused to extend the "usual judicial 
deference" to the legislature in Moore because the case dealt with a regulation of the 
family. Finding that such an intrusion threatened the right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governed this 
case.37 Although the facts of Belle Terre are quite similar to those of Moore, the Court's 
analysis in Moore was much more searching and less deferential. The reason for this 
difference is that the Court found that a fundamental right was implicated in Moore, 
while it explicitly found that none was involved in Belle Terre. 
SUMMARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON ZONING 
States can delegate to their subdivisions the power to regulate the uses of land as 
part of their police power.38 This power can only be used for certain purposes, but 
these purposes are defined very broadly -- the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.39 Such a broad definition does not make fertile ground for facial challenges 
31 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,2 (1973). 
32 [d. at 7. 
33 [d. at 7-9. 
34 [d. at 7. 
35 431 U.S. 494, 497 (1977). 
36 [d. at 498. 
37 [d. at 498-99. 
38 Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
39 [d. at 395. 
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to zoning laws,40 but the possibility remains that the Court will find that no relation 
exists between a particular application of a law and one of the permissible purposes.41 
A statute is also vulnerable if it infringes on a fundamental right.42 
FREE EXPRESSION 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment protects, inter alia, freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press.43 These freedoms, when considered together, shall be referred to as "freedom of 
expression." Where the protection of these guarantees is sought, the Court must first 
determine whether there has indeed been any expression. This becomes an issue where 
a litigant engages in nonverbal conduct which he alleges is expression. If the Court 
finds that there has been expression which has been restricted, it must then decide if 
that expression is obscene and thus deserving of no First Amendment protection. If the 
expression is not obscene it may still be offensive, in which instance it will receive some 
protection, but not full protection. 
ARGUABL Y EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT 
David Paul O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate (draft 
card) on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.44 Destruction of the certificate was 
a violation of federallaw.45 In United States v. O'Brien, the Court expressly rejected the 
view that all sorts of conduct could be labelled speech even if the actor intended for the 
conduct to express an idea.46 The Court viewed the conduct in this case as having both 
communicative and non-communicative elements.47 Where such elements were found 
in the same conduct, "a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the 
non-speech elements can justify incidental limitations on" the speech elements.48 For 
40 [d. 
41 See Neetow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
42 See Moore v. City 0/ East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1976). But e/. Village 0/ 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,7-10 (1974) (scrutinizing claim that rights of association, 
travel, privacy and due process were violated by a zoning ordinance). The Court 
ultimately found that no fundamental right was violated. 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. I 
44 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968). 
45 [d. at 370-71. 
46 [d. at 376. 
47 [d. at 376, 381-82. 
48 [d. at 376. 
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a government regulation under the police power that affects freedom of expression to 
be permissible, it must be within the constitutional power of the government and 
further a substantial state interest which is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression. Any incidental restriction on First Amendment rights must be no more than 
what is necessary to further that state interest.49 
The Court, in upholding O'Brien's conviction, distinguished the case from 
Stromberg v. California. 50 In Stromberg, the Court struck down a statute that made it 
illegal to express opposition to organized government by displaying a flag, badge, 
banner or device.51 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in O'Brien, found that 
the Stromberg case was distinguishable because the statute in that case was aimed at 
suppressing communication and could not, therefore, be upheld as a regulation of 
noncommunicative conduct.52 
A year after O'Brien, the Court invalidated the suspensions of high school 
students for wearing black arm bands as a protest to United States policy in Vietnam.53 
The Court found that such symbolic action was "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and 
therefore entitled to "comprehensive protection.,,54 The Court acknowledged that the 
school environment has special characteristics,55 but as long as the expressive conduct 
was not disruptive, it was entitled to First Amendment protection.56 "Undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble."57 
Thus, arguably expressive conduct may either be "symbolic· or it may be a mix 
of communicative and non-communicative elements. In the former case, the Court will 
view the conduct as virtually "pure speech" and afford it commensurate constitutional 
protection.58 In the latter case, the Court will apply the test of O'Brien, determining if 
the restriction at issue is within the power of the government under the Constitution, 
whether it furthers a substantial governmental interest, whether that interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and whether any incidental restriction 
49 [d. at 377. 
50 [d. at 382 (distinguishing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931». 
51 283 U.S. at 361, 369-70. 
52 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
53 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 
( 1969). 
54 [d. at 505-06. 
55 [d. at 506. 
56 [d. at 508. 
57 [d. 
58 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
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on constitutionally protected expression is limited to that which is necessary to further 
that interest.59 
UNPROTECTED SPEECH 
Not all expression is protected by the First Amendment. Some expression is 
considered of too little value to be protected.60 In Roth v. United States,61 the Court 
heard two cases involving First Amendment claims. In the first case, Roth published 
and sold books, photographs and magazines. He was convicted of mailing obscene 
materials in violation of the federal obscenity statute.62 Alberts, the appellant in the 
other case, was convicted of violating a California statute by keeping obscene books for 
the purpose of selling them and by writing and publishing an obscene advertisement of 
them.63 In affirming the convictions, the Court declared that "ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance ... have the full protection of the [First 
Amendment] unless excludable because they encroach upon ... more important interests."64 
However, the Court specifically excluded obscenity from the area of constitutional 
protection.65 This holding required the Court to define obscenity. 
That task proved to be quite difficult for the Court. In Roth, the Court offered 
a test: if to the " ... average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal[ed] to the prurient interest" in 
sex, the material was obscene.66 
The members of the Court could not, however, reach any lasting agreement as 
to the standard. In the ten years following Roth, the thirteen obscenity cases that came 
before the Court produced fifty-five separate opinions. Five different views 
developed.67 One was shared by three justices. Warren, Brennan and Fortas laid out 
their test in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.68 In their view, for material to be considered 
obscene, the government had to show that the dominant theme of the material, taken as 
a whole, appealed to the prurient interest in sex; that the material was patently 
59 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
60 E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
61 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
62 [d. at 480. 
63 [d. at 481. 
64 [d. at 484. 
65 [d. at 485. 
66 [d. at 489. 
67 See generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M TUSHNET, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1121 (1986). 
68 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). 
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offensive because it affronted contemporary community standards relating to 
description or representation of sexual matters; and that it was utterly without socially 
redeeming value.69 This was the test generally followed by the lower courts.1° 
Redrup v. New Yore' marked the beginning of the Court's practice of issuing per 
curiam reversals of convictions for the sale or exhibition of materials which five or 
more members of the Court found not to be obscene. From 1967 to 1973, thirty-one 
cases were disposed of in this fashion. This became known as the Redrup approach.n 
Miller v. California was decided in 1973. The Court's opinion laid out a new, 
three-part test. Material was obscene if: the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find the work as a whole appealing to the prurient 
interest; the work depicted or described, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
that was specifically defined by the applicable state law; and the work as a whole 
lacked serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.73 
Two facets of the Miller test are especially noteworthy. First, it rejects the 
"utterly without socially redeeming value" test of Memoirs.14 The standard it uses, lack 
of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, makes it much easier to find 
material obscene. Second, it allows local standards to enter the determination -- there 
is no national definition of obscenity.75 The Miller test is now the standard for 
obscenity. 
OFFENSIVE SPEECH 
If expression is not found to be obscene under the Miller test, it is entitled to 
constitutional protection. However, the Supreme Court has recognized a category of 
expression which is not obscene, but which is, because of its offensive nature, of too 
little value to receive the full protection of the First Amendment. In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, the Court listed the types of expression for which a citizen could be 
punished. Among these types were the "lewd" and the "profane." The Court found that 
such utterances were not needed for the communication of ideas and were of "slight 
social value as a step to the truth."76 
23. 
69 [d. at 419-20. 
70 G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 1121. 
71 386 U.S. 767 (1967). 
n G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 1122-
73 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). 
74 [d. at 24-25. 
75 [d. at 30. 
76 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
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In 1968, Paul Robert Cohen was arrested for wearing a jacket with the words 
"Fuck the Draft" written on it. He was convicted of disturbing the peace by offensive 
conduct.77 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction.78 The state clearly could 
not punish Cohen for the underlying content of his message.79 Further, the state, in its 
role as guardian of the public morality, could not be allowed to remove from the public 
vocabulary words it deemed offensive.so Because "[o]ne man's vulgarity is another's 
lyric," "the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style largely to the individual."8' 
A truly captive audience might have been entitled to protection from Cohen's 
expression,82 but the "ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut 
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing that 
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an .. .intolerable manner."83 This was 
so even though "[w]e are often 'captives' outside ... the home."84 The emotive function of 
words was often the most important element of the overall message,8S so that a finding 
that the same cognitive thought could be expressed without that particular word would 
not extinguish a First Amendment claim. 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court heard a challenge to the power of the 
Federal Communications Commission to enforce a content-based regulation against a 
radio broadcast that was "indecent but not obscene."86 The broadcast was a satirical 
monologue by George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words."87 The FCC prevailed.88 Offensive 
expression was "not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all 
circumstances."89 Context was an essential consideration.9O Broadcasts entered the 
home, and because the audience could tune in at any moment, prior warnings could not 
77 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971). 
78 [d. at 26. 
79 [d. at 18. 
80 [d. at 23-25. 
8' [d. at 25. 
82 See id. at 21-22. 
83 [d. at 21. 
84 [d. 
8S [d. at 26. 
86 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). 
87 [d. 
88 [d. at 750-51. 
89 [d. at 747-48 (opinion of three justices). 
90 [d. 
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provide complete protection to an unwitting listener. Nor was it a complete remedy that 
the listener could turn off the radio if he heard indecent language.91 
If the Court determines that expression is not obscene under Miller, but is 
offensive, lewd or profane, it will examine the context in which the expression is found. 
If the audience is "captive," the Court is more likely to find that regulation of the 
expression is permissible. If there are youths present in the audience, particularly if 
they are able to be exposed to the expression without parental consent, the Court will 
be more willing to uphold a regulation of the expression. 
WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: THE POLICE POWER MEETS FREE EXPRESSION 
The Court has issued a few landmark decisions in cases involving conflict 
between the police power, in the form of land use restrictions, and First Amendment 
values as embodied in adult entertainment. The variation in the analysis used in these 
cases and the inconsistency in the outcomes reveal that the conflict between police 
power precedents and the jurisprudence of free expression is a perplexing one for the 
Court. 
Jacksonville, Florida passed an ordinance which declared that it was a public 
nuisance for a drive-in theater to show a movie which displayed any of several 
specified parts of the human anatomy if the picture was visible from any public place.92 
The Court closely examined the arguments offered by the city in defense of the 
ordinance in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville. The Court focused on the nature of the speech 
being regulated and used language from First Amendment jurisprudence.93 The Court 
declared that the ordinance was unconstitutional.94 
The ordinance could not be upheld as a time, place and manner regulation 
because it was not content-neutral; nor was there a sufficiently captive audience to 
justify state intervention.95 The ordinance swept too broadly to be upheld as an 
exercise of the state's police power to protect children. The scope of the ordinance was 
not restricted to nudity which would be obscene, even as to children.96 The scope was 
too narrow for Jacksonville to successfully defend the statute on the ground that it was 
necessary to prevent motorists from being distracted. The Court found " ... no reason to 
think that a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet ... would be any less 
distracting to the passing motorist."97 
91 [d. at 748-49. 
92 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206-7 (1975). 
93 See id. 
94 [d. at 217-18. 
95 [d. at 209-12. 
96 [d. at 212-14. 
97 [d. at 214-15. 
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A deeply divided Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance against a First 
Amendment challenge in Young v. Amf!rican Mini-Theatres.98 The challenged statute 
classified certain enterprises, including adult theaters, as ·regulated uses.· It required 
that an adult theater not be located within 1000 feet of any two other ·regulated uses· 
or within 500 feet of a residential area.99 Justice Stevens, writing for four members of 
the Court, noted, "[fJew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to 
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters 
of our choice.,,100 
Although the state could not validly enact a total suppression of this type of 
communication, "[tJhe State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the 
basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.,,101 The 
remaining question was whether this classification was justified by any interest of the 
city. Stating that "[tJhe city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life 
is one that must be accorded high respect," and that the city should be allowed to •... 
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems,"102 Justice Stevens found that 
the classification was justified. 103 The plurality opinion admitted that the restriction 
was content-based, but found it constitutionally permissible because it was viewpoint 
neutra1. 104 
Justice Powell concurred and found that First Amendment concerns were 
implicated only incidentally. 105 He saw no denial of a full opportunity for expression 
to convey its desired message nor of a full opportunity for everyone to receive it. 106 
The rest of Powell's opinion provided a look at things to come.107 He found that Detroit 
had made no effort to suppress free expression. 108 The case, he argued, was not to be 
seen as involving a content-based restriction on the time, place or manner of 
98 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
99 [d. at 52. See also id. at 53-54. 
100 [d. at 70. 
101 [d. at 70-71. 
102 [d. at 71. 
103 [d. at 71-72. 
104 [d. at 70. 
105 [d. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring). 
106 [d. at 78-9 (Powell, J., concurring). 
107 Compare id. at 73-84 (Powell, J., concurring) with Renton v.Playtime Theaters, 
475 U.S. 41 (1986) (each giving deference to state actor and lending credence to claims 
of neutrality toward content). 
108 [d. at 80-81 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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communication. Rather, the city had decided to treat certain movies differently 
because they had a different effect on their surroundings. 109 
The dissenting opinion of four of the justices argued that if First Amendment 
protection applied only to expression which more than a few of us would go to war to 
defend, then popular opinion would define the scope of an essential part of the Bill of 
Rights. 110 This was counter to the purpose of the Bill of Rights, which, according to the 
dissenters, was "designed to protect against precisely such majoritarian limits on 
individual liberty." 111 The dissent also noted the significant similarities between the 
facts of this case and those of Erznoznik, decided only one year earlier. 112 
The statute challenged in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim excluded all live 
entertainment from the borough. 113 The appellants operated an adult bookstore. The 
store contained coin-operated devices which showed adult films. When the operators of 
the store added a coin-operated device that allowed a customer to see a live 
performance by a nude dancer behind a glass panel, they were convicted of violating 
the prohibition on live entertainment.114 
The Court found the convictions unconstitutional. 115 Entertainment, including 
nude dancing, was entitled to First Amendment protection.116 The right assertedly 
threatened, not the power being exercised, determined the standard of review. 117 When 
a zoning law infringed on a First Amendment right, it had to be narrowly drawn and 
had to further a sufficiently substantial state interest. 118 
109 [d. at 80-82 (Powell, J., concurring). 
110 [d. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 88 (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
("The factual parallels between that case and this one are striking. 
There, as here, the ordinance did not forbid altogether the 'distasteful' 
expression but merely required an alteration in the physical setting of the 
forum. There, as here, the city's principal asserted interest was in 
minimizing 'undesirable' effects of speech having a particular content. 
And, most significantly, the particular content of the restricted speech at 
issue in Erznoznik precisely parallels the content restriction embodied 
in ... Detroit's ... " ordinance. "In short, Erznoznik is almost on 'all fours' with 
this case."). [d. 
113 452 U.S. 61, 63, 64 (1981). 
114 [d. at 62-64. 
115 [d. at 65, 77. 
116 [d. at 65-66. 
117 [d. at 68 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-530 (1945». 
118 [d. at 68. 
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The Borough claimed that the ordinance was part of its plan to create a 
commercial area that catered only to immediate needs of residents. 119 However, many 
of the permitted uses went well beyond such a purpose.120 Under Mt. Ephraim's 
statutory scheme, "[v]irtually the only item or service that [could] not be sold in a 
commercial zone [was] entertainment. ... "121 Further, the Borough failed to show that 
problems associated with live entertainment were greater than those associated with 
permitted uses, so that the ordinance could not be upheld as a reasonable restriction on 
time, place or manner.122 
In addition, the ordinance did not leave open adequate alternative avenues of 
communication, a requirement for it to be upheld as a valid time, place or manner 
restriction. 123 The Court suggested in dicta that if the county had been the zoning 
authority and it had excluded live entertainment from the Borough, but not from the 
entire county, the restriction might have been upheld. The Court also indicated that its 
ruling might have been different if the Borough had established that live entertainment 
was available in reasonably nearby areas. 124 
The Court made its most recent pronouncement on the state of the law in this 
area when it handed down City oj Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc. 125 The ordinance was 
designed to concentrate on adult theaters 126 by forbidding them to locate within 1000 
feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park or 
school. 127 Writing for the six-member majority (B1ackmun concurred in the result), 
Rehnquist viewed the resolution of the case as being largely dictated by Young v. 
American Mini-Theatres. 128 Because the ordinance did not ban adult theaters completely, 
the Court decided that it should be analyzed as a time, place or manner restriction. 129 
Finding that the ordinance was aimed only at " ... the secondary effects of such theaters 
on the surrounding community," and " ... not at the content of the films," the majority 
ruled that the regulation was content-neutral and, as such, was acceptable if it was 
119 Id. at 72. 
120 Id. at 73. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 73 ("[P]roblems that may be associated with live entertainment, such as 
parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities."). 
123 Id. at 75-77. 
124 Id. at 76. 
125 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
126 Id. at 52. 
127 Id. at 43. 
128 Id. at 46. 
129 Id. 
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designed to serve a substantial government interest and did not unreasonably limit 
alternative avenues of communication.130 
The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial state 
interest.131 The ordinance stated that its purpose was to "prevent crime, protect the 
city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the 
quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban 
life' .... ·132 Rehnquist noted that the ordinance did not declare its purpose to be the 
suppression of free expression. He also opined that the city would have tried to close 
the theaters or restrict their number instead of just restricting their location if it had 
been trying to suppress their message.133 The majority opinion buttresses its assertion 
that the purposes of the ordinance were permissible by pointing to Renton's reliance on 
the experiences of Seattle and Detroit and on its own "findings" from public hearings. 134 
Playtime Theatres contended that the ordinance was underinclusive because it 
did not regulate other adult businesses that were likely to produce secondary effects 
similar to those of adult theaters. To rebut this contention the majority pointed to the 
lack of evidence of any such businesses in Renton. The Court found no reason to 
assume that Renton would not amend its ordinance if the need arose. 13S 
The majority found that the ordinance easily met the constitutional requirement 
of providing for adequate alternative avenues of communication. The ordinance left 
520 acres, about five of the area of the city, as potential sites for adult theaters. The 
majority was not persuaded by the appellants' arguments that much of the land was 
already occupied, that almost none of it was for sale or lease and that there were no 
commercially viable adult theater sites within the specified 520 acres. "That 
respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing 
with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a first amendment 
violation."136 The government does not have to ensure that a speech-related business 
will be able to get a site at a bargain.137 
130 [d. at 47-50. 
131 [d. at 50-51. 
132 [d. at 48. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. at 50-52. 
135 [d. at 52-53. 
136 [d. at 54. 
137 [d. 
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A MORE COMPREHENSIVE STANDARD 
SOURCE OF STANDARDS 
The standards for review of government actions should be both those raised by 
the right implicated and those tied to the power exercised. Different powers of 
government pose different dangers and potentials for abuse. Thus, challenged exercises 
of those powers should be held to a minimum standard, regardless of the context in 
which they are exercised. In addition, different rights have different roles, different 
levels of importance and different vulnerabilities. In recognition of this, when an 
exercise of governmental power infringes on a constitutionally protected right, a 
standard of review commensurate with that right should be imposed. 
To be more specific, the zoning power is broad. The purposes for which it may 
be employed are broad. However, if a statute, or a particular application of a statute, 
does not serve these purposes, it should be struck down. Where the exercise of zoning 
power infringes on a constitutional liberty, such as freedom of expression, a 
"permissible purpose" should be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for upholding 
the state action. 
Imposing only the standard attached to the power involved, without reference 
to the freedom infringed, would allow the government, by being selective about how it 
enforces its will, to select a low standard of review for its own actions, even where the 
most vital guarantees for personal liberty are involved. 
To impose only the standard connected with the right implicated might allow the 
government to employ its powers in dangerous ways. It would also give government a 
free reign in areas which involve no freedom for which the Court acknowledges 
constitutional protection. 
SUGGESTED ANALYSIS 138 
POLICE POWER. When the Court encounters a case in which a zoning ordinance 
impacts an adult entertainment establishment,139 it should first determine whether the 
ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power. The Court should require the 
individual challenging the statute to show that the statute is "clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare."140 If the person making the challenge can make this showing, then the 
138 The proposed analysis begins from the premise that the precedents in each area 
are correct interpretations of the Constitution. 
139 The proposed analysis is suitable for any case in which an exercise of the police 
power is alleged to infringe on free expression. Challenges to restrictions on adult 
entertainment establishments are simply a common context for such to arise. 
140 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395.(1926) (quoting Cusack 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530-1 (1917». 
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case should be over -- the statute should be declared unconstitutional. If the person 
making the challenge can make this showing as to a particular application of the statute 
then the Court should enjoin that application. 141 
DOES THE ORDINANCE RESTRICT "SPEECH"? If the statute survives the "police 
power" test above, then the Court should inquire whether the conduct affected by the 
statute is, in fact, speech. If the conduct is verbal, the Court should generally have no 
difficulty finding that it is speech. If the conduct is nonverbal, the Court may find 
either that it is not speech at all, that it has both communicative and noncommunicative 
elements,142 or that it is symbolic -- nearly "pure speech."143 If it is not speech, the 
statute should be upheld. 
If the conduct has both communicative and noncommunicative elements, the 
Court should apply the three-point test of O'Brien: whether the statute is within the 
constitutional power of the government; whether the purpose of the statute is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression; and whether any incidental restriction on First 
Amendment rights is no more than is necessary to further that governmental interest. 144 
If the statute passes all three prongs of this test, the Court should uphold it. If it fails 
any of them, or if the conduct is symbolic, then the Court should progress to the next 
step in the analysis. 
OBSCENITY. If the case has not been resolved by the foregoing analysis, the Court 
should determine whether the speech involved is obscene. It should make this 
determination by applying the test put forth in Miller v. California: whether the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work as a 
whole appealed to the prurient interest; whether the work is a patently offensive 
depiction of sexual conduct that has been specifically defined by the relevant state law; 
and whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value. 145 If the c'ommunicative conduct that is restricted meets all of these criteria, it 
is unprotected. 146 The person challenging the statute has no more claim than he or she 
would if there was no speech. The statute should be upheld. 
OFFENSIVE SPEECH. If the Court finds that the expression is not obscene, it should 
decide whether it is profane, libelous, or insulting.147 If it is not, the Court should 
141 Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
142 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
143 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
144 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
145 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). 
146 [d. at 23. 
147 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
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proceed to the next step which is in the next paragraph. If the expression is offensive, 
lewd or profane, the Court should examine the context of the expression. l48 The factors 
that the Court examines would include the presence of youths in the audience, the 
existence of a "captive" or unwilling audience and the expectations of those who are 
exposed to the expression unwittingly. 
In the usual adult entertainment setting there will presumably be no youths 
exposed to the expression. No one will have the expression thrust upon them, and it is 
unlikely that anyone entering the establishment will be surprised by the nature of what 
they observe. Such a set of facts do not make a case for regulation. 
CONTENT-NEUTRALITY. If the case has still not been resolved, the Court should 
determine whether the statute can be upheld as a valid restriction on time, place or 
manner. The Court should first ask whether the statute is content-neutral. Perhaps the 
. most glaring error in the Court's analysis in Renton was its use of legislative cognizance 
of the "secondary effects" of a type of speech as a basis for finding that the regulation 
enacted was content-neutral. The ordinance in Renton was content-based on its face. 
Only "adult" theaters were restricted. A theater was only an "adult" theater if the films 
it showed were "distinguished or characteri[zed] by an emphasis on matter depicting, 
describing or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or "specified anatomical areas ... ." 
The lawmakers' concern for secondary effects is relevant -- it goes to the magnitude of 
the government interest involved and possibly to how narrowly tailored the law is as 
well. But it has nothing to do with classifying what type of ordinance it is that has 
been passed. Judicial use of legislative concern for secondary effects of communication 
with a certain content should be limited accordingly. If the statute is not content-
neutral, it is not a valid time, place or manner restriction and should be struck down. 
GOVERNMENT AL INTEREST. If the statute is content-neutral, the Court should 
decide whether it is designed to serve a governmental interest that is significant. 
Secondary effects are relevant to this determination. 149 Of course, it would be naive 
to suppose that the city would state an impermissible purpose in the statute itself. Yet 
148 C/. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S 726, 742, 744-45, 746-50 (1978). 
149 Many of the "secondary effects" that the Court has shown concern for are 
actions of those who receive the communication. There are limited instances in which 
the tendency of a communication to cause those who receive it to take certain actions 
can serve as the basis for restricting that communication. The "fighting words" doctrine 
of Chaplinsky is an obvious example. A more relevant example is Kingsley Int'l Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents of University of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), striking down a statute 
that prohibited the issuance of a license to show non-obscene movies that "portray 'acts 
of sexual immorality [as] desirable, acceptable, or proper patterns of behavior'". [d. at 
687. "The state, Quite simply, has struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected 
liberty." [d. at 688. "Advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not ... 'a justification 
for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is 
nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.'" [d. at 689. Most 
adult entertainment is at least arguably not advocacy at all, but this should only serve 
to weaken the argument for making the communicator subject to restrictions based upon 
the actions of the recipient of the communication. 
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this is precisely what the Court did in Renton. The Court's credulity should certainly 
have been overcome by the fact that the provision explaining the purpose of the Renton 
ordinance was added to the ordinance after the lawsuit was instituted. It is also naive 
to believe, as the Court claimed to, that city lawmakers are so unsophisticated that they 
will not try to pursue impermissible purposes through indirect means ~here !he direct 
means are plainly more likely to be successfully challenged. Such def~tence is 
inappropriate in this analysis. Further, before giving weight to post hoc claims of 
reliance on the experiences of other communities, the Court should weigh the relevance 
of those experiences to the situation at hand, the similarity of the measure at issue to 
the measures adopted by the communities whose experiences are allegedly relied on and 
the evidence that those who claim reliance actually knew of the experiences. 
NARROWLY TAILORED AND ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVES. If a significant 
government interest is served, the Court must decide whether the statute is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. If it is not, the statute is unconstitutional. 
If the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest the Court 
must ask whether it leaves open adequate alternatives for communication. Theoretical 
availability of alternative avenues should be deemed insufficient. Even practical 
alternatives should not always be enough. If, for instance, an adult theater may open, 
but it must pay a great deal more for rent because of government restrictions, or it can 
get an economically feasible site, but the site is inferior (in terms of location, size and 
suitability for the type of structure needed) to what would be available absent 
content-based regulations, there must come a point where the alternative is not 
"adequate."150 "'One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in 
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.'"151 
The Court's treatment of this issue in Renton was sorely lacking. The Court 
assumed away the issue by stating "[t]hat [adult entertainment establishments] must fend 
for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective 
buyers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment violation"152 assumed away 
the issue. The operators of adult theaters are not on an equal footing with other 
prospective land users when they are subject to ordinances that restrict the possible 
150 See generally Note, Zoning and the First Amendment Rights 0/ Adult Entertainment, 
22 VAL. U. L. REV. 695, 717-23 (1988). The author suggests that after determining that 
there is some land which an adult entertainment establishment could operate on within 
the ordinance, a court should determine whether the sites are commercially viable. If 
the zoning ordinance unreasonably restricts access to commercially viable sites, it should 
be struck down. If the ordinance does not have an unreasonable effect on access to 
commercial viability, a court should determine whether land is economically available -
- whether it can be purchased or leased for a reasonable price. Although the author of 
the note refuses to say that any of these factors -- geographic availability, commercial 
viability or economic availability -- is dispositive, he asserts that they should all be 
considered. 
151 Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 86 n.6 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting, quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939». 
152 Renton, 475 U.S. at 54. 
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locations for their businesses and which do not apply to the same extent to other 
possible land users. 
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NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL HARM--
LET'S GET SERIOUS 
John L. Ehrler 
INTRODUCTION 
The former common law prohibitions against allowing recovery for negligently 
inflicted emotional harm have been eroded in some jurisdictions by abandoning 
arbitrary rules of law. In part, this development recognizes that the reasons for not 
allowing recovery were possibly overstated or imaginary. The present more liberal 
situation carries the dangers of compensating some Questionable claims and over-
extending defendant's liabilities. Some commentators have suggested new non-arbitrary 
rules of law, aimed at correcting potential abuses while allowing recovery to deserving 
plaintiffs. The problem is to design a system which selectively separates meritorious 
from specious claims, emphasizing the role of judges. 
Most of the published commentary involves two kinds of cases: I) Emotional 
harm to a bystander who observes a victim's physical injury caused by a defendant's 
negligence; or 2) emotional harm to the plaintiff himself caused by a defendant's 
negligence but without any contemporaneous physical injury. either as cause or effect; 
often the negligence entails nothing more than defendant providing erroneous 
information to the plaintiff. 
The inquiry should begin with an examination of the nature of the emotional 
harm suffered, to bar recovery for grief and other non-compensable harms. The injury 
must be more than trivial and temporary. Plaintiff must prove these points. 
This article focuses on what must be proved at trial, and how. Plaintiff must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's act(s) are the actual proximate 
cause(s) of the harm suffered, and are more than mere triggers, more than contributing 
factors, and more than the first event in an attenuated chain. 
Defendant may present affirmative defenses, which, if proved by a 
preponderance of evidence, will relieve him of liability: 1) The injury would not have 
occurred to a normal plaintiff of average temperament (not one with "thin skin"); 2) 
plaintiff's conduct was an important contributing factor, either because he voluntarily 
placed himself in a precarious position, failed to mitigate the harm, or took some other 
inappropriate action. 
BACKGROUND 
This note discusses the development of negligently inflicted emotional harm as 
an independent tort, a relatively new cause of action. Traditionally, the common law 
was reluctant to recognize emotional harm and allowed recovery for it in two broad 
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categories:' where the harm was intentionally, rather than negligently, inflicted, and 
where there was some independent cause of action to which the emotional harm claim 
was appended and thus said to be "parasitic." Examples of the "host" or primary causes 
of action are breach of contract and personal (physical) injury caused by defendant's 
negligent conduct. 
Since about 1970, courts in a small number of states have decided that 
negligently inflicted emotional harm is an independent cause of action. The 
pronouncements ~suallY take the form of a decision overturning the precedent which 
allowed the claim only when it was parasitic. The majority of states today require 
physical injury to the plaintiff2 or to a victim whose injury is witnessed by a plaintiff-
bystander. 
Many commentators have applauded and encouraged this movement, seeing it as 
long overdue.3 To a large extent, the movement may be seen as recognizing that the 
reasons which courts gave in the past for barring recovery in non-parasitic cases are 
either invalid or at least less compelling today. To begin our inquiry, we must review 
these reasons. 
Probably the single greatest concern was that a plaintiff would get undeserved 
compensation through fraud. This could be the result of the difficulty in objectively 
confirming a plaintiff's allegations that he had indeed suffered an emotional injury. 
Even where the fact of the injury was not questioned, its magnitude was still uncertain. 
Perhaps the plaintiff was exaggerating, and it was impossible to prove otherwise. In the 
final analysis, the court or jury would have to rely almost exclusively on the plaintiff's 
testimony. 
If the injury were real, the next difficulty was proving the causal link between 
defendant'S conduct and plaintiff's injury. There might be a time lag between them, 
, Even at the turn of the twentieth century, two kinds of cases were exceptions to 
the general rule of disallowing recovery for emotional harm: cases involving the 
negligent mishandling of corpses, and cases involving erroneous notification by telegram 
of an event such as the death of a close relative. 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., at 362, point out the rationale for the 
exception: "What all of these cases appear to have in common is an especiallikeIihood 
of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which 
serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." 
Modern counterparts to these exceptions are discussed briefly infra. 
2 It is useful to distinguish the various kinds of physical injury which pertain to 
emotional harm cases. The first kind is physical injury to a plaintiff directly caused 
by a defendant's negligence; this physical injury may be the cause of subsequent 
emotional harm, or there may be another cause. In either event, the resultant emotional 
harm is considered parasitic, and is addressed herein only in a cursory fashion. We are 
primarily interested in non-parasitic, "independent" causes of action. The second kind 
of physical injury is the result of the emotional harm. As we shall see, many courts 
require a plaintiff to prove physical manifestation of emotional harm. 
Yet another kind of physical injury is that suffered by a third party victim, the 
injury witnessed by the bystander-plaintiff. In most cases, injury must be actual and 
serious for recovery to be considered. 
3 See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent 
Tort, 59 GEO. L. J. 1237 (1971); Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for 
Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984). 
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or alternative explanations. An especially perplexing Question, not resolved today by 
any means, was distinguishing between an injury proximately caused by a defendant's 
conduct--one where the plaintiff deserves recovery--and an injury in fact caused or 
explained by an unusual or abnormal or undue susceptibility to harm on the part of the 
plaintiff; this is not the kind in which recovery should be allowed.4 
Although hard to resolve in a single case, these concerns were not rejected solely 
because of their difficulty. Courts feared that once the rules were relaxed there would 
be a flood of litigation, and even trivial claims would have to be heard. Among 
other concerns was the belief that allowing recovery would place undue responsibility 
on defendants. Liability could be extended beyond the defendant's culpability in at 
least two ways. 
First, if the barriers were removed, a defendant might become liable for 
significant injury where very clearly he was unlucky enough to have drawn a plaintiff 
whose pre-existing susceptibility to harm was, if not the very cause of the injury itself, 
the cause of the severity of the injury. The "thin-skull" plaintiff rule in physical injury 
cases held that "you take your plaintiff as you find him." That is to say, once 
defendant is negligent, he is liable for the full extent of damages, even if no reasonable 
defendant could have foreseen the magnitude of the injury. Should this concept be 
extended to the arena of emotional harm, where there are already difficulties enough? 
The second was the possibility that once defendants were found liable for a new 
cause of action, plaintiffs would multiply not only in general, but for the incident at 
hand. For example, if the mother of a child killed in an auto accident could recover for 
emotional harm, what about father and grandmother and aunt and second cousin? 
Where would lines be drawn? 
These concerns were the product of their time, reflecting an era in which the 
study of mental health, psychology and psychiatry were in their infancies, and the older 
fields of medical science were very much limited in diagnostic capability compared 
with today. Also, personal liability insurance was not as common or prominent as 
today. 
It is perhaps an oversimplification to say that the judicial system simply did not 
have the means, fortitude or experience to solve the problem; by "the problem," I mean 
the difficulty in establishing principled methods to distinguish deserving from 
undeserving plaintiffs and claims. Two Questions arise from all of this: I) Given the 
concerns cited, how did the courts respond? 2) Are the concerns expressed above still 
valid? 
ALLOWING RECOVERY UNDER ARBITRARY RULES 
The answer to the courts' reaction is that they grudgingly gave ground when 
faced with a particularly compelling set of circumstances, and granted plaintiff at 
4 This Question is addressed infra, nn. 46-61 and accompanying text. 
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least a chance to present his case.5 From today's perspective, it appears that the fear of 
allowing recovery to an undeserving plaintiff was stronger than the fear of an unjust 
denial to a deserving one. A paramount concern remained a guarantee that there truly 
was an injury. Thus, where facts were similar but perhaps not quite as compelling, as 
cases were distinguished, a rule evolved which only later was seen to be unfortunately 
rather arbitrary. 
As we examine this, our purpose is not to trace the history of arbitrary rules, 
which has been done elsewhere,6 but rather to demonstrate in what way they are 
arbitrary. At some point, the circumstances of a case would drive a court to allow 
recovery for serious fright suffered by a plaintiff through defendant's negligence. The 
fear might be of impending physical harm? One way to increase the certainty of 
genuineness in such a situation is to require that there be physical impact between the 
object feared and the plaintiff. Very probably, the judge who first thought of this 
impact rule envisioned a case (or probably it was thrust before him) where the 
defendant's negligence created some physical movement, perhaps at high speed, 
threatening collision with plaintiff. The impact requirement does serve as a very crude 
filter; it can separate a valid claim from one brought by another plaintiff in the same 
situation, but who was at a great enough distance from the threatened collision - let us 
say several hundred feet - so as to make groundless his fear and attendant emotional 
injury. 
But the problem is that the requirement of physical contact became an all-or-
nothing rule. Any contact would do, no matter how slight. (It is a little difficult to see 
what else could be done, once the rule was established.) However, the problem is that 
there is little difference between Plaintiff A, who fears an impending high-speed 
collision and whose arm is lightly brushed by the passing vehicle, and Plaintiff B, who 
fears the same collision but whom the vehicle misses by a hair's breadth. More 
precisely, the legal distinction between the plaintiffs is out of proportion to the 
virtually insignificant, and certainly meaningless, distinction between what happened 
to them physically. Such is the nature of the arbitrary rule. 
Where did all of this lead? Until about 1970, courts did not recognize emotional 
harm as an independent tort, and required in most cases a showing of physical harm -
that is, an objectively demonstrable ailment directly caused by emotional distress. 
Starting at this time, a few states did extend liability to independent emotional harm 
5 The posture of many reported cases is appeal by a plaintiff from the trial court 
decision, which has the effect of terminating the case before it goes to the jury. 
6 See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 548-52, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176-78 (1982) 
(brief but excellent history). See generally Comment, The Increasingly Disparate 
Standards of Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Injuries, 52 U. CINe. L. REV. 
1017 (1983); Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm -
A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982); Miller, The 
Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment 
Fit the Crime", I U. HAW. L. REV. I (1979). 
7 A classic case is Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y. 237,176 N.E.2d 729,219 
N. Y.S.2d 34 (1961). 
78 
claims but even today, the list is short,8 and some partial retractions have occured in 
forefront states.9 
A MODERN EVALUATION 
Undoubtedly, the new trend was in large part based on the perception of several 
courts that the old fears were no longer valid, had dramatically reduced importance, or 
were outweighed by considerations of justice.10 Let us see how perceptions shifted, and 
then evaluate whether any of what I have referred to as the old concerns still merit our 
considera tion. 
Probably the single greatest difference in perception involved a steady growth 
in the courts' confidence that medical science could (I) establish that emotional harm 
had occurred, and (2) identify the causative factor(s).ll The development of that part 
of medical science dealing with the psyche had lagged behind the "hard" sciences such 
as biochemistry for a long time, but eventually flowered and was accepted. It seemed 
that tort law had not changed nearly as fast as, to pick one discipline as an example, 
psychiatry;12 it was argued that it was time for the law to catch up with modern 
capabilities. 
8 A partial list includes Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970); Molien 
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); 
Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); and Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio 
St. 3d 131,447 N.E.2d 109 (1983). 
9 This is extensively discussed in Miller, supra note 6. 
10 A fairly comprehensive analysis of the old concerns, applied to a bystander case, 
in which recovery was allowed, appears in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 158-64, 404 A.2d 
672,678-685 (1979). Some of the six notes infra appear as notes in that case. 
11 [d. at 158-60, 404 A.2d at 678. 
"A survey of cases from other jurisdictions does not show the development 
of a logical and consistent rule, but reveals that the trend is a hesitant 
abandonment of...artificial restrictions and barriers to recovery in favor 
of a greater reliance on general tort law principles and the contemporary 
sophistication of the medical profession to test the veracity of claims for 
relief." Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, -' 520 P.2d 758, 762 (1974). 
12 Courts "have recognized the maturation of medicine" in cases where emotional 
distress was intentionally inflicted, or where claim was parasitic, but "[w]here the 
defendant is less culpable ... courts have been reluctant to recognize the enhanced ability 
of science to measure mental distress." Comment, Recent Developments, Torts, 63 GEO. 
L. J. 1179, 1184-5 n.30 (1975). 
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The net result of heightened confidence in medical science was this: If it could 
be confirmed that there was harm - in the absence of physical injury - it was no longer 
necessary for the emotional harm to be parasitic to a separate cause of action to ensure 
gen uineness. 13 
What about the other "policy" reasons which had prevailed in the past? While 
advances in medical science were seen as deterrents to fraud, it was also argued now 
that the mere possibility of fraud was hardly a reason to deny plaintiffs their day in 
court.14 The concern over a flood of litigation was largely abandoned, even at times by 
courts holding the old line. 15 
Finally, the concern of "unduly" extending liability without limits was seen as 
a problem which could be controlled. And, as one commentator pointed out, it seemed 
more sensible to draw a line other than at the point of an absolute bar to recovery.16 
My own perspective of this situation is that much of the previous concern is 
gone, but what remains is still important. Less danger exists today that a completely 
fraudulent claim will be brought, and the litigation flood is largely imaginary; further, 
trivial claims are de facto weeded out by the existing legal structure and process. There 
still remain serious issues regarding an undue extension of liability in cases where 
defendant is culpable of something, and juries tend to sympathize with an injured 
plaintiff, and "tack on" an emotional harm award, if they get the chance. 
The acceptance of a completely independent status for- the tort of emotional 
harm is well established in only a minority of jurisdictions. Where the claim is not 
13 "Because other standards exist to test the authenticity of plaintiff's claim 
for relief, the requirement of resulting physical injury, like the 
requirement of physical impact, should not stand as another artificial bar 
to recovery, but merely be admissible as evidence of the degree of mental 
or emotional distress suffered." Leong, 55 Haw. at -' 520 P.2d at 762. 
14 "Any rule which seeks to bar fraud ... by withholding legal protection frqm all 
claims, just and unjust, employs a medieval technique which .. .is scarcely in keeping with 
the acknowledged function of a modern legal system." Bystander's Recovery for 
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, 29 ARK. L. REV. 562, 564-65 (J 976) (quoting Leflar 
& Sanders, Mental Suffering and Its Consequences - Arkansas Law, 7 U. ARK. L. SCH. 
BUL. 43, 60 (1939». 
15 "[W]e point out that courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits, 
whether there be few suits or many; the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows 
society's pressing need for legal redress." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 
912, 917 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1968) (allowing recovery to a bystander). 
The contemporaneous and opposed case is Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 
N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). "This court has rejected as a ground for denying 
a cause of action that there will be a proliferation of claims. It suffices that if a 
cognizable wrong has been committed that there must be a remedy, whatever the burden 
of the courts." Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77. 
16 "If a line of circumscription is to be drawn for the sake of public policy, or even 
in the application of traditional tort principles, is it not more reasonable and humane 
to draw it somewhere other than at the point where no recovery is allowed simply 
because drawing the line elsewhere is difficult? Is not the line drawn in ... Dillon more 
reasonably arbitrary than that drawn in Tobin?" Simons, Psychic Injury and the 
Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 1,21 (1976). 
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appended to a "host claim", the necessity to show physical injury in order to enter the 
courthouse is logically the remainder of an era where other arbitrary rules were used 
to separate plaintiffs. It is much more principled to dispense with these rules altogether 
and to examine the problem from a different viewpoint. 
PROPOSED APPROACH TO AN EMOTIONAL HARM CASE 
The viewpoint to consider is the course of a trial which may be likened to an 
obstacle course, with recovery of damages as the prize, and with several discrete hurdles 
to be overcome by the plaintiff. Then, before the finish line, the defendant will have 
an opportunity to disqualify the plaintiff because of the latter's status or conduct. 
More specifically, the plaintiff will be required to do the following: I) Prove by 
it preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the acts of 
negligence which the plaintiff alleges are the cause of his injury. Obviously, this 
imposes no new burden on the plaintiff; 2) demonstrate that the injury is genuine, 
serious, and clearly not primarily caused by any incidental circumstance which the 
defendant could either control or foresee. Further, the injury must have been caused 
by something other than a stimulus commonly encountered in human experience; 3) 
prove by a heightened standard - clear and convincing evidence - that defendant's acts 
caused the harm. The actions must be more than a contributing factor, more than the 
first event in an attenuated chain of causation, and more than a mere triggering event. 
The standard of clear and convincing proposed here is not novel, but is not what is 
commonly required. 
The defendant will have the opportunity to present affirmative defenses; if 
these are proved by the preponderance of the evidence, they will bar recovery by the 
plaintiff. Either of the following defenses would be fatal to the plaintiff's recovery: 
I) A showing that the injury was caused by an unusual susceptibility of the plaintiff, 
or alternatively, that a normal plaintiff would have suffered so little injury as to 
render it non-compensable. 2) A showing that some aspect of the plaintiff's conduct 
was inappropriate - he either voluntarily put himself in an exposed position, he failed 
to do anything to mitigate or avoid the injury, or there is some act or response by the 
plaintiff which is inconsistent with the later claim of injury. 
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT HARM 
The first requirement listed as an element of the plaintiff's case is proof that the 
acts alleged to have caused the injury were actually committed in fact by the defendant. 
This is not controversial and is of course an element of every tort claim brought by a 
plaintiff. 17 
17 Plaintiff may, in the alternative impute responsibility to the defendant via 
vicarious liability. That is, under limited circumstances, a plaintiff injured by a child 
may impute liability to the parent as the defendant. Thus, the defendant may be liable 
because of the act of another. 
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However, once we consider the nature of the harm suffered, we begin to 
encounter problems. The plaintiff should have the burden to prove that the harm is 
genuine, serious, and clearly not primarily caused by any incidental circumstance which 
the defendant could either control or foresee. The requirements of "genuineness" and 
seriousness mayor may not coincide. And unavoidably intermixed is another concept 
which is closely related: the harm must be of a kind that we choose to compensate; it 
must be the "right kind" of harm. 
DISTINGUISHING HARM FROM INJURY 
No small part of a generalized and historic opposition to allowing recovery for 
emotional harm has been the difficulty of identifying exactly what injury is involved. 
One does not identify the harm by listing its symptoms; saying that the harm is 
sleeplessness, or headaches, or uncontrolled crying does little more than confirm that 
there is a manifestation of injury. At the risk of oversimplification, the answer may 
be labelled "primary effects· (grief, shock, fear or anger). These primary effects then 
mayor may not give rise to some manifestation of physical or psychic harm which can 
be confirmed objectively. 
This concept may be understood by consideration of a typical "bystander case," 
in which we see a sequential chain of causation as follows: 
Negligent conduct 
causes 
Physical injury to victim 
causes 
Primary effect (e.g., shock) on plaintiff 
causes 
Manifestation of injury in plaintiff 
One should distinguish between the manifested injury and its cause - in the 
example above, shock - because in many cases, only some of the plaintiff's injury is 
caused by the defendant's conduct. Real life is full of situations involving a complex 
set of factors, and it is not always possible to identify a single cause. 
When we ask what the injury or harm is that is being compensated, only the 
generalized type of distress such as shock or fear should qualify. The question is: did 
defendant's action cause shock, rather than: did defendant's action cause sleeplessness. 
If the act caused the primary distress, that is enough. More will be said on the second 
link -- whether the shock caused the sleeplessness - in connection with plaintiff 
susceptibility. 
AN EXAMPLE OF AN UNCOMPENSATED HARM: GRIEF 
A benefit of this analysis is that it allows us at the outset to differentiate types 
of harm for which there is generally no relief. The most important of these is grief, by 
which I mean that profound sorrOw occasioned by one's awareness of a victim's loss of 
life, or perhaps a devastating physical injury. Beyond grief, it becomes more difficult 
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to avoid value judgments. but one commentator has listed for exclusion from recovery 
"'mere' upset. dismay. humiIiation •... and anger".18 
Fright seems to be somewhere in between. perhaps because it may be profound 
and justified. or in contrast. trivial and short-lived. 
Probably no modern case in the field of negligent infliction of emotional harm 
has received more attention than Dillon v. Legg.19 A consideration of Dillon reveals 
important aspects of grief as it typifies the kind of harm where no recovery is provided. 
This 1968 California decision set forth three guidelines which it stressed were to be 
used as tests of foreseeability by courts in their deliberations on bystander cases. Dillon 
proposed that the bystander be allowed to recover if three conditions were met:20 I) The 
victim and the bystander plaintiff must be closely related; 2) the bystander was 
nearby; and 3) the bystander's injury was a direct result of a sensory and 
contemporaneous observance of the accident. 
Note carefully the last factor. which has the function of distinguishing the harm 
of shock from the harm of grief. Consider two accidents in which a child is killed. In 
the first. the parent is far removed and learns of the tragedy only later. In the second. 
the parent is a contemporaneous witness. The former is not entitled to damages for 
emotional harm while the latter. the bystander. recovers. Why? Because the 
compensation is not for the grief at the child's loss. but rather for the shock of 
witnessing the accident. When we say freedom from emotional injury is to be a 
protected right. we do not mean to compensate for grief. Any number of decisions 
following Dillon may be cited on this point.21 
OTHER HARMS AND ARBITRARY RULES 
Of course. other rules have in the past been used to differentiate types of harm. 
Certainly. the foundation of the "zone-of-danger rule" is a willingness to compensate 
when the harm entailed is fright. or fear for one's physical safety. The theory is that 
recovery is proper where the defendant's negligence exposes the plaintiff to serious 
bodily harm. and recovery should not depend on whether impact occurred. The 
difficulty is that the zone of danger is a physical concept and may not necessarily 
18 Comment. Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the 
Nervous Shock Cases. 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 512. 517 (1968). 
19 68 Cal. 2d 728. 441 P.2d 912. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
20 Id. at 36. 441 P.2d at 920. 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
21 Cortez v. Macias. 110 Cal. App. 3d 640.167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980) is one example. 
Here. a mother's claim for emotional distress following the death of her young child 
after alleged physician malpractice is not allowed as a matter of law at trial. and 
appellate court upholds. In this poignant case. a mother leaves febrile child in th~ 
emergency room to settle the bill and upon return is told of the child's death. All of th'C: 
plaintiff'S manifestations of emotional harm follow this notification. thus showing that 
there was no contemporaneous observance of a shock-inducing event. The harm is 
clearly grief at the death of the child rather than shock induced by witnessing any 
negligent act of the defendant. 
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correspond to the individual's perception of fear. That is, one person may perceive 
danger at a given distance, while another does not. The zone rule may perhaps be 
defended in that it works most of the time, but very likely, it works by denying some 
deserving plaintiffs at the expense of ensuring that undeserving ones are barred from 
recovery. 
SERIOUSNESS OF THE HARM 
The desire to limit recovery to cases where the injury is serious is historic.22 
When we say that seriousness should be a requirement before an injuryqualifies to be 
compensated, we may mean seriousness in one of several different aspects. Do we mean 
the harm must be of a serious nature? Do we mean that the intensity or magnitude of 
the harm must be great enough? Does the duration of the harm matter?23 
Taking these in turn, we have seen in the preceding section that the nature of 
the harm matters, and grief, despite its seriousness, is not compensated. While it is 
difficult to generalize, there should not be compensation for feelings of embarrassment 
or the fear of ridicule even where these may be traced to a negligent act of defendant. 
In Woodell v. Pinehurst Surgical Clinic,24 plaintiff was erroneously and negligently 
told by defendant clinic that she would deliver twins. After a single child was 
delivered, the mother brought a claim for several different injuries, only the emotional 
harm claim concerning us here. The basis of the claim was humiliation and 
embarrassment,and the trial court's dismissal was upheld because the plaintiff suffered 
no physical injury. 
This is really not a satisfactory way to settle this case. As we have seen, at least 
some jurisdictions no longer require physical injury, and certainly, there may well be 
serious harm in its absence. The case ought to be dismissed, but on the grounds that the 
injury is not actionable because it is trivial, its nature is common, and it is at least 
partly either imagined by the plaintiff, or contributed to in a large way by her. Here 
the plaintiff's real injury is disappointment; the plaintiff looked forward to having 
twins and likely proclaimed her expectation to the world at large. 
22 Among the cases stipulating seriousness as a necessity is Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio 
St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983), but it includes the comment, "Finally, we note that 
determination of both seriousness and reasonable foreseeability must be accomplished 
on a case-by-case basis." Id. at -,451 N.E.2d at 767. Paugh is an interesting bystander-
like case and the analysis follows Dillon to a large extent despite the fact that there is 
no identifiable victim! The nearest substitute to a victim is plaintiff's house or fence. 
There is an interesting discussion on seriousness as a prerequisite to recovery, 
and the attendant problem of defining what is an undesirable trivial injury in Bell, The 
Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery For Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984); 
cf., Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm: A Response to Professor 
Bell, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 413 (1984). 
23 See text, infra. 
24 Woodell v. Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, 78 N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716 (1985). 
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DEGREE OF SEVERITY 
Even if the harm is one we want to compensate because it is serious, what if the 
extent of the injury is minor? This is not a very fruitful area for inquiry, because 
questions of degree are ultimately questions of fact, and are for juries to determine. 
But let us at least define the problem. Consider a fact pattern for a bystander injury 
case, including the death of the victim, and for the sake of argument, a bystander 
meeting the Dillon guidelines. Thus, we are ready to allow the case to proceed, 
primarily for the purpose of verifying the factual allegations of the plaintiff. Now, let 
us make this variation - the injury is minor, and the bystander correctly perceives this.25 
Perhaps the victim is grazed, and requires two stitches at a doctor's office. If this is the 
case, we would not expect a normal bystander to become an emotional harm plaintiff -
she is very unlikely to succeed, the reward would certainly be small, and she may have 
a lot of difficulty in getting a lawyer to take her case. 
DURATION 
If the harm is short-lived, it may not be serious. Even if we can get universal 
agreement that this is a valid principle, we are then faced with deciding what length 
of time is "enough." Usually, this needs to be determined in the framework of the 
circumstances of a case. The problem does arise in what I call a pure misinformation 
case, which has these characteristics: 1) There is no harm other than the victim having 
an erroneous perception of reality, said perception resulting directly from a 
communication from the defendant. As an example, a medical misdiagnosis could be 
merely misinformation if the course of treatment was not affected by the misdiagnosis 
25 But what happens where the bystander's perception is erroneous? That is, 
suppose the physical injury to victim is not serious, but bystander thinks it is? We can 
examine two bystander cases which address this issue. 
In Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981), the plaintiff drives through an 
intersection and waits for his mother, who is in a following car. Defendant's car 
negligently strikes the mother's car, and she receives very minor injuries. Nonetheless, 
the plaintiff later sues the defendant for negligently inflicted emotional harm, alleging 
sleeplessness and pain in his back and legs; a doctor testifies that these symptoms were 
caused by plaintiff witnessing the accident and fearing for his mother's safety. On 
appeal, the court reverses the trial court and allows the plaintiff to go to trial for 
factual determination, holding that it is enough if a reasonable man would believe, and 
the plaintiff at bar did believe that there was a strong possibility of serious injury to 
the victim. 
In contrast, Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M 538,673 P.2d 822 (1983), holds that 
the accident being witnessed must result in serious physical injury or death to the 
victim in order for the bystander to recover. The difference in the holdings is 
interesting because it points out the deficiencies in the Barnhill holding. Implicit in 
Barnhill's holding is the idea that recovery may be had for emotional distress 
independent of whether it is "justified." A further "explanation" of the holding is that 
the plaintiff is allowed to recover for the time in which there was uncertainty as to the 
victim's fate. Curiously, if that is the reason, the plaintiff would recover a greater 
amount by never inquiring into the actual physical condition of the victim, certainly 
an undesirable and inconsistent outcome. 
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(this happens when the misdiagnosis is corrected promptly); 2) any actions taken by 
the victim based on the misinformation are not in themselves harmful. 
We must observe that a prerequisite of a claim based on misinformation is the 
correction of the plaintiff's perception. Usually, the defendant checks and advises the 
plaintiff of the true situation.26 However, often plaintiff is actively engaged in the 
process of error correction. In either case, plaintiff's claim is logically limited to harm 
suffered during that period of time when he was under the erroneous perception.27 
Whether some threshold limit has been passed could be a jury question, and this 
presumes that the concept of the threshold is part of the court's jury instruction.28 
26 It has been suggested that plaintiff in a libel case be barred from recovery where 
defendant retracts in a reasonable time. A retraction published as broadly as the libel 
repairs much of the harm. See LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An 
Accommodation of the Competing Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 
NEBR. L. REV. 249, 304-315 (1987). A misinformation case is similar in that a 
prompt correction reduces harm; it seems evident that the reduction in harm is directly 
proportional to the speed of the correction. If we examine the extreme case of a 
virtually simultaneous, yet sequential misinformation and correction, there is no harm. 
Imagine Kaiser Foundation Hospital telling the Moliens (see text, infra) that Mrs. Molien 
had syphilis, and five seconds later retracting in an authoritative manner. No jury 
could reasonably find that a subsequent divorce had as a proximate cause the 
misdiagnosis which existed as a fact in the minds of the couple for a period of five 
seconds. But, of course, the 5-second example is unrealistic; the difficulty is that a 
"real-world" problem is going to be one of degree. 
In one respect, there is a stronger argument for barring recovery in the case of 
rapid correction of misinformation than for barring libel recovery after a retraction. 
In correcting erroneous non-libelous misinformation provided to one person, it is certain 
that the correction gets to the victim; in libel retraction, where the harm is caused by 
misinformation remaining in the minds of perhaps millions of readers, there is no 
assured way to reach everyone. 
Of course, libel and misinformation (as the latter term is used herein) are far 
from identical; plaintiff /victim in what we have been calling misinformation cases does 
not need a retraction to be published - his injury is not dependent on the belief of third 
parties. 
27 Martell v. St. Charles Hospital, 137 Misc.2d 980, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1987) is decided 
contra my position. Defendant'S error is corrected within two days, but the court holds, 
" ... the recovery ... should not be artificially limited simply because in the opinion of the 
defendant...the plaintiff's suffering should have ended at a particular moment or upon 
the happening of a particular event." Id. at 990, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 352. 
At a further point in the same opinion, "If the defendants ... are responsible for 
the injury the damages are not to be limited merely because this particular plaintiff was 
susceptible to greater damage than might be another individuaL" Id. Because of the 
phraseology, there is room for interpretation, but this last quotation could be read as 
extending liability in cases where aberrant susceptibility of the plaintiff is the 
dominant cause of the injury; this is very much a minority position. 
" 28 As an alternative, it is not beyond the pale of reason that an arbitrary timeframe 
or set of them be used. How might this work? Let us confine our inquiry to three 
categories of misinformation, and suggest some limits for consideration. In each case, 
there would be no recovery if the error is corrected by defendant within the limit 
stipulated, so long as defendant's culpability is simple negligence, as opposed to 
recklessness: Information to victim that he has a life-threatening disease. (The 
contrary, erroneous information that victim is free from a life-threatening disease, can 
hardly be a "pure" misinformation case, because it is almost sure to entail omitted 
treatment.) 48 hours. Information to the victim that he has a medical condition less 
serious than life-threatening. One week. Information that a relative has died. 8 hours. 
" Difficulties can be seen immediately; it is hardly likely that a comprehensive 
listing could be developed, even if a legislature or court were so inclined. 
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OTHER NON-ACTIONABLE HARMS 
There are probably some special cases where the harm has some peculiar 
characteristic that renders it unappealing from the viewpoint of recovery. And, there 
is a peculiar kind of case in which we readily sympathize with the victim, but reason 
precludes recovery because it is difficult to find a true harm. These are what I call the 
"false good news" cases. 
For example, suppose a person with a life-threatening malady who surprisingly 
and erroneously is told by a doctor or hospital that there has been some error, and the 
person need not fear that malady. If by the nature of the case, there is no deterioration 
of the victim's condition proximately caused by any act or omission stemming from the 
misinformation, it is hard to see why there should be recovery under an emotional 
harm claim, when the true state of affairs is re-established. Physically, the victim is 
back where he started, and certainly, he cannot claim harm for the intervening period 
when he thought he was healthy; during that period, he experienced the opposite of 
harm, albeit under false pretenses. The claim would seem to be based on an aggravation 
of an already distressed person facing death, where until the sequence of false 
hope/"correction," there was no one culpable and hence that person was not a victim in 
the sense of incurring an injury caused by another. 
Kossel v. Superior Court29 comes close to the fact pattern and result suggested 
above, but the case is settled on other grounds. In Kossel, a cancer patient was told that 
there had been a mistake and that he did not have cancer. Soon thereafter, however, 
the "mistake" was cancelled and the patient was back where he started. It is unclear 
from the opinion whether the patient had any claim that the faulty diagnosis affected 
his medical treatment. If it did, that is malpractice, in which the harm is physical, and 
the injury can be objectively demonstrated. The claim in Kossel, however, was brought 
by the spouse rather than the patient. The relationship, or lack thereof, between the 
plaintiff-spouse, and the defendant hospital, is the ground for the dismissal at appeal; 
she could not recover because she was not the direct victim of the misinformation. 
This seems to be the right result, but not for the right reason. The court's 
decision leaves room for a recovery by the "right kind" of plaintiff where there is no 
injury. The starting point ought to be whether there was an injury crossing some 
threshold of seriousness; this inquiry should precede any relational questions. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON CAUSATION 
In analyzing emotional harm claims, we can consider the elements to be 
demonstrated by a plaintiff to overcome his case, and then go on to look at certain 
affirmative defenses offered, as a series of hurdles or barricades for the plaintiff to 
pass in order to prevail. Some of the barricades should be higher than others in order 
to meet the concerns of those opposed to recovery for emotional harm that still retain 
29 186 Cal. App. 3d 1060,231 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1986). 
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some validity. One way to elevate a barrier is to require heavier burdens of proof for 
some elements of the plaintiff's case. 
Every claim brought against a defendant for emotional harm rests on a discrete 
act or omission of the defendant. (For the sake of simplicity, I shall use the term "act" 
or "action" to include "omission" in the remainder of this paper.) Proving that this 
action did in fact occur is the first element in the case; no special burden seems 
appropriate here. If contested, the plaintiff has this burden, but the ordinary standard 
of proof - preponderance of the evidence - will suffice. 
At the next step of the analysis, it is proposed that causation - that is, the link 
between the act and the harm - be shown by a clear and convincing standard. This 
proposal is not original; clear and convincing is the standard for recovery for 
negligently inflicted emotional harm in Virginia,30 for example. Imposing this standard 
has several important consequences. 
First, it acts as a deterrent to some plaintiffs. They or their prospective 
attorneys may be less willing to enter the race where the burden to be met is higher. 
Secondly, for those who do proceed to trial, clearly a properly instructed jury will find 
it more difficult to find for the plaintiff. Thirdly, there will be an increase in the 
number of cases where judges will decide using their own discretion that a clear and 
convincing standard has not been met, and find that the plaintiff fails.31 
With this preface, let us examine the key causation questions that must be 
satisfied by clear and convincing evidence: Is it clear that the defendant's act is 
significantly more than a contributing factor; if several factors can be identified, is the 
act in question the dominant causative event? 
ATTENUATION 
As an example of how the proposed causation standard would resolve a 
troublesome case better than the actual decision, consider Kelly v. Kokua Sales Supply. 
Ltd.32 An unfortunate accident occurs in Hawaii whereby defendants, through their 
negligence, are responsible for the deaths of a child and her mother. The tragedy is 
compounded when a short time later, the grandfather of the child victim (he is also 
the father of the other victim, but let us refer to him as grandfather here) is notified 
by telephone at his home in California and suffers a fatal heart attack. The decedent's 
estate brings a claim of emotional distress against those held negligent in the accident. 
30 See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974); Hughes v. Moore, 214 
Va. 27, 34,197 S.E.2d 214,219 (1973). 
31 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), held that where a clear and 
convincing standard of proof is required of plaintiff on a given element of his case, as 
a matter of law, the trial court must use this standard in response to a motion for 
summary dismissal. It is presumed here that the Liberty Lobby decision applies beyond 
defamation to a tort such as negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
32 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). 
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Let us set aside the question of whether the grandfather had a pre-existing 
condition, and the possibility that grief over the loss of the grandchildren rather than 
shock is the cause of the injury (it seems very difficult to decide either way since the 
decedent is not available for examination). It is more useful to examine the way in 
which the case is disposed of by the Hawaiian court. 
The court does not consider this a bystander case. If it did and applied the 
Dillon factors: (1) close family relationship, (2) contemporaneous observance of the 
accident, (3) physical proximity, it is clear that only the first is met. The case arises, 
however, following the decision in Hawaii in Rodrigues v. State33 to recognize emotional 
harm as an independent tort and to decide cases based on general principles of tort law. 
Thus, nothing like the Dillon guidelines apply here. However, in what must be seen as 
a major retreat from the earlier Hawaiian decisions in Rodrigues and Leong v. Takasaki 
(which is a bystander case),34 the court in effect applies a Dillon guideline of physical 
proximity, limiting recovery in such cases to plaintiffs "located within a reasonable 
distance from the scene of the accident."35 Much emphasis is placed on the great 
geographical distance between California and Hawaii, and plaintiff 10ses.36 
The decision is confusing and inconsistent. Part of the confusion may be 
attributed to the backtracking phenomenon. How could the case have been handled 
without falling back to a Dillon-like guideline? It seems clear that the primary 
motivation of the court is the concern with extending the defendant's liability too far. 
But if a limit is desired, geography is hardly a reliable index (suppose the grandfather 
lived a block away - would that have made a real difference?) Much more appropriate 
in this case would be denying recovery because of the attenuated nature of the claimed 
causation. Defendant is clearly responsible for the deaths of the direct victims of the 
accidents, but based on foreseeability, he can hardly be responsible for consequences to 
relatives of the victims without limit, even where it can be proved that shock rather 
than grief is the "explanation" of that injury. Here, there is an implication that the 
telephone call and perhaps its abrupt nature played a key role. But, of course, the 
defendant had no part in making this call. 
Plaintiff's case should fail because the grandfather is not a direct victim of the 
defendants' negligence - he had no contact with the defendant - nor is there any 
existing relationship between them giving rise to a duty which was breached. Nor could 
the grandfather be construed as a bystander. Grandfather was an innocent victim, and 
the defendant was culpable of something, but that is not enough. All of this is another 
way of saying that causation can only be attributed to the defendant in this case by an 
attenuated chain. If this is the focus, the disposition is straightforward. 
33 52 Haw. 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970). 
34 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) 
35 Kelly, 56 Haw. at _, 532 P.2d at 676. 
36 Actually, the summary judgment for the defendants granted by trial court is 
affirmed. 
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TRIGGERS 
In Kelly, attenuation lies in the intervening telephone call, and in the physical 
remoteness of the grandfather from the accident caused by the defendants' negligence. 
In what way other than attenuation may the plaintiff fail to show causation? If the 
negligence of the defendant serves merely as a trigger, no proximate causation occurs. 
Consider Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.37 This is another landmark 
decision in California, rivaling Dillon in the attention it received both in the literature 
and from courts throughout the country.38 Valerie Molien, a hospital patient, was 
negligently misdiagnosed as having syphilis while undergoing some routine testing. 
Immediately thereafter, her husband Steven underwent a similar test and was found to 
be free of syphilis (presumably at this point the test on Valerie was repeated and the 
earlier test seen to be in error). Despite Steven's negative test result, Valerie accused 
Steven of infidelity and eventually they were divorced. 
When Steven brought an emotional harm action against the defendant hospital, 
the trial court sustained defendant hospital's demurrer on the ground that the plaintiff 
could not state a cause of action, not having claimed any physical injury from the 
emotional harm. But on appeal, and this is the significance of Molien, the California 
Supreme Court reversed, thereby establishing emotional harm as an independent tort for 
the first time. 
It does seem a very strange case for this to ha ve happened, because the facts are 
so far from compelling. It must first be observed that the misdiagnosis does not cause 
any substantial direct harm from a medical viewpoint; any culpability of the hospital 
lies in incorrect information rather than incorrect treatment.39 Secondly, whereas 
Valerie Molien may have had good reason for suspecting her husband of infidelity 
during that short time before her husband tested negative and her own diagnosis was 
corrected, that particular reason for suspicion expired with the correction of the error. 
She may have had other good reasons for her suspicions of infidelity, but the point is 
37 96 Cal. App. 3d 469, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). 
38 See, e.g., Note, Negligent In/liction of Emotional Distress: Reconciling the Bystander 
and Direct Victim Causes of Action, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 145 (1983); Note, Molien v. Kaiser: 
Remedy for an Odious Diagnostic Error, 14 U. WEST. L. A. L. REV. 61 (1982); Note, 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of Action in California: 
Do Defendants Face Unlimited Liability?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 181 (1982). 
Numerous courts have cited Molien. Shepardizing in September, 1988 showed that 
132 state or federal cases mention Molien. Of these, seventeen cases are cited to show 
that Molien was followed. Some of these extend the principles of Molien to cases other 
than negligent infliction of emotional harm; a particularly fascinating case is Kately 
v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983), wherein the plaintiff-
bystander is the owner of a boat and the victim is killed in a water-skiing accident. 
Defendant's liability is based not on negligence, but on products liability. 
39 Valerie Molien was treated with massive doses of penicillin, which the court 
characterized as "unnecessary and painful". While no timeframe is mentioned in the 
opinion, it seems likely that this did not extend beyond a few days. In any event, what 
she suffered was physical pain, no emotional, and that injury was of course suffered 
by her rather than Steven, who is the plaintiff in the case we are discussing. 
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that the other reasons are not linked to the defendant. Thus, all the defendant did in 
this case was trigger a set of suspicions, not cause them.4o 
There are really two different kinds of injury in Molien. The first of these is the 
emotional harm caused by the misdiagnosis; a section of the opinion where the Court is 
imputing defendant's responsibility to the plaintiff, who is Stephen, not Valerie, says: 
"It is easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its probable source 
would produce marital discord and resultant emotional distress to a married patient's 
spouse."41 But this injury was, or at least should have been, transient, because the 
misdiagnosis was corrected. The greater injury, and the one for which the plaintiff 
seeks compensation is the emotional distress as the marriage disintegrates. Part of the 
claim is for medical costs for counseling in an effort to save the marriage. While exact 
chronology is not provided in the appellate court opinion, it seems reasonable to 
presume that the counseling was at a point later than the time when the true diagnosis 
was made known. 
Certainly the facts here raise suspicions of an unusual plaintiff susceptibility 
or pre-existing condition. Usually, as discussed elsewhere in this note, it is the 
susceptibility to harm, meaning that there is too little resistance in the plaintiff's 
makeup to be able to cope with some stressful event. But here, the real susceptibility 
almost surely resides in the weak marriage of the Moliens, which was susceptible to 
divorce. The divorce of such a weak marriage was the cause of Steven's emotional 
distress, and not the harm caused by the misinformation. Defendant's negligence is at 
best a contributing factor, not even necessarily a "but for" factor. Can the Moliens show 
to a clear and convincing standard that but for the negligence, they would still be 
married? 
It would be straining to call any susceptibility to divorce unusual given 
contemporary divorce rates. But if the argument is made that the Moliens' 
susceptibility to divorce is average, does this not come close to saying they had roughly 
a one-in-two chance of staying married for even 10 years? If this is so, how can a 
negligent event outside the marriage be the legal cause of harm under a heightened 
standard? Further, allowing recovery for emotional harm caused by divorce has 
enormous potential for a flood of litigation. 
In summary, the case should be thrown out as a matter of law because the 
defendant's negligence did nothing more than trigger a chain of events. The plaintiff 
40 Plaintiff conceivably could argue that defendant's actions are the cause, because 
whereas Valerie's suspicions are irrational in the face of the correction, those are after 
all still her suspicions, rational or irrational. The response to this is that defendant 
could hardly foresee that plaintiff would form opinions or suspicions or ideas based on 
a diagnosis made by defendant, and continue to hold them when the diagnosis was 
changed (and observe the yes/no nature of the test - you either have syphilis or you 
don't, with no middle ground). 
41 Molien, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 616 P.2d 813 at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
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cannot show even by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant's negligence 
caused the injury.42 
ONL Y A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR 
Where it can readily be seen that the emotional harm is caused by several 
different factors, a case can be made for barring liability againt the defendant unless 
by clear and convincing evidence it is shown that the defendant's actions are the 
dominant cause of the harm. 
This could be applied to the case of Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center,43 
which is also discussed below from the viewpoint of plaintiff susceptibility. In Hoard, 
there are a number of events: 1) A teenage girl is critically injured in an automobile 
accident; 2) parents go to defendant hospital and are told erroneously of death of girl, 
who in fact is at another hospital; 3) victim survives, but has sustained serious and 
permanent damage; 4) after a time lapse, parent plaintiffs develop manifestations of 
emotional harm. 
Even a cursory review reveals the obvious fact that the plaintiffs have 
understandable reasons for emotional distress. However, the defendant hospital is tied 
only to one reason. Can the plaintiffs hold defendant liable for their harm? They 
should be required to prove by the heightened standard that the defendant's actions are 
the dominant causative factor. 
AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES 
Defendant may present affirmative defenses which cancel liability if proved by 
a preponderance of evidence. 
PLAINTIFF SUSCEPTIBILITY 
If defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would 
not have occurred to a normal plaintiff, he should be relieved of liability. 
Alternatively, he may show that a normal plaintiff would have been injured only to a 
trivial degree. "Normal" means a person of average constitution, free of any 
aberrational emotional susceptibility, capable of coping with at least the stresses of 
dail y life. 44 
42 The court instead concentrated on these questions: Did defendant owe a duty to 
this plaintiff? (Yes) May plaintiff recover even though he suffered no physical injury? 
(Yes) 
43 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 (1983). 
44 See Simons, supra note 16, at n. 118, where it is contended that the "normal 
individual is impossible to define and consequently unavailable as a standard for 
recovery." 
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It is beyond dispute that reactions to stimuli and events vary with the individual 
perceiving them; this is true of physical reactions,45 and of psychic or emotional 
response.46 Our legal system has always been aware of this and it is an important factor 
in explaining why arbitrary rules were and are used to deny recovery. It is just too 
difficult to attribute or allocate causation to the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's 
heightened susceptibility to harm.47 The problem is by its nature intractable and resists 
attempts to resolve it by statistical data, for instance. One is never quite sure what the 
true cause is, or what proportion of causation lies with each factor. 
An early attempt at analysis was made by Smith,48 who examined over 300 cases 
and who concluded that some 60% of them involved unusual plaintiff susceptibility. 
Little support is provided, and one gains the impression that Smith merely examined 
reports of cases, rather than made any independent examination. He also buttressed his 
argument with the observation that there is a 5/1 female/male ratio in the class of 
plaintiffs;49 this is corroborated if we accept the added inference that women are more 
prone to heightened emotional susceptibility than are men. Smith's work has been 
mentioned by other commentators50 and courts51 but it has not to my knowledge been 
confirmed or refuted by any other published work which includes a compilation of data 
or a statistical analysis. 
Perhaps it is unnecessary to quantify this matter, because we can readily show 
that the plaintiff's unusual susceptibility is the dominant cause of the harm, at least in 
some cases. Let us examine some actual fact patterns. In Williamson v. Bennett, the 
plaintiff automobile driver was involved in a collision caused by the defendant's 
45 Capps, Torts-Damages-Aggravation of Pre-existing Injuries, 43 N.C. L. REV. lOll 
( 1965). 
46 Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of Action 
in California: Do Defendants Face Unlimited Liability?, 22 SANT A CLARA L. REV. 181, 
196 (1982). 
47 See supra, note 4. 
48 This work is plainly dated and based primarily on the author's interpretation of 
writings available to him on a large number of old cases. A perusal of his Appendix A 
reveals that many of the cases "investigated" are more than 30 years old. Thus, there is 
little direct research. Despite this weakness, the Smith study is cited by many modern 
commentators because, probably, there is no modern counterpart. Note, Relation of 
Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 V A. L. REV. 193, 
306-7 (1943). 
49 Id. at 280-1. 
50 See Simons, supra, note 16; Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional 
Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 512 (1968); 
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 
GEO. L. J. 1237 (1971). 
51 See, e.g., Sinn v. Bird, 486 Pa. 146,404 A.2d 672 (1979); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel 
& Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (the latter was a 
California bystander case, which set the standard until overruled by Dillon). 
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negligence.52 Damage to the vehicles was slight, and Mrs. Williamson was uninjured. 
After a few days, she developed serious manifestations of emotional distress, and 
attributed these to her vivid recollection of a recent accident involving a relative. Her 
relative was driving a car that was struck by a child on a bicycle, and the child was 
killed. Mrs. Williamson had not witnessed this accident, but said that at the time of her 
own collision (in which no bicycle was involved), she feared that it was an identical 
situation; she even went so far as to say that she was afraid to look at that portion of 
her car that was damaged for fear of seeing the (imagined) dead child. 
The court on appeal found that Mrs. Williamson's susceptibility was abnormal, 
and further added that she would be barred from recovery based on fright, because her 
fear was for another, not herself.53 
This case is one where we can readily see that a foreseeability analysis works. 
Defendant can foresee physical damage as a consequence of his negligence, and perhaps 
a possibility of some amorphous emotional upset, likely to be short-lived and not very 
serious. He could hardly expect the aberrational fears of this particular defendant, and 
the subsequent degree of injury. The case is chosen to show that the defendant here 
could easily and convincingly have shown that the bizarre response admitted by the 
plaintiff is the cause of her harm; such a showing by itself should rightfully serve to 
relieve the defendant of liability. 
Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center is a misinformation case.54 The medical 
center negligently and erroneously told the Hoards that their 17-year-old daughter had 
died of injuries sustained in an auto crash shortly after being brought to the center. 
Actually, the girl had been taken to another hospital; the dead girl at the Shawnee 
institution was another victim of the same crash. Lisa Hoard, the accident victim, was 
still alive but had suffered extremely severe injuries and was comatose for six weeks 
immediately thereafter. Her recovery was limited, and she remained a considerable 
burden on her parents. 
Many of the symptoms complained of by the parents in their action were not 
immediate, a factor in the court's decision to deny them relief.55 The court also 
obviously struggled with the difficulty in separating the causative factors, i.e., reaction 
52 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960). 
53 This latter point is a mechanism the court uses to deny recovery on what I call 
a secondary ground. That is, the court says that recovery which might be allowed to 
someone in the zone of danger is based on the danger and fear to the plaintiff herself. 
In the Williamson case, plaintiff feared for some supposed party she merely imagined 
to be present. The primary point is not who she fears for, but the completely 
unexpected nature of her fear. 
54 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 (1983). 
55 [d. at -' 662 P.2d at 1220-1. 
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to the physical injury and its resultant burden versus the aftermath of the shock 
induced by the negligent and erroneous notification of death.56 
But predisposition or heightened susceptibility was also a very important factor. 
In the case of Mr. Hoard, he had a prior history of cardiac problems, and some part of 
the post-accident harm seemed related to this condition, in the court's analysis. Mrs. 
Hoard had been taking medication for many years for nervousness; she had been earlier 
treated for depression, alcoholism and esophagitis; the latter was also an ailment she 
complained of after the accident.57 The court found as a matter of law that the 
causation alleged by the Hoards was too speculative to merit recovery from defendant.58 
PLAINTIFF CONDUCT AS A BAR TO RECOVERY 
In addition to susceptibility, an affirmative showing that the plaintiff's conduct 
was an important factor should bar his recovery. What is intended here is an analog to 
contributory negligence in a manner which might be referred to as an "all-or-nothing" 
decision. Prior to more recent comparative negligence schemes characterized by 
reduction in the amount of the plaintiff's award, any finding of contributory 
negligence totally barred recovery. 
This may seem draconian, but in practice I believe it would be applied only in 
clear-cut situations. A first example would apply to what we have previously defined 
as a pure misinformation case. Where defendant can prove that the plaintiff expressed 
serious disbelief upon the receipt of the information, and this was not merely an 
emotional reaction or a wish fulfillment, there can be no recovery, as a matter of law. 
That is, the jury never gets to say, "Plaintiff did not believe it, but we find for him 
anyway." 
Such a rule would work best in the situation where the plaintiff's doubt is strong 
enough so that he seeks confirmation of the information from another source, and this 
search can be objectively demonstrated. In Johnson v. State of New York,59 the plaintiff 
is negligently and erroneously told by a hospital that her mother, a patient of the 
56 Note that Kansas did not subscribe to the general exception remarked in the text, 
supra note I, allowing recovery for emotional distress caused by erroneous death 
notification by telegraph. If they had, it might have made an important difference in 
this case. [d. at ,662 P.2d at 1220. 
57 [d. at _, 662 P.2d at 1218. 
58 "The alleged resulting damages are simply too conjectural, speculative, 
and remote in time from the incident to form a sound basis for 
measurement, and therefore no recovery can be allowed upon the basis 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The foregoing issue 
presented a question of law for the trial court and therefore a motion for 
summary judgment was properly sustained." [d. at -' 662 P.2d at 1222-3. 
59 37 N.Y.2d 378,334 N.E.2d 590,372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). 
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hospital, has died.6O The burden of the case in the eyes of the court is to hold that there 
may be recovery without a showing of physical harm. 
After the notification, the plaintiff and a relative express a definite skepticism 
about the information, and make inquiries which result in finding the error.61 The 
opinion does not specify the time lapse between error and correction, but it could not 
have been very long, as the correction involved viewing the remains of the deceased at 
a mortuary. But that is only one point. What is of interest here is the profound 
inconsistency between (a) the alleged harm upon hearing the news and (b) the 
demonstrable disbelief of plaintiff. How can the news have been the cause of the harm 
if the plaintiff did not believe it? It seems that the real driving force for plaintiff's 
claim is not harm but indignation. 
The rule proposed is that a showing by the defendant in a misinformation case 
that the plaintiff disbelieved the information will exonerate the defendant of liability. 
Admittedly, the rule does not work as well when there is a significant delay between 
the defendant's erroneous statement and the plaintiff's search for confirmation.62 
Another way in which the plaintiff's conduct may act as a bar to his recovery 
is through placing himself voluntarily - or more precisely, gratuitously - into a situation 
where there is heightened risk of emotional stress. This occurred in Justus v. Atchison,63 
a California bystander case in which the plaintiffs lost because they failed to meet 
precisely one of the Dillon guidelines. Plaintiff was an expectant father present in the 
delivery room, when through medical malpractice, the fetus was stillborn. We are 
concerned here solely with the claim of the plaintiff -father for negligently induced 
emotional harm, rather than the wrongful death claim. 
Rigidly following Dillon, the plaintiff64 is denied recovery because while he was 
a contemporaneous witness to some events in the delivery room, he did not observe any 
injury or the stillbirth itself. Plaintiff was unaware of any serious problem until the 
attending physician acknowledged the stillbirth outside of the delivery room. Thus, 
60 Cases for erroneous notification of death seem to be hybrids of the ancient 
exceptions to the ban on recovery for emotional harm negligently inflicted - namely, 
corpse m,ishandling cases and faulty telegram cases. The corpse cases were always 
considered to give rise to unquestionably genuine harm, by their very nature. Erroneous 
wire cases were somehow related, but of course differ in that all that happened was an 
erroneous communication, not a mishandling. The common thread was death, the 
subject matter of the most common telegram cases. 
61 There were two patients named Emma Johnson, and the "other one" died. 
62 If the defendant corrects before the plaintiff seeks confirmation, perhaps that 
should bar recovery also. The question of the defendant's correction is more general 
than consideration of attempted confirmation by the plaintiff. See supra, note 26. 
63 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). 
64 There are a number of plaintiffs here because several cases with similar fact 
patterns were consolidated on appeal. 
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there was no shock induced by contemporaneous observation of a sudden event, and 
recovery was barred following Dillon.65 
But for our purposes, what appears as dicta in Justus66 points out that the 
expectant father was a special kind of bystander. In Justus, the plaintiff had 
gratuitously entered the delivery room for no useful purpose other than the amorphous 
benefits of accompanying mother and witnessing the birth; that is, there is no 
cognizable benefit accruing to the newborn running from the father's presence. 
Further, it is well known that emotions and potential stresses run high in such a place.67 
These factors differ from the more typical situation, where the bystander is 
probably present in a protective capacity and not voluntarily there.68 Further, the 
environment may be termed "emotionally neutral", at least before the traumatic event, 
which is likely to be a collision. That is, the typical bystander case does not take place 
in surroundings where high emotion is commonplace. 
The general rule ought to be that a gratuitous presence bars recovery for 
subsequent emotional harm; however, what I have called a gratuitous presence might be 
distinguished from a voluntary one. The two are similar in that both are positive 
elections of conduct, usually without specific reward to the actor, but they differ in 
that the voluntary act is intended to have a direct and beneficial effect on the potential 
victim. The distinction is clear if one contrasts a rescue attempt (clearly voluntary) to 
accompanying the expectant mother to delivery (gratuitous). 
Thus, in summary, the gratuitous bystander should be barred as a matter of law 
from recovery, while the involuntary or voluntary (in the sense of a volunteer/rescuer) 
"bystander" may proceed.69 
FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF TO MITIGATE HARM 
One of the cases cited as a landmark in the establishment of emotional harm as 
an independent tort is Bass v. Nooney Co., a 1983 case.1° The court decided for the first 
65 The very natural and foreseeable grief at the loss of a child, by itself, is not 
compensable. 
66 [d. at 578, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at Ill. It is surely less common for a 
direct victim of misinformation to intrude his presence than for a bystander, but where 
he does, he should not recover emotional harm damages. 
67 "Surely a layman who voluntarily observes a surgical operation must be prepared 
for the possibility of unpleasant or even harrowi'ng experiences. This is no less true 
of...childbirth. The ever-present possibility of emotional distress dissuades us from 
extending the Dillon rule into the operating amphitheater in these circumstances." [d. 
68 "By its nature the Dillon cause of action presupposes that the plaintiff was an 
involuntary witness to the accident." [d. 
69 The term "bystander" is hardly appropriate for one who is in fact a rescuer; of 
course, in that context, the bystander label means he has no immediate relationship to 
the defendant. 
70 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983). 
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time in Missouri that a cause of action may be stated in the absence of physical impact. 
Let us examine the fact pattern of this case to see what disposition could be made, once 
we accept that impact is not a precondition to recovery. It must be said in preface that 
the failure of plaintiff to mitigate harm is probably not the most important aspect of 
this case. However, it is a factor, and discussion of the other factors may well be a 
useful review. 
Mrs. Bass got stuck for 30 minutes in an elevator in the building where she was 
employed?' The defendant's negligence is shown via res ipsa loquitur.n The issues we 
address are susceptibility, plaintiff conduct and seriousness. 
Testimony was brought out that Mrs. Bass was under stress in her personal life, 
being in the midst of a divorce, and being responsible for three teenage children. That 
however is not the major point; the susceptibility is virtually self -proving. Here is a 
woman stuck in an elevator for thirty minutes who admits she did not fear physical 
injury by a fall of the elevator. She is merely stuck. Soon after she gets stuck, she 
summons help, and while she is not immediately freed, she is in communication with 
persons who call maintenance people. Would a normal person have been emotionally 
harmed after such a minor incident?73 Perhaps this is a jury question, but there is 
more. 
While the elevator did get stuck, the elevator did not malfunction in any other 
way. The alarm bell worked, as did the lights, and there was a "Door Open" button 
which plaintiff did not push. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, plaintiff was 
a ware of the function of this device?4 All plaintiff had to do was to push this button, 
and she would have been able to step out of the elevator easily, because it stopped only 
71 There is some uncertainty concerning the time Mrs. Bass actually was stuck in the 
elevator; the text of the opinion clearly counts the time as a half-hour. However, note 
2 of the opinion indicates that the plaintiff estimated she had entered the elevator at 
an earlier time than other reports, and she may have thought it was an hour. I have 
used the half-hour in my discussion. Id. at 766-7. 
n The acceptance of plaintiff's claim of res ipsa loquitur by the court is rather 
facile; their discussion rests on a determination that "the jury could reasonably find that 
either or both of the defendants were in control of the elevator, so as to make the 
application of res ipsa loquitur proper." (The defendants are the building owners and 
the Otis Elevator Company.) Id. at 768. 
This is a rather strained interpretation; a minority opinion in this case points out 
that "[i]n our complex modern society ever-increasing numbers of people are served 
daily by electrically energized devices and machines serving human needs ... devices that 
... are becoming ever more automated ... .inevitably breakdowns ... and failures of electrical 
and mechanical devices occur .... " Id. at 777. There is a difference between the opinions, 
and the latter is the better view, in my opinion. 
73 Note also that unlike many of the physical effects running through cases 
discussed herein, here there is no impact and it could be argued that the harm was 
temporary, if we correlate the extent of the harm to the extent of Mrs. Bass's 
involuntary confinement. This may be a way of saying that she is entitled to 30 
minutes worth of emotional harm. Such an equation would not be appropriate where 
the harm was a truly serious one, such as a bystander observing the death of a relative, 
but seems appropriate here. 
74 646 S.W.2d 765, 780 (Mo. banco 1983). 
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one foot above the nearest floor. Thus, the plaintiff did nothing to mitigate the 
distress; her inaction may be seen as a contributing factor. Plaintiff's argument was 
that her fright was such that it rendered her incapable of such action. This argument 
stretches foreseeability too far. One must foresee that the victim is not so terrified that 
she is capable of ringing the alarm, but she is so terrified that she cannot push the 
"Door Open" button. 
Several other facts are in the defendant's favor. Elevators are very dangerous; 
if a cable breaks, or someone falls down the shaft through an open door, death is likely. 
Among what might be classed as secondary dangers is the potential for injury in 
extricating passengers from a stuck elevator. This is secondary in that the magnitude 
of the bodily injury is very likely to be minor, compared to what would happen in a fall 
down the shaft. Because elevators are dangerous they have numerous safety features 
and undergo routine inspections by law. No doubt, elevators could be made even safer, 
but only at prohibitive inconvenience or cost. Would not have Mrs. Bass's injuries been 
prevented or ameliorated had the defendant provided an attendant operator or for that 
matter, a trained psychologist who would recognize and treat claustrophobia or 
acrophobia? The point is not to suggest these measures, but to emphasize that we must 
accept some risk. Because of the regulation of elevators by public authorities, there has 
probably been a weighing of what devices among the myriad possibilities should be 
installed. 
In this case, all of the safety features worked as planned, but Mrs. Bass did not 
use them all; it seems very unjust to penalize the defendant where he has expressly 
provided devices to mitigate potential harm, and the plaintiff does not use them. 
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THE CASE OF "INTENT": 
SHOULD THE ELEMENTS OF MURDER BE EXPANDED IN VIRGINIA? 
David L. Thomas 
INTRODUCTION 
The word "murderer" connotes in human beings an intensity of feeling that ranks 
near the top of the human emotional spectrum. Although the "murderer" is to be 
abhorred, his status is to be protected. That is, the term "murderer" embraces such 
magnitude of horror that the label must be saved only for those who truly deserve it. 
Therefore, the state legislature has established strict rules concerning the designation 
"first degree murderer." Among the rules is one that demands that the slayer possess not 
only the express "intent to kill," but also a "willful, premeditated, and deliberate" 
mindset. My inquiry here examines whether that rule of first degree murder in 
Virginia can be replaced with either an "intention to cause serious bodily injury" or a 
"reckless disregard for human life." 
DISCUSSION 
HISTORY 
As common law murder evolved, a debate raged, and remains, as to what 
constitutes first degree and second degree murder.' Each state has instituted its own 
, See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 86-96 (1969). 
Perkins discusses the origins of the degrees of murder, which were embodied in a 
1794 Pennsylvania statute that came to be known as the "Pennsylvania Pattern." Today 
this doctrine is no longer embodied in an existing authoritative statute but survives in 
modern case law in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868). 
ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER--Does It Exist? 
Generally when one speaks of attempted murder, the list of essential elements 
includes only those used in first degree murder offenses. Additionally, it is essential 
that in order to have a valid attempt charge that the crime was not accomplished. Thus 
it would seem that a charge of attempted second degree murder would be rendered an 
impossibility. (The malice in second degree murder is generally imputed from the 
unlawful killing.) However, this assumption may be too hasty. 
The presumption may be that all unlawful killings are second degree murder, but 
the Commonwealth still has the burden of proving malice if the defendant shifts the 
burden back to the Commonwealth. Thus, in second degree murder cases the 
prosecution must either elevate the killing to first degree murder through a showing of 
willful intent to kill or it must battle the defendant's contention that there was no 
malice to constitute second degree murder by showing that the defendant's actions were 
either with reckless indifference to the value of human life, Commonwealth v. Malone, 
354 Pa. 180,47 A.2d 445 (1956), or that the defendant intended serious bodily injury 
which was "life threatening." Cruce v. State, 87 Fla. 406, 100 So. 264 (1924). Thus 
malice, it would seem, can be proven in second degree murder cases, even without a 
death. Therefore, the elements of attempted second degree murder would be: 
I. Either an intent by the defendant to cause serious bodily harm that is life-
threatening or a reckless indifference to human life demonstrated by the 
defendant's actions. (No "intent to kill" element is necessary in second degree 
murder cases in Virginia.) 
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views concerning the requirements for each degree of murder.2 For example, in most 
states a presumption of second degree murder arises from the death of an individual 
when caused by a criminal agent.3 The unlawful act causing the death imputes the 
necessary malice.4 However, this view of murder is not accepted by all states.5 Another 
difference is in the "intent" requirement. Most states require an "intention to kill" only 
for first degree murder;6 however, a minority of states require a specific "intent to kill" 
for second degree murder as well? 
Not surprisingly, conflicts exist over the restrictiveness of the first degree 
murder statutes. Many jurists believe that the "intent to kill" and the "premeditated and 
deliberate killing" requirements are too narrow. These jurists are of the opinion that 
the intent or malice requirement of first degree murder can be fulfilled by an intention 
2. Actions that would set into motion the process of events leading up to the 
fulfillment of the crime. 
3. No one need be injured by the attempt. (There is no corpus delicti element.) 
Because malice can be fulfilled for second degree murder without a killing, the door is 
left open for a valid charge and conviction of attempted second degree murder. 
However, the difficulty in using this theory lies in the use of recklessness; for by 
definition recklessness lacks the specific intent which is required by all crimes of 
attempt. That leaves attempted second degree murder limited to only those defendants 
exercising an "intent to cause serious injury". 
It should be noted that the theory of attempted second degree murder has never been 
used in the state of Virginia. 
An Example of Attempted Second Degree Murder: 
A man is walking down the street. He carries a gun on his person for protection. 
Another man coming from the opposite direction bumps into the armed man and calls 
him a name. The armed man, who is provoked, but not to a level justifying voluntary 
manslaughter, draws his weapon and fires at the other man. The intent of the armed 
man is to seriously injure the other by shooting him in the chest. There is no specific 
intent to kill. However, the recklessness of the act itself raises a presumption of second 
degree murder malice. The shot fired at the passerby misses him and lodges in a tree. 
Because there is both malice and a specific intent to injure, the charge of attempted 
second degree murder is warranted. 
2 R. PERKINS, supra note I, at 88-9. 
3 Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 292 S.E.2d 339 (1982). 
4 Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244,38 S.E.2d 457 (1946). 
5 State v. Rowley, 216 Iowa 140,248 N.W. 340 (1933). The court held that the State 
need prove more than a death by an unlawful act to raise a presumption of murder. 
6 New York does not even require an "intent to kill" as an essential element of 
murder. See People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924). 
7 See, e.g., State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987); People v. Koerber, 244 
N.Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926). 
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on the part of the accused to do "great bodily harm" to the victim8 or by a "reckless 
disregard for human life" demonstrated by the accused.9 The influence these jurists 
have on courts' interpretations of the differing state murder statutes is great. Today 
the New York and federal courts, two of the largest systems in the country, lead the 
way in expanding the intent requirement of first degree murder to include "reckless 
disregard for human life:'O while Louisiana and Indiana have led the charge toward 
the inclusion of the intent to do "serious bodily injury."" 
8 An example of this judicial thought may be found in People v. Murphy, 1 Cal.2d 
37, 32 P.2d 635 (1934), where the court extended the torture element of first degree 
murder to wife beating. 
9 Jernalowski, 238 N.Y. at 188, 144 N.E. at 497. 
'0 United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (1983). 
The court in Shaw held that "the malice required for conviction of first degree or 
second degree murder does not require [a] subjective intent to kill, but may be 
established by evidence of conduct which is reckless and wanton and gross deviation 
from [a] reasonable standard of care, of such nature that [the] jury is warranted in 
inferring that [the] defendant was aware of [the] serious risk of death or serious bodily 
harm." Shaw, 701 F.2d at 392 (quoting United States v. Black Elk, 597 F.2d 49, 51 (8th 
Cir. 1978». 
Although the federal courts have stated that there still must be premeditation, that 
requirement is presumed fulfilled from successfully showing that the defendant's act 
constituted gross recklessness. In Shaw, the defendant negligently shot at a car while 
hunting deer at night (spotlighting). Although there was no specific intent to kill or 
even premeditation proven, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder on the 
grounds that his act was grossly reckless. Shaw, 701 F.2d at 367. 
See also Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 596 (Del. 1985), where the court held in regard 
to felony-murder that "a person possessing a reckless state of mind can only be 
convicted of first degree murder if he recklessly kills while committing a felony." 
Although this limits the reckless intent doctrine to certain instances of murder, it does 
show a trend away from the stricter rule of "willful, premeditated, and deliberate." For 
one of the most famous cases on this subject, see People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 
144 N.E. 497 (1924). 
" State v. Brooks, 499 So.2d 741 (La. App. 1986). 
In Brooks the defendant contended that a specific intent to do serious bodily injury 
could not replace the intent to kill element of first degree murder. The court disagreed 
holding that "in proving first or second degree murder, either the specific intent to kill 
or the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm can be proven". Brooks, 499 So.2d at 
744. However, the court did sustain the defendant's argument on the grounds that 
attempted first degree murder, of which the defendant was charged, required an intent 
to kill, not an intent to do harm. 
See also State v. Martin, 213 N.J.Super. 414, 517 A.2d 513 (1986). In Marlin, where 
the defendant killed a woman by knowingly setting a building on fire when he knew 
people were inside of it, the court held that "a murder conviction based on "purposeful" 
or "knowing" conduct can result from conduct which is practically certain to cause 
serious bodily injury when death is a result of the injury caused". [d. at 418, 517 A.2d 
at 517. 
See also Robinson v. State, 453 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 1983). In Robinson, the defendant 
kicked his child to death for bed wetting. The court in upholding the first degree 
murder conviction held that "there must be evidence that the defendant had a conscious 
objective to kill the victim or was aware that his conduct would result in [the] death of 
[the] victim". [d. at 280 (quoting Burkhalter v. State, 397 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. 1979». An 
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VIRGINIA 
Although Michie's Jurisprudence attempts to read the intent to do "serious bodily 
injury" into Va. Code Ann. 18.2_32,12 it does so in an unacceptable manner. Michie's 
contention is that the statute is satisfied because an intent to do "serious bodily injury" 
is equivalent to "lying in wait" for the victim, thus implying the intent-to-kill element.13 
To support its deviation from the wording of the statute, Michie erroneously cites 
Commonwealth v. Jones,14 which does not even address the issue of "serious bodily 
injury." In fact, Jones is a landmark "lying in wait" case, and in it, the court states 
explicitly that an "intent-to-kill" element is still necessary in order to prove first degree 
murder and cannot be overlooked simply by proving that the accused was "lying in 
wait." The party must necessarily be "lying in wait" to kill. 15 Therefore, the popular 
intent to kill is not necessary. only a presumed awareness by the reasonable man 
standard that the intent to harm would in fact occasion death. See Honesty v. 
Commonwealth. 81 Va. 283 (1886) for similar language. . 
For a listing of other cases affirming the trend toward inclusion of the "intent 
to do serious bodily injury" as a replacement for the "intent to kill" elements of first 
degree murder, see also State v. Gerrel, 499 So.2d 381 (La. App. 1986); State v. Flowers. 
509 So.2d 588 (La. App. 1987); Burse v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. 1987); Ortiz v. State, 
651 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Cr. App. 1983); and Smith v. State, 486 N.E.2d 465 (Ind. 1985). 
12 VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 18.2-32 (1988). 
The full text of the statute reads: 
First and second degree murder defined; punishment.--
Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait. imprisonment. starving, 
or by ap.y willful, deliberate. and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or 
attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate object sexual penetration, 
robbery, burglary or abduction, except as provided in Section 18.2-31, is murder of the 
first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony. 
All murder other than capital murder and murder in the first degree is murder of 
the second degree and is punishable as a Class 3 felony. 
13 9B MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA, 
HOMICIDE Sec. 19 (1952 & Supp. 1984). 
14 Commonwealth v. Jones, 28 Va. 598 (1829). 
In Jones, the defendant and the deceased were socializing at a grocery in Lynchburg, 
Virginia in the spring of 1829. A prostitute, whom each man had known. entered the 
establishment and began insulting the deceased. The deceased there upon struck the 
prostitute and she appealed to the sympathies of the defendant to protect her. This 
incident incited a two-day war of words and deeds between the two men which 
culminated in the defendant's purchasing a gun and shooting the deceased. The rule of 
law that this case demonstrates is "intent". The court, in upholding the defendant's 
conviction of first degree murder, continually showed how the defendant had planned 
and deliberated over the killing. [d. at 598. 
15 [d. 
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argument imputing intent to do "serious bodily injury" to those "lying in wait" is very 
weak. 
However, Michie's conclusion is invalid only in its analysis. The conclusion is 
correct! The intent to do "serious bodily injury" does replace the "intent to kill" and 
"premeditated and deliberate killing" requirements in first degree murder in Virginia. 
The reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court is not that it is incorporated into the 
"lying in wait" element, but that it raises a presumption of deliberation. The court 
limits the application of the intent to do "serious bodily injury" to circumstances where 
a reasonable man would have known that the harm intended would "probably occasion 
the victim's death."16 This expansion of first degree murder was first instituted in 
Honesty v. Commonwealth 17 and was reaffirmed in Hall v. Commonwealth. 18 The full rule 
of law reads: "[a]nd if there be a reasonable doubt whether he had willed, deliberated, 
and premeditated to kill the deceased, or to do him some serious bodily injury. which 
would probably occasion his death. the jury ought not to find him guilty of murder in the 
first degree."19 
16 Honesty v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 283 (1886). 
17 [d. at 283. 
A complete narrative of Honesty follows: 
On November 14, 1884 there was a celebration in an unspecified Virginia city. The 
defendant was out in the street with an associate "hallooing and dancing". Honesty, 81 
Va. at 302. The defendant had in his possession a large stick and threatened aloud that 
" if any son of a bitch of a democrat as much as rubs against me, I will give him hell." 
[d. at 302. Later that same evening the deceased and a friend proceeded toward the 
friend's home. They stopped along the way in order to enter an alley to "answer a call 
of nature". [d. at 303. There, they heard the defendant and his compatriot arguing. 
When the deceased requested the defendant to end the heated argument, the defendant 
began harassing, cursing, and pushing the deceased. When the deceased attempted to 
leave the alleyway, the defendant struck him in the head with a brick, thereby causing 
his immediate death. 
The court held that the defendant's conviction of first degree murder should be 
sustained on the grounds that the use of the brick as a deadly weapon raised the 
presumption that the defendant deliberately caused the deceased's death. This the court 
reasoned was because a reasonable man would know that a blow, such as the one the 
defendant gave the deceased, would "probably occasion death". [d. at 294. 
18 Hall v. Common wealth, 89 Va. 171, 15 S.E. 517 (1892). 
In following Honesty, the court in Hall stated that a serious wound caused by a 
deadly weapon raised a prima facie presumption of an intent to do "serious bodily 
injury" and would substitute for the "willful, premeditated, and deliberate" element of 
first degree murder. Hall, 89 Va. at 178, 15 S.E. at This finding was affirmed by 
the court in Mealy v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 585, 115 S.E. 563 (1923). See also Wade 
v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 177, 116 S.E.2d 99 (1960), where the court refers to proof of 
intent to do "serious bodily injury" as an alternative to the "willful, premeditated, and 
deliberate" element of first degree murder. 
19 Honesty, 81 Va. at 294 (emphasis added). 
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The case law in Virginia is not as clear when the charge is first degree murder 
as the result of "reckless behavior.,,20 No major cases in Virginia address reckless 
A Logical Expansion of the Law? 
The logic behind the expansion of the first degree murder elements to include the 
intent to do "serious bodily injury" is based in part upon the court's view of 
premeditation as seen in Honesty. The array of cases that cite Honesty as controlling 
refer to the case's alternative interpretation of premeditated and deliberate murder. See 
Hall v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 171, 15 S.E. 517 (1892), Mealy v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 
585,115 S.E. 563 (1923), and Carson v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 398, 49 S.E.2d 704 (1948). 
In Hall, the use of a firearm in and of itself was sufficient to justify Honesty's 
alternative murder element. Hall, 89 Va. at 178, 15 S.E. at 519. The logic behind the 
expansion is embodied in the latter part of Honesty's definition of the crime of first 
degree murder. which may be summarized as: "If a reasonable man knows his actions 
could result in death, than he should be held responsible for the natural consequences 
of those acts." 
The argument for the expansion of first degree murder is in fact the same 
argument used by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 
N.W.2d 304 (1980), where the court struck down the felony-murder doctrine. The 
argument is that the law must punish not in accordance with mere presence, but with 
culpability. One must be made responsible for culpable intent and the actions that 
follow from that intent. Although a defendant can always attempt to reduce first 
degree murder to second degree murder by stating that he "didn't mean to kill," the state 
must logically be entitled to a presumption of intent if a reasonable man would know 
that his actions would probably occasion the death of the other party. One may nat be 
allowed to ignore the consequences of ones act by mere denial after the fact. Intent is 
to be proven by the totality of the circumstances, Beck v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 
170, 342 S.E.2d 642 (1986), not by the per se testimony of the accused. To allow such an 
erroneous standard would make criminal intent obsolete. . 
20 How Negligence Fits into the Spectrum of Legal Liability 
If the proposition that gross recklessness can give rise to first degree murder is true, 
than it is also a truism that negligence (the failure to exercise due care) is a wrong 
whose spectrum extends from the civil court proceeding to the highest realms of the 
criminal court system. A diagramming of that negligence spectrum follows: 
Civil Court Proceeding 
No 
Negligence 
Negligence 
Absence of Malice 
/ Criminal Court Proceeding 
Involuntary 
Mansla ugh ter 
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behavior as a replacement for the "intent to kill" element of first degree murder.21 Even 
Michie's is silent on the subject. Instead, persuasive law such as the landmark New 
York case People v. Jernatowski, which states that acts that show "reckless disregard for 
human life" can fulfill the requirement of intent for first degree murder,22 must be 
cited as authority in order to make a case for this doctrine in the Virginia courts. 
21 The Logic Behind Recklessness 
(In its context as a substitute for first degree intent) 
The viability of using reckless conduct as a substitute for the "intent to kill" and the 
modus operandi (premeditation) in a first degree murder case is not as unusual as it 
would first appear. The reasoning of a court effectuating the substitution may be 
grounded in common sense. If the actions of the defendant are truly outrageous enough 
to elevate the crime to first degree murder, than perhaps the "intent" and motive do, in 
fact, exist and, hence, may be implied for purposes of proving murder. 
It would seem logical that at some point on the negligence-recklessness spectrum, a 
reasonable man knows he is committing a dangerous act and understands its foreseeable 
consequences. At such a level the defendant, whether he had actually contemplated his 
intention, would be implicitly intending the outcome of his actions. 
The only true defense a defendant could raise, after the Commonwealth had 
elevated the recklessness to the first degree level and, thereby satisfied its burden of 
proof, would be the irresistible impulse insanity defense. (That is the affirmative 
defense where although the defendant knows of the consequences of his actions, he is 
nevertheless unable to stop his behavior. An impulse compels him to act against his 
will.) 
Allowing an individual's outrageous acts either to slide by the judicial scales of 
criminal prosecution or to a void higher levels of criminal punishment by pleading a 
lack of "intent," in all likelihood gives rise to intelligent killers with outrageous and 
uniquely planned premeditated murders. 
However, the scenario just contemplated can be avoided if the Commonwealth is 
allowed to raise a presumption of "intent" by proving a stipulated level of 
outrageousness. The burden is then shifted onto each defendant to prove a lack of 
"criminal intent." This presumption, according to some jurists, would lead to a fairer 
system of adjudicating crimes involving death. 
On the other hand, the difficulty with this type of system lies in the fact that it 
raises first degree murder to a strict liability or quasi-res ipsa loquitur standard. Those 
types of classes of proof in a civil system may be acceptable, but under the guise of 
criminal justice they are unconstitutional in their disregard for due process. 
Therefore, the premise onto which extreme gross recklessness as a substitute for first 
degree murder may be based is fatally flawed. Unless due process can be satisfied, 
reckless conduct in and of itself can never raise a presumption of first degree murder 
no matter what level of recklessness is proved by the Commonwealth. In the opinion 
of this author, the New York Murder Statutes as they are presently interpreted by New 
York Courts through decisions like lernatowski are constitutionally unsound. 
22 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924). In lernatowski, a railroad strike occurred in 
Buffalo, New York. The deceased's husband was a foreman with the railroad. He did 
not participate in the strike and elected to cross the picket line. Late one evening one 
of the strikers fired two gunshots into the foreman's house in an attempt to scare the 
foreman. The defendant at the time of the shooting knew that the house was occupied 
and had even been told moments before the incident by the deceased to "get away from 
there." The result of the defendant's act was the death of the foreman's wife, as one of 
the gun shots hit and killed her instantly. 
The court held that the defendant's act justified a conviction for first degree 
murder because the defendant did "an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing 
a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a premeditated design to 
effect the death of any individual." [d. at 190, 144 N.E. at 497. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thus "if A finds B asleep on straw, and lights the straw, meaning to do B serious 
bodily injury, but not to kill him, and B is burned to death, it is murder" (in the context 
of first degree murder).'!3 The intent to do "serious bodily injury" replaces the "intent 
to kill" element under Virginia's first degree murder statute. However, the argument 
over "reckless disregard for human life" is stiIl an open Question in Virginia. 
23 Honesty, 81 Va. at 295. 
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APPENDIX: 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER 
IN VIRGINIA 
It is my contention that the Virginia Model Jury Instructions should be amended 
to reflect an intent to do "serious bodily injury" as a viable substitute element for the 
crime of first degree murder. The corrected version should read: 
The defendant is charged with the crime of first degree murder. The 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following 
elements of the crime: 
(I) That the defendant killed (Name of Person); and 
(2) That the killing was malicious; and 
(3) That the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated or that the 
intention of the defendant was to cause (Name of Person) serious bodily 
injury, which would probably occasion his death.24 
24 See generally 1 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, VIRGINIA MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 485 (1985 & Supp. 1987). 
The unedited current version of the Virginia Model Jury Instructions includes all 
of the proposed new instructions minus the wording "or that the intention of the 
defendant was to cause (Name of Person) serious bodily injury, which would probably 
occasion his death." The new wording comes from the jury instructions given by the 
court in Honesty, 81 Va. at 294. 
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